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Foreword
This volume is one in a series commissioned by the American Enterprise
Institute to contribute to the debates over global environmental policy
issues. Until very recently, American environmental policy was directed
toward problems that were seen to be of a purely, or at least largely,
domestic nature. Decisions concerning emissions standards for automo-
biles and power plants, for example, were set with reference to their effect
on the quality of air Americans breathe.
That is no longer the case. Policymakers increasingly find that debates
over environmental standards have become globalized, to borrow a word
that has come into fashion in several contexts. Global warming is the most
prominent of those issues: Americans now confront claims that the types
of cars they choose to drive, the amount and mix of energy they consume
in their homes and factories, and the organization of their basic industries
all have a direct effect on the lives of citizens of other countries—and, in
some formulations, may affect the future of the planet itself.
Other issues range from the management of forests, fisheries, and water
resources to the preservation of species and the search for new energy
sources. Not far in the background of all those new debates, however, are
the oldest subjects of international politics—competition for resources
and competing interests and ideas concerning economic growth, the
distribution of wealth, and the terms of trade.
An important consequence of those developments is that the arenas in
which environmental policy is determined are increasingly international—
not just debates in the U.S. Congress, rulemaking proceedings at the
Environmental Protection Agency, and implementation decisions by 
the states and municipalities, but opaque diplomatic “frameworks” and
“protocols” hammered out in remote locales. To some, that constitutes a
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dangerous surrender of national sovereignty; to others, it heralds a new
era of American cooperation with other nations that is propelled by the
realities of an interdependent world. To policymakers themselves, it
means that familiar questions of the benefits and costs of environmental
rules are now enmeshed with questions of sovereignty and political
legitimacy, of the possibility of large international income transfers, and of
the relations of developed to developing countries.
In short, environmental issues are becoming as much a question of
foreign policy as of domestic policy; indeed, the Clinton administration
made what it called “environmental diplomacy” a centerpiece of this
country’s foreign policy.
AEI’s project on global environmental policy includes contributions
from scholars in many academic disciplines and features frequent lectures
and seminars at the Institute’s headquarters as well as this series of studies.
We hope that the project will illuminate the many complex issues con-
fronting those attempting to strike a balance between environmental
quality and the other goals of industrialized and emerging economies.
CHRISTOPHER C. DEMUTH
ROBERT W. HAHN
American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research
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Introduction and Summary
As of early 2003, global climate policy appears to be in an awkward 
spot. The Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by the European Union and its
member states and by Japan, and ratification seems likely (though not
guaranteed) by the Russian Federation, Poland, and other industrialized
countries with economies in transition.1 If those countries ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, it will enter into force, probably in early 2003.2 Even if the
Kyoto Protocol enters into force, however, it would cover less than 
half of global greenhouse gas emissions. The United States, responsible 
for about a quarter of all greenhouse gas emissions,3 remains on the side-
lines, with no current intention of ratifying the protocol and few signs of
engaging in global climate policy efforts. Although President George W.
Bush has proposed a set of tax credits and voluntary measures intended 
to reduce future emissions intensity (emissions per dollar of gross domes-
tic product), few concrete steps have been taken to implement those
proposals, and he has repudiated regulatory limitations on emissions.4
Further, the Kyoto Protocol includes no emissions limitations on develop-
ing countries, whose greenhouse gas emissions are increasing rapidly and
will surpass those of the industrialized countries by 2020 or so; China’s
emissions alone already account for over 13 percent of the world total car-
bon dioxide emissions.5 Developing countries have staunchly opposed any
limitations obligations; they have asserted (with considerable justification)
that the current buildup of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere is
largely the responsibility of the wealthy countries, which have emitted
much greater amounts of greenhouse gases in the course of industrialization
and which currently maintain far more greenhouse gas–intensive lifestyles.
But without the participation of the United States and major emitting
developing countries, which together account for over half of global
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greenhouse gas emissions, the Kyoto Protocol (or any other international
effort to address the risks of climate change by curbing greenhouse gas
emissions) is doomed to fail.6 Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol will be a
largely symbolic victory unless all major greenhouse gas–emitting coun-
tries join in some form of effective international regulatory regime in the
relatively near future. And in addition to the Kyoto Protocol’s limited
coverage, its design, while embodying several salutary elements, has sig-
nificant flaws—most notably the failure to set regulatory targets in accor-
dance with emissions pathways that appropriately balance relevant costs
and benefits. Yet adverse effects from climate change are a serious enough
prospect to warrant some well-designed, cost-effective regulatory meas-
ures. Accordingly, ways must be found to build a new and more inclusive
architecture for global climate policy, through fundamental modification
of the current Kyoto Protocol structure, by developing alternatives outside
the Kyoto Protocol structure, or both.
We examine how the present situation in climate policy arose and the
potential steps forward from the current impasse. We summarize the cur-
rent state of information regarding the extent of warming that would be
caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions, the impacts
of warming, and the costs of emissions limitations. We explain why partic-
ipation by all major greenhouse gas–emitting countries is essential to curb
future emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such
participation. We argue that it is in the national interest of the United States
to participate in such a regime, provided that it is well designed. We then
discuss the elements of sound climate regulatory design, including maxi-
mum use of economic incentives, the comprehensive approach, and other
flexibility mechanisms; participation by all major emitting countries
including developing countries; regulatory targets based on longer-term
emissions pathways that aim to maximize net social benefits; and effective
arrangements to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations by nations
and sources. We evaluate the successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol
in light of those elements. Finally, we propose a series of U.S. initiatives at
both the international and domestic levels, with the aim of engaging the
United States and major developing country emitters such as China in the
global greenhouse gas regulatory effort and correcting the remaining
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defects in the Kyoto Protocol design. Although several alternatives to the
current Kyoto Protocol regime have been proposed,7 we argue that the best
approach for surmounting the current global climate policy impasse is a
new strategy that would lead, sooner or later, to simultaneous accession by
the United States and China (and other major developing country emitters)
to a modified and improved version of the Kyoto Protocol agreement.
Greenhouse gases are generated globally by many different human
activities in many different sectors through the use of more or less deeply
embedded technologies and practices. Although some substantial limita-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions may be achieved in the near term at low
(or perhaps even negative) cost, significant limitations will require major
changes in production and consumption technologies, investments, and
practices; those structural changes can only be accomplished over a longer
time scale. The transition from a high– to a low–greenhouse gas economy
will not be a free lunch. But if the transition is managed wisely by enlist-
ing all major emitting countries and using the most cost-effective and
efficient means (including comprehensive coverage, sinks, and global
emissions trading) to achieve soundly designed targets over appropriate
time scales, there should be no major adverse effect on economic growth.
Successful technological innovations and institutional reconstruction will
allow high standards of lifestyles to be maintained. Over the longer term,
prosperity does not require ever expanding use of fossil fuels and ever
rising greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, if the adverse effects of climate
change are or may be large, then intelligent climate policy along the lines
we advocate will enhance total well-being by reducing the risk of signifi-
cant climate damages at moderate cost.
Climate Policy Today
Following the entry into force of the 1992 Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol to the convention was concluded in
December 1997. Responding to a 95 to 0 vote in the U.S. Senate against
ratifying any climate treaty lacking meaningful participation by developing
countries,8 the Clinton administration, which had signed the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, never submitted it to the Senate.9 Further multilateral negotiations 
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on implementing the Kyoto Protocol hit a stalemate at The Hague in late
2000. In March 2001 President Bush announced that the United States
would no longer pursue the Kyoto Protocol; so far, he has not proposed
an alternative. By June 2001, many informed observers expected the
Kyoto Protocol process to fall apart.10 Yet it did not. At the 2001 negoti-
ating sessions in Bonn and Marrakech, the other countries of the world
reached a compromise to enable implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
regime, without U.S. participation and without emissions limitations on
developing countries.11 In February 2002 President Bush reiterated his
decision to stay out of the Kyoto Protocol and not to seek any domestic
regulatory limitations on U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.12 Nonetheless, a
substantial number of countries and the European Union have ratified the
Kyoto Protocol, and it appears likely that there will be sufficient additional
ratifications for the protocol to enter into force in early 2003. What should
the United States—and the world—do now?
Ironically, the agreements reached at Bonn and Marrakech in 2001 to
implement the 1997 Kyoto Protocol were in important respects a success
for U.S. climate policy; the U.S. delegation was a wallflower at its own vic-
tory party. For both environmental and economic reasons, the United
States has long advocated two key elements: a comprehensive approach to
limiting net greenhouse gas emissions (including methane and all other
major greenhouse gases, not just carbon dioxide, and also sinks such as
forests); and international greenhouse gas emissions trading.13 Those two
ideas were formulated and proposed in the first Bush administration and
championed in the Clinton administration,14 often against opposition
from Europe. At U.S. insistence, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol adopted both those ideas, and in Bonn
and Marrakech the participating countries agreed on rules to implement
them (subject to certain restrictions) despite U.S. rejection of the protocol
as a whole. So why would the United States not sign on? Although further
liberalization of emissions trading and wider authorization for sink credits
are important, the major stumbling blocks to U.S. participation have been
the absence of any emissions limitations obligations for major developing
countries and the arbitrary character of the Kyoto Protocol emissions
limitation targets. We propose steps to solve those defects and thereby to
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promote accession by the United States and major developing countries to
an efficient cap-and-trade regime.
Since the Bush administration abandoned the Kyoto Protocol process
in early 2001, a number of U.S. domestic developments have suggested
possible future movement on climate policy. In 2001 a National Academy
of Sciences panel convened at the request of President Bush issued a
report confirming that projected increases in unregulated greenhouse gas
emissions would likely cause significant warming. In February 2002
President Bush proposed a package of climate measures that announced a
voluntary program for limiting greenhouse gas emissions with a goal of
reducing U.S. greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent by 2012 (versus a
projected 14 percent reduction by that year on the basis of current
trends). He proposed to strengthen current arrangements for voluntary
registration of greenhouse gas reductions with the possibility of earning
tradable credits against future regulatory requirements for businesses that
achieve demonstrated real reductions. Bush also proposed tax and other
nonregulatory incentives and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. He argued that setting targets based on greenhouse gas intensity
rather than on aggregate emissions was a better way of balancing envi-
ronmental and economic goals and suggested that such an approach
might be of interest to developing countries. At the same time he pro-
posed new legislation using a three pollutant strategy to reduce, over a
fifteen-year period, power plant emissions of nitrogen oxide, sulfur
dioxide, and mercury, but not carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases, through a cap-and-trade system. Other domestic political actors,
however, have recently shown greater willingness to initiate limitations 
on greenhouse gas emissions. The Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee has (narrowly) reported out a bill using a four pollutant strat-
egy that would include regulatory limitations on carbon dioxide from
power plants, Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman have prepared
a bill to cap and trade U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, and a number of influ-
ential senators have called on the administration to reengage in international
climate negotiations.15 In June 2002 the Environmental Protection Agency
submitted a U.S. climate report to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change secretariat that stated that warming due to projected emissions
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would cause significant adverse effects. Notwithstanding those develop-
ments and vocal criticism from Europe and elsewhere of the U.S. position,
the administration has declined even to discuss either a domestic U.S. 
or international greenhouse gas regulatory regime. Meanwhile, several 
states, including California, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey, are adopting their own emissions control requirements.16
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, seem likely to have conflict-
ing influences on the climate policy process. On one hand, they are
reminders of the interconnectedness of U.S. and international affairs and
have spurred new enthusiasm for multilateral strategies to address common
global ills. They may also encourage moves to reduce U.S. dependence on
foreign oil, which might or might not mean reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions.17 On the other hand, the terrorist attacks have raised a new
threat that is more immediate than climate change and that may under-
standably divert the attention of governments (especially the U.S. govern-
ment) and the public from climate protection, at least for a while.
It thus remains unclear where the United States will go in the climate
policy arena in the years ahead. We suggest that the two most frequently
heard options—join the Kyoto Protocol in essentially its current form now
or stay out of any international agreement for the indefinite future—are
both unsatisfying. Instead, we suggest a proactive but alternative approach:
the United States should engage China (and other major developing coun-
tries) in a parallel regime and then jointly seek to enter a suitably modified
version of the Kyoto Protocol. The modifications to the Kyoto Protocol
should include the participation of developing countries on appropriate
terms, the removal of unjustified restrictions on the comprehensive
approach and international emissions trading, and the adoption of emis-
sions limitation pathways based on maximizing net social benefits. Such
measures would be good for the United States and for the world.
The Kyoto Protocol’s Persisting Flaws
As originally negotiated in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol treaty contained sev-
eral salutary features, including emissions trading and a comprehensive
approach. But it also had three basic flaws: it set emissions limitations for
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the industrialized countries without clarifying the means for achieving
them; it failed to provide any emissions limitation obligations for devel-
oping countries, even in principle, now or later; and the limitations that
it established for the industrialized countries were short-term and arbi-
trary. The negotiations at Bonn and Marrakech have partially remedied 
the first flaw, but the second two flaws remain and must be addressed to
build a sound global climate regime.
First, the Kyoto Protocol established emissions limits without clarifying
the means—and hence the costs—of compliance, including the role of
sinks and the scope of emissions trading. For example, Kyoto Protocol
Article 17 authorized emissions trading in two short sentences that left
many open questions. In the post–Kyoto Protocol negotiations, countries
and interest groups that opposed those flexibility mechanisms sought to
block their elaboration and derided every attempt to implement flexibil-
ity as a “loophole” or a “weakening” of the treaty. If the flexibility mecha-
nisms had been well defined at the outset, such obstructionism would
have been deflected, and countries would have been better able to fore-
cast the actual costs of agreeing to targets. Explicitly authorizing wide use
of the flexibility mechanisms would have ensured significant reductions in
the costs of compliance and thereby would have attracted participation.
European opposition to U.S. advocacy of sinks and emissions trading was
the main reason for the deadlock in the talks at The Hague, after which
the United States was understandably dubious about joining the Kyoto
Protocol.
Surprisingly, however, at Bonn in July 2001 (with the United States on
the sidelines), the European Union and developing countries gave Japan
and Canada much of what they had refused to give the United States at
The Hague: broader use of sinks (although subject to quantitative restric-
tions) and of emissions trading (with no quantitative restriction on the use
of trading based on “supplementarity,” but with a new “reserve require-
ment” on sellers). In October 2001 the European Union proposed to
create its own internal greenhouse gas emissions trading system. And at
Marrakech in November 2001, the European Union agreed to give Russia
almost twice as large a quantity limit on credit for sinks as Russia had
requested in Bonn. What explains the European Union’s shift toward
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accepting sinks and trading? Does it reflect a newfound appreciation for
flexibility, or does it reveal a consistent symbolic politics of using the
climate issue to shame the United States—first criticizing U.S. advocacy of
flexibility as a loophole and then quietly embracing cost-saving flexibility
once the United States could be denounced for staying out of the treaty
altogether? Whatever the explanation for belated European openness to
flexibility, it bears reminding that the Bonn and Marrakech accords still
retain some restrictions on both sinks and trading. Those restrictions
should be significantly eased or eliminated. Further, work should begin
now on actually implementing emissions trading on the international level
through a comprehensive approach.
The Bonn and Marrakech accords failed to address the second basic
flaw in the Kyoto Protocol: the omission of developing country participa-
tion in emissions limits and trading. The United States has long sought to
include major developing countries in the global emissions limitations
regime. All major emitting countries must participate for the treaty to
address climate change effectively and avoid shifting emissions from
participants to nonparticipants. The full cost savings to be gained from
international emissions trading also depend on the inclusion of major
developing countries such as China. Further, competitiveness concerns in
U.S. politics—the fear that U.S. firms subject to emissions limitations will
be undercut by developing country firms not subject to any controls—
make meaningful participation by China and other major developing
countries a prerequisite to U.S. treaty ratification. Yet in an abrupt depar-
ture from prior global environmental agreements, the Kyoto Protocol
provides no regulatory obligations for developing countries, now or in the
future. The Marrakech accord agreed only to consider in a year’s time how
to frame the issue for discussion a year after that. Worse, the United States
is now out as well. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol now omits the United States
and China—the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters—as well as
other major developing countries. As a result, the Kyoto Protocol now
omits more than half of global greenhouse gas emissions, and that omis-
sion will worsen over time because it excludes the countries whose emis-
sions are growing fastest. If those omissions are not repaired, the Kyoto
Protocol will prove a costly environmental failure. Accordingly, it is
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imperative to create incentives to engage participation by major develop-
ing countries and, correlatively, to engage the United States.
Third, the Kyoto Protocol adopted, and the Bonn and Marrakech
accords accepted, a single, short-term set of emissions limitation targets
established in an essentially arbitrary way. The treaty calls for industrial-
ized countries to reduce their aggregate emissions by the first commitment
period (2008–2012) to an average of 5.2 percent below their levels in
1990, the base year selected in the 1992 Framework Convention on
Climate Change. Those Kyoto Protocol arrangements do not represent
sound target setting or equitable burden sharing. As a result of economic
growth, emissions in many industrialized countries, especially the United
States, have grown rapidly since 1990, even though greenhouse gas inten-
sity (greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP) has generally declined.
“Business-as-usual” emissions (emissions in the absence of regulatory
controls) are projected to continue to grow substantially between now and
2010 (and much more for some countries than for others). As a result,
various studies estimate that the Kyoto Protocol targets would require
industrialized countries, as a group, to cut their aggregate emissions by
between 16 and 24 percent below the business-as-usual level in 2010.18
Some individual countries, including in particular the United States,
would be required to make even greater reductions. Those very sharp
reductions were not based on and cannot be justified by an analysis of the
socially desirable pathway of emissions controls. As discussed below, they
are significantly more stringent than either the restrictions implied by the
least-cost path to stabilize global greenhouse gas concentrations at various
plausible levels or the restrictions implied by an emissions limitations
pathway that balances regulatory costs and benefits and seeks to maximize
net benefits to society.
The European Union has nonetheless accepted the Kyoto Protocol tar-
gets, in part because of the availability of unrestricted internal EU emis-
sions trading and the fact that the United Kingdom and Germany have
experienced dramatic reductions in carbon dioxide emissions since 1990
for nonenvironmental reasons: changes in UK energy policies and the
economic rationalization of the Eastern sector of Germany following
reunification. Thus, the European Union faces much lower emission
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reduction burdens than those imposed on the United States and a num-
ber of other industrialized countries under the Kyoto Protocol targets. For
example, the United States, whose Kyoto Protocol target is 7 percent
below its 1990 level by 2008–2012 (seemingly only slightly more strin-
gent than the average required reduction of 5.2 percent below the 1990
level for all industrialized countries as a group), has experienced and is
predicted to continue high emissions increases over the 1990–2010 time
frame. Those increases are largely due to economic growth (the United
States also has admittedly done little to curb greenhouse gas emissions,
but so have most other countries). As a result, the United States would be
required to reduce its emissions below the business-as-usual level in 2010
by a whopping 31 to 33 percent. The U.S. share of all of the industrial-
ized countries’ reductions required under the Kyoto Protocol would be
between 50 to 80 percent.19 That high relative burden and concerns 
about its impact on the competitiveness of U.S. industry help explain U.S.
resistance to joining the Kyoto Protocol. Although the use of a compre-
hensive approach and international emissions trading would greatly
reduce the costs of meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets for all nations, the
United States would still be saddled with a heavily disproportionate bur-
den. Further, the Kyoto Protocol says nothing about developing country
emissions.
A better approach would be to endorse the principle of setting emis-
sions limitations based on maximizing the net social benefits of climate
regulation (balancing costs and benefits). That principle would then be
used to develop and refine appropriate time paths of global emissions over
several decades, starting gradually and tightening over time, and adopting
and adjusting regulatory targets in relation to those pathways and new
information. Those targets might be expressed in emissions intensity as
well as emissions.
Moving Forward: A United States–China Strategy
The flaws in the Kyoto Protocol do not justify refusal to face up to the
risks of climate change. Yet instead of proposing an alternative to the
Kyoto Protocol, the Bush administration seems to have embraced a
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strategy of “benign neglect” in the hope perhaps that the Kyoto Protocol will
collapse when the time comes to implement it, or that the climate change
issue will just go away. It will not. Unchecked increases in greenhouse gas
emissions appear likely to cause global warming that will, on balance,
significantly adversely affect the environment and human welfare and 
also pose some uncertain risk of triggering fundamental, highly disrup-
tive changes in basic climate-related earth systems.20 Those risks warrant
a well-designed global regulatory response. Further, the United States has
important economic and strategic as well as environmental interests in
helping to shape and participate in a sound and effective international
greenhouse gas regime.
Much attention has focused on two starkly opposed options: America
could stay out of the Kyoto Protocol regime altogether and thereby thwart
any effective global climate policy. Or America could join the Kyoto
Protocol and the Bonn and Marrakech accords as currently drafted and
then work within the treaty group to promote developing country partic-
ipation and better-reasoned target setting as well as to remove restrictions
on the comprehensive approach and trading. The first option is contrary
to the interests of the United States as well as those of the world. The sec-
ond option is unrealistic; it would require an unlikely about-face by the
Bush administration (but might be pursued by his successor). It is also
unlikely to result in developing country participation anytime soon or to
bring about any fundamental change in the existing Kyoto Protocol targets
and structures. The United States is likely to have greater leverage by first
seeking to develop an alternative international greenhouse gas regulatory
initiative outside the Kyoto Protocol framework and later accomplishing
changes in the Kyoto Protocol arrangements when they are merged into a
new and more inclusive global climate regime.
Accordingly, we urge a third option: that the United States stay out of the
Kyoto Protocol for now; take significant domestic actions to prepare to join
an international cap-and-trade regime; insist that it will only join a regime
that allows full emissions trading under a comprehensive approach, sets reg-
ulatory requirements based on sensible emissions limitations pathways, and
involves developing countries; and engage China and other major developing
countries in an international cap-and-trade regime, parallel to and initially
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separate from the Kyoto Protocol. The United States could implement such a
strategy by reaching an agreement with China to create a joint cap-and-trade
regime, possibly bringing in other developing countries as well. China
already emits 13 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions; other major
developing country greenhouse gas emitters include India (5 percent),
South Korea (1.8 percent), Mexico (1.7 percent), South Africa (1.5 percent),
Iran (1.4 percent), Brazil (1.4 percent), and Indonesia (1 percent).21 Other
industrialized countries, such as Australia and Canada, might join that regime.
Once the United States, China, and other major emitters had created the new
regime, economic and environmental logic would sooner or later likely lead
to a merger with, or joint accession to, a modified version of the Kyoto
Protocol. A virtue of such an approach is that it would allow a few nations
to experiment with alternative approaches to international climate regula-
tion, including approaches geared to the needs and interests of developing
countries, and avoid the need immediately to begin a fundamental renego-
tiation of the Kyoto Protocol that would involve scores of nations.
Our proposed strategy would increase the likelihood that, by one or
another means, the United States, China, and other major developing
countries could, perhaps within a decade or less, together join an
expanded and improved global emissions limitation and trading regime. As
currently designed, the Kyoto Protocol cannot achieve that objective.
Neither the United States nor China would likely join the Kyoto regime
without the other, but joint accession would attract both. China’s accession
would satisfy domestic U.S. political requirements of meaningful partici-
pation by developing countries (especially if other developing countries
follow China’s lead), improve global environmental effectiveness, and
reduce global costs through wider participation and expanded emissions
trading. When coupled with the other improvements to the Kyoto Protocol
that we propose, this step would meet the stated U.S. objections to the
Kyoto Protocol in its present form and politically enable the Bush admin-
istration (or successor) to join the international greenhouse gas regulatory
effort. At the same time, China, by joining alongside the United States
(with an assignment of “headroom” greenhouse gas emissions allowances
substantially in excess of its current emissions), would gain a large market
for lucrative allowance sales, additional sources of foreign investment and
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technology transfer, and international prestige similar to that attending its
recent entry into the World Trade Organization.
Further, we argue that the Kyoto Protocol parties would actually prefer
the United States and China to join some version of the Kyoto Protocol
together and would oppose either one joining on its own. The entry of the
United States alone would drive up greenhouse gas emissions allowance
prices sharply, to the detriment of other wealthy country parties to the
Kyoto Protocol such as Japan and the European Union. The entry of China
alone would flood the allowance market and depress prices, to the detri-
ment of Russia and Ukraine, the principal allowance sellers under the
Kyoto Protocol. The joint accession of a major buyer (the United States)
and a major seller or sellers (China and possibly additional developing
countries) would ensure a degree of continuing price stability in the
allowance market.
As we envision the process, the United States might initially approach
China alone; if the prospects were favorable, the effort might engage other
major developing countries such as India, Brazil, and Indonesia. Other
OECD countries that are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol, such as
Australia, might join in that regime. At the same time as it was approach-
ing China and others, the United States might also seek to develop a
North American Free Trade Agreement regime for greenhouse gas emis-
sions and trading. The European Union, Japan, Russia, and other Kyoto
Protocol parties would be consulted. It is important to note that the
inclusion of the United States and major developing countries (whether
after an initial period of experience under one or more independent
trading systems or directly) and the other improvements that we propose
could be accommodated within the basic structure of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, we propose
that the Kyoto Protocol be improved through an evolutionary strategy of
restructuring or merger rather than be scrapped and replaced with some-
thing entirely different.
We believe that such a strategy is realistic and superior to other pro-
posals that have been made to build a better global climate policy. Our
strategy is better for both the United States and the world. From the
world’s perspective, a more inclusive international climate regime with
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wider emissions trading would be far more environmentally effective and
economically efficient than the Kyoto Protocol or other proposals for alter-
native approaches including an international carbon tax.22 For the United
States, the environmental and economic case for joining the Kyoto
Protocol “as is” is not strong enough to overcome the current opposition
to participation in the administration and Congress. With the addition of
China and the other changes to the Kyoto Protocol that we propose
(including basing regulatory targets on emissions pathways that balance
social costs and benefits and removing restrictions on trading and the
comprehensive approach), the net benefits would become strong enough
to make the case for the United States to join an international cap-and-
trade regime. (The inclusion of additional major developing countries
would make the case for U.S. participation even stronger.) The United
States and U.S. business firms could take advantage of the low-cost abate-
ment opportunities in developing countries, could develop business
opportunities for greenhouse gas–efficient technologies and services in
those countries, and could play a significant role in designing the inter-
national trading system and providing financial and other services in the
new markets that it would create.
Because it would require a number of years of negotiation and lead time
before the United States and China (plus others) could together join a suc-
cessor to the Kyoto Protocol by one or a combination of the methods
stated above, our scenario would mean that the United States could not
be held to its Kyoto Protocol limitations targets for the first commitment
period in 2008–2012; the targets would have to be relaxed or postponed,
with the United States, China, and others joining the cap-and-trade
regime under second commitment period targets and beyond. European
officials and environmental advocacy groups might resist and denounce
such “special treatment” for a “laggard” United States, but our approach
would be far more environmentally progressive than the current posture
of permanent U.S. nonparticipation and no obligations for developing
countries. In the end the environmental, economic, and competitiveness
advantages of joint accession by the United States and China would 
likely be so overwhelming as to carry the day. Indeed, in our view, the
European Union has made a strategic error over the past several years
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insofar as it has been focusing its efforts on cajoling the United States into
joining the Kyoto Protocol while leaving China and other major develop-
ing countries out, when it was clear that the United States would not join
the Kyoto Protocol without significant developing country participation.
The European Union should have been working (harder) to attract China
and other major developing countries and thereby to engage the United
States.
China, however, may well perceive only costs from joining, not only
because it would consider abatement obligations as a costly brake on its
economic development but also because many forecasts of the impacts of
global warming suggest that China would on balance benefit from a
warmer world. If so, China will have to be “paid to play.” The most cost-
effective way to attract China to join the abatement regime will be through
assignments of “headroom” emissions allowances that China can then sell
to industrialized countries or keep as a reserve for faster economic
growth—just as was done in the Kyoto Protocol and the Bonn and
Marrakech accords to engage Russia and Ukraine.23 We believe that, with
China’s accession to the WTO and its continued development of a market-
based economy, together with the economic benefits that China could
reap from selling allowances in return for foreign investments, the
prospects for China’s participation are good.
If China joins, other major developing countries will have both politi-
cal precedent and strong economic incentives to join. Because emissions
limitations may, for similar reasons, impose significant social costs on
those countries and provide only modest benefits, they will also probably
have to be “paid to play” via headroom allowance allocations.
The issuance of headroom allowances to China and other developing
countries poses potential political problems on several fronts.
Environmental interests may decry the legitimization of large increases in
greenhouse gas emissions in those countries. The current Kyoto Protocol,
however, condones unlimited increases in developing country emissions;
our approach would establish an upward limit, while also compensating
developing countries for their abatement efforts. Some critics may also
oppose the expanded opportunities for firms in industrialized countries to
avoid costly domestic emissions limitations by resorting to international
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emissions trading, but by doing so those firms would be accomplishing
equal or greater emissions abatement at lower global cost (and thereby
enabling their governments to join or effectively to implement the treaty).
Other constituencies may resist the significant resource transfers to devel-
oping countries that are involved in purchasing allowances to meet caps
on industrialized countries; yet the alternatives are either far more costly
domestic abatement, far more costly methods of financing abatement in
developing countries (for example through massive infusions of official
development assistance), or else abandonment of any effective interna-
tional greenhouse gas–limitations effort to manage the risks of climate
change. Many are skeptical that a system of international emissions trad-
ing, especially one involving developing countries, can be made to work.
The challenges to securing agreement on and then successfully imple-
menting any form of a broadly inclusive global greenhouse gas regulatory
regime are indeed formidable. Domestic experience, especially in the
United States, has, however, demonstrated that emissions trading can
work and deliver tremendous environmental and economic benefits. On
a global scale, it is far superior to the available alternatives in delivering
cost savings and attracting developing country participation. 
* * * * *
Chapter 2 explains why the planetwide risks of climate change justify a
prudent, cost-effective global regulatory program to limit the global
growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Chapter 3 shows that it is essential
to include all major greenhouse gas–emitting countries in such a program
and also points out the significant obstacles to securing inclusive partici-
pation. In chapter 4 we argue that it is in the U.S. national interest to
participate in a global greenhouse gas regulatory regime, provided that 
the regime’s design is sound. Chapter 5 details the key elements of a 
sound regulatory design for global climate policy. In chapter 6 we evalu-
ate the Kyoto Protocol relative to those elements and argue that it must be
modified to include major developing county emitters, establish sound
emissions limitations pathways, and remove restrictions on the compre-
hensive approach and trading. In chapter 7 we present the components of
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our proposed strategy, which includes U.S. initiatives at both the interna-
tional and domestic levels to correct the Kyoto Protocol’s existing flaws
and to engage not only the United States but also major developing coun-
tries such as China in a mutually beneficial climate policy regime. Chapter 8
provides a brief conclusion.
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Prudent Investment in Regulation to
Mitigate Climate Change
In this chapter we briefly summarize the available information on the con-
tribution of increases in uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions to global
warming, the resulting risks of climate change, and the costs of emissions
limitations. We then summarize the essential implications of that infor-
mation for climate policy. Looking at the matter from a global perspective
instead of in terms of the national interest of any given country, we find
that the risks of climate change due to uncontrolled increases in green-
house gas emissions are sufficiently serious to justify initiating a well-
designed global regulatory program to limit those emissions. Global
investment in limiting the growth of those emissions through such a pro-
gram represents prudent insurance against the risks of climate change.
Such a program should use strategies to minimize the costs of limiting
emissions and set realistic emissions pathway goals by balancing the costs
of limiting emissions against the benefits.
The Warming Effects of Uncontrolled Emissions
Several greenhouse gases that trap solar radiation and warm the earth’s
atmosphere, including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydro-
chlorofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, tropospheric
ozone and its precursors (volatile organic compounds and nitrogen
oxide), and dark soot, are emitted by human activities.1 Other emissions,
including sulfur aerosols created by emissions of sulfur dioxide and par-
ticulate matter, exert a reflective cooling effect. The various gases reside in
the atmosphere for different lengths of time and have different relative
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impacts on atmospheric temperature.2 They arise from many diverse
sources and human activities, including fossil-fuel extraction, distribu-
tion, and combustion; manufacturing; agriculture; and forestry. Some of
those gases also have important sinks; for example, carbon dioxide is
removed from the atmosphere by plant photosynthesis and is stored in
forests, grasses, agricultural soils, and oceans. Atmospheric concentra-
tions of those gases have increased substantially over the past century as
a result of industrialization and other human activities. Economic growth,
population growth, technological changes, energy alternatives, land uses,
and other variables affect the level of business-as-usual emissions—the
level that will occur in the absence of regulatory measures. The business-
as-usual emissions are projected to increase significantly with global eco-
nomic development and to raise atmospheric concentrations further.3
Significant uncertainties attend efforts to predict the impacts on global
atmospheric temperatures of current and future greenhouse gas emissions
from human activities. In estimating those impacts, climate models must
deal with many complexities, including uncertainties in future economic
activities and technologies; natural variability in climate; the roles of solar
activity, clouds, oceans, and terrain; the impacts of copollutants emitted
by the same activities that emit greenhouse gases (including the formation
by copollutants of aerosols and clouds with a cooling effect); and
increased growth of vegetation in the presence of increased carbon diox-
ide levels (which in turn removes some carbon from the atmosphere).
Nonetheless, even taking into account such uncertainties, understanding
has advanced sufficiently to sustain general but not unanimous agree-
ment among knowledgeable scientists on two basic conclusions that are
reflected in recent reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and a National Academy of Sciences panel convened at the
request of the White House.4
First, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the National
Academy of Sciences reports concluded that rising greenhouse gas atmos-
pheric concentrations due to human activities are already causing the
earth’s atmosphere to warm. Second, with respect to the future (and even
if present warming is not attributable to human activities), these bodies
concluded that the rate and extent of warming will increase significantly
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over the twenty-first century and beyond if steps are not taken to limit the
growth in net greenhouse gas emissions that will otherwise occur. Forecasts
suggested that business-as-usual levels will increase dramatically over the
next several decades. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
predicted that if measures are not taken to limit the projected growth in
greenhouse gas emissions, surface temperatures will rise by 2100 between
1.4 and 5.4 degrees Celsius from 1990 levels. While somewhat more ten-
tative in its conclusions, the National Academy of Sciences committee
found that a 3 degree Celsius increase in surface temperature by 2100 is
consistent with current understanding about the intricacies of climate
change. The National Academy of Sciences panel also cited two other
well-regarded climate change models that forecast 2.7 and 4.4 degree
Celsius rises by the end of the century. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change found that warming at the rate and magnitude projected
is, on the basis of the available data, very likely without precedent during
at least the past 10,000 years.
In considering the policy significance of those findings, which will
undergo modification as scientific understanding advances, we should
emphasize that global temperature is not a function of current emissions
but of the total stock (concentration) of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere. All greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for substantial, but
widely varying, periods of time. Methane, for example, resides in the
atmosphere for an average of about ten years, whereas carbon dioxide can
reside in the atmosphere for centuries. Emissions represent a flow into the
atmospheric stock, and capture by sinks represents a flow out. The emis-
sions from human activities that occur during a single year or even a
decade are small relative to the total stock in the atmosphere.5 Moreover,
it will be difficult to alter annual emissions very much in a short period of
time. These circumstances have several policy implications. Given past
emissions, we are probably locked into some significant warming trend
for the future, regardless of what we do now or in the future. Accordingly,
investment in adaptation measures to limit adverse impacts from warming
is advisable. Also, immediate steep cuts in current greenhouse gas emis-
sions will not immediately bring about a commensurate reduction in
warming because they will have only a small effect on the total stock.
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Lesser reductions in the short run can, to a substantial extent, be com-
pensated by greater reductions later. Yet earlier emission reductions will
have more impact on future greenhouse gas buildup than later emission
reductions and can help mitigate climate change and its consequences in
the interim as well as in the longer term. Further, if reductions are post-
poned too long, it will be impossible or very costly to make, in a timely
fashion, the reductions needed to prevent quite serious harms that may
result from the buildup of the atmospheric greenhouse gas stock. Thus,
decisions about the timing and magnitude of emissions limitations should
be made within a decades-long perspective by taking into account the
stock-flow structure and the relative costs and benefits of reductions in
different periods. As a result, effective policies to limit warming should
concentrate on a strategy and institutional design that is sustainable and
effective over the long run. As explained below, such an approach points
to a policy of beginning with broad participation in modest reductions
and tightening them over time.
The Risks of Warming
Global warming at the pace predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change and National Academy of Sciences is likely to cause a
variety of effects that, although they will vary over space and time and will
include some benefits, will be adverse on balance, and will become
increasingly significant and adverse over decades as climate change accel-
erates. The U.S. national climate policy report submitted pursuant to the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in June 2002 appears to
reflect general agreement with that view.6
Limited understanding of ecosystem dynamics, the potential synergis-
tic effects of climate change (including carbon fertilization), and differing
impacts by region, time frame, and geographical scale complicate the pre-
diction of warming effects. Different countries will be affected in different
ways and to differing extents. Some countries may benefit from warming
in the short run, a factor that complicates the possibility of global agree-
ment on greenhouse gas limitation measures. Nonetheless, the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change, the U.S. National Assessment,7 and
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several independent researchers have attempted to forecast the global and
regional impacts of climate change, typically based on models that predict
a 2 to 5 degree Celsius rise in temperature by 2100.8
Although initial (gradual) warming and carbon dioxide fertilization
seem likely to help agriculture in some areas,9 the effects in other regions
will likely be adverse, and the impacts of more rapid or severe warming
as the business-as-usual emissions levels accelerate are likely to be adverse
worldwide. Shifts in temperatures and rainfall patterns will affect crop
yields and growth cycles. Impacts on human health are a particularly
uncertain issue. Heat stress due to increased temperatures can lead to
illness and death, but cold weather is also associated with significant mor-
bidity. Higher populations and lengthened life cycles of disease-carrying
agents such as mosquitoes could result in increased levels of disease,
including the spread of tropical diseases into temperate areas. Some
ecosystems, including wetlands, grasslands, forests, mountains, rivers,
and lakes, are threatened because of their limited ability to adapt to the
projected rate and magnitude of climate change, which leads to significant
loss of biodiversity. Sea-level rise and increases in tropical storm intensity
may cause increases in flooding and storm surges in low-lying coastlines.
Those harms and their severity will likely grow as both warming and the
rate of warming increase.
Nonlinear effects might also occur when rapid warming triggers 
thresholds in critical earth systems and causes far-reaching, potentially
highly disruptive changes. Possibilities include the collapse of the western
Antarctic ice sheets, the melting of Arctic tundra, and shifts in ocean cur-
rents.10 The likelihood of those events’ occurring and what temperature
changes might cause them are not known, although most scientists think
that the probabilities are low.
Those impacts from climate change would in turn affect various sectors
of the economy. Agriculture and forestry will likely be the most strongly
affected. Electricity supply, water supply, construction insurance, and
tourism could also be significantly affected. The impacts of climate change
will vary widely among different countries and regions. The most severe
physical impacts will be in developing countries because of their location,
climate, environment, larger share of economic activity in climate-sensitive
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sectors such as agriculture, and lack of resources and capacity for taking
measures to adapt. Adaptation measures can reduce the adverse impact of
climate, particularly in agriculture and human settlements. For example,
human settlements can be relocated from low-lying coastal areas; drought-
resistant crops can be developed and water storage and supply systems
upgraded; public health measures can be taken to address diseases. These
adaptation measures will, of course, consume social resources.11
Small island states are perhaps the most vulnerable because of rising
seas and limited supplies of water. Africa may also be among the hardest
hit. Latin America faces decreases of especially important crops.
Comparatively, the threats to Europe, North America, Russia, and Japan
are more limited. Those regions are not as climate sensitive, and they have
greater capacities to adapt. And China may enjoy significant net benefits
for a substantial period.
Quantifying the damages due to climate change in economic terms is
difficult. In addition to sorting out uncertainties and making simplifying
assumptions, quantitative estimates of the benefits of preventing climate
change must often assign economic values to assets traditionally lacking
market value, such as ecosystems. Several studies have tried to quantify
the adverse economic effects within certain industries; few have examined
aggregate damages.12 A recent synthesis by Richard Tol of the literature on
the effects of global climate change addressed several key endpoints: agri-
culture, forestry, water resources, energy consumption, sea level rise,
ecosystems, and human health.13 Tol found that some initial warming 
(1 degree Celsius) and carbon dioxide fertilization would likely help
agriculture and human health in some areas (including Europe, North
America, Japan, Australia, Russia, and China, which would enjoy an early
gain of 1 to 3 percent of gross domestic product) but would have adverse
effects in poorer areas (especially Africa and Southeast Asia, which would
lose 1 to 4 percent of GDP). And he found that the impacts of greater than
1 degree Celsius warming would become adverse worldwide over time and
would include losses of 1 to 2 percent in wealthy countries and 4 to 9 per-
cent in Russia and developing countries (except for China, which exhibits
persistent gains from climate change of about 2 percent of GDP).14 Tol’s
synthesis did not account for a number of adverse effects, such as fisheries
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losses, extreme weather events, and the possibility of fundamental changes
in polar ice systems, ocean currents, or other critical earth systems. His
predictions for China have direct implications for the treaty negotiations:
if China sees itself as gaining from global warming, it will be even more
reluctant to join abatement efforts.
With specific respect to the United States, a comparison of studies
suggests the total adverse impact on U.S. GDP to be about 1 to 2 percent,
on the basis of a 2.5 to 4 degree Celsius change in temperature over the
twenty-first century.15 Regional effects within the United States would
vary widely.
Some critics have argued that such numbers significantly understate
the adverse impacts of warming because they do not adequately or prop-
erly value reductions in ecosystem services, many of which we do not
know. Others have argued that estimates may be exaggerated because
autonomous adaptation (for example, farmers changing their planting
patterns) may offset much of the adverse effect of climate change and do
so at low cost. In considering the policy significance of those risks, we
must emphasize that adverse effects will most likely occur gradually,
although at an increasing pace and over a long time period. Intensively
managed ecosystems and ecosystems subject to market price signals 
(such as agriculture in developed countries) are more likely to adapt well
than are unmanaged and unpriced ecosystems. Further, the possibility of
highly disruptive shifts in critical earth systems (such as the Antarctic ice
sheet and deep ocean circulation) at some point along the way cannot 
be entirely ruled out, but the likelihood of such effects occurring is not
well understood.
The discount rate used when aggregating impacts over time is impor-
tant; a lower discount rate implies greater weight given to future events,
including the social costs of adverse impacts from climate change that
occur decades hence. Different studies have used different discount rates,
typically in the range of 1 to 5 percent, and different societies may implic-
itly adopt different discount rates. For example, more prosperous societies
can better afford to take costly steps in the near term to reduce risks of
future harms and thus may adopt lower discount rates. Poorer societies
may of necessity care less about events beyond short-term survival and
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thus may adopt higher discount rates. By the same logic, the discount rate
used by a society may decline as its wealth grows over time. Climate
change models have been starting to employ discount rates that start at 3
or 5 percent and then decline over time.16 A recent analysis suggested that
incorporating uncertainty about discount rates—letting rates fluctuate
randomly in an array of scenario runs—may be appropriate to reflect
agnosticism about the ideal rate; such an approach tends to increase the
estimated damages from future climate change compared with studies that
choose a fixed rate at or near 3 percent.17 The choice of an appropriate
discount rate or of other methods or principles for evaluating climate
policies that involve costs incurred decades in advance of the bulk of the
benefits afforded is not a technical issue. It is an important normative
question that deserves fuller consideration.18
The fact that different countries will be affected in different ways and to
differing extents and that some may benefit in the short run significantly
complicates the possibility of global agreement on measures to limit
greenhouse gas emissions. A further complication is that developing
countries, despite their greater physical vulnerability to climate change,
may tend to value climate protection less than do industrialized countries.
Luis Gomez-Echeverri has asserted:
Many in developing countries will not, at least in the foreseeable
future, pay any attention to [climate change, because it is] an issue
that may cause a problem for the sustenance of life in the distant
future when their principal concern is the preservation of life today.19
Populations under severe stress from poverty understandably focus their
priorities on near-term necessities and steeply discount losses that would
only occur long into the future.
The Costs of Limiting Emissions and the
Role of Sound Regulatory Design
Significant uncertainties exist in estimating the costs of greenhouse gas
limitations, depending on the methodology used and the assumptions
made about matters such as technological innovation and discount rates.
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Nevertheless, the transition from a high–greenhouse gas to a low–
greenhouse gas economy will certainly not be a free lunch. For example,
the cost of meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets through wholly domestic
measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions has been estimated to range
from substantially less than 1 to more than 3 percent of GDP in the United
States and a number of industrialized countries.20 Yet sound regulatory
design, including the use of a comprehensive approach, worldwide emis-
sions trading, and other flexibility mechanisms can greatly reduce (up to
90 percent) the costs of achieving greenhouse gas limitations compared
with a policy under which each country relies solely on domestic meas-
ures targeted at carbon dioxide emissions. Further, setting targets based
on a balancing of relevant costs and benefits over time would avoid the
high costs of steep near-term cuts in emissions by phasing in reduction
over time, which would enable advantage to be taken of technological
innovation and capital stock turnover.
Estimating the Costs of Greenhouse Gas Limitations. Estimating the
costs of abating greenhouse gas emissions is an extremely complex under-
taking. Models require that assumptions be made (in the face of consider-
able uncertainty) about business-as-usual emissions paths in the absence
of regulation, the nature and performance of regulatory measures to limit
emissions growth, the future trajectory of the economy, the development
of technology, and the characteristics of markets. It is thus not surprising
that estimates of the costs of achieving a given level of emissions limita-
tion vary widely among different studies using different models and
assumptions. The evaluation for current policy purposes of the future
costs of emissions reductions (like their future benefits) can also be  sig-
nificantly influenced by the choice of the discount rate used to compute
their net present value.21 A recent study conducted by the Energy
Modeling Forum used thirteen different models to estimate the costs 
of meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets for the United States. Each model
used similar assumptions. The results offered a wide range of marginal
costs for controlling a ton of carbon; they ranged from $70 to more than
$400 in 1999 dollars—figures that translate to a 2010 GDP loss of .2 to 
2 percent to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets.22 A similarly wide range of
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costs is also found in other studies of the costs of meeting the Kyoto
Protocol targets.23
Underlying the debate about the role of technology is a rift between
engineers and economists in the methodologies used to estimate costs.24
Economists tend to favor a macroeconomic top-down approach that
extrapolates behavior in relation to changes in relative prices.25 It assumes
that consumers and firms operate efficiently under each set of incentives
and that significant market and institutional barriers to the adoption of
efficient responses are absent. Students of the engineering school, on the
other hand, favor a bottom-up approach that identifies abatement oppor-
tunities available to specific consumers and firms.26 Researchers using
that methodology typically allege that information gaps, serious market
imperfections, institutional obstacles, and perverse government policies
(such as energy subsidies) prevent consumers and firms from adopting
those new technologies. They insist that steps can be taken to address
those problems and thereby facilitate market actors’ adopting new tech-
nologies that will make huge contributions to reducing carbon emissions.
Because researchers using a bottom-up approach tend to believe that
significant untapped efficiencies currently exist that can be realized by
realigning incentives and removing barriers, their analysis generally pro-
duces lower cost estimates than top-down approaches. One 1997 study
using a bottom-up approach found that the United States alone could save
$300 billion of energy costs annually through the increased use of energy-
efficient technologies.27 Other studies using that approach suggest that 
20 to 25 percent of existing carbon emissions could be eliminated by
switching to more efficient technologies.28 Engineering methodologies
frequently reject many of the factors used in economic models.29 They
also typically use a much lower market discount rate and are more opti-
mistic in their predictions of technological advance.30 Many economists,
on the other hand, tend to believe that the assumptions used in bottom-
up approaches are too sanguine and underestimate true costs, including
information and transaction costs. Currently, researchers are trying to
integrate the two approaches. Methodological advancements in that 
area could prove to be one of the keys to creating more consistent, reliable
cost estimates.
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In addition, retrospective regulatory analyses suggest that economists’
initial estimates of the prospective costs of regulations tend to overstate
the actual costs in many cases.31 Such overstatements appear to be par-
ticularly likely where the regulatory program employs economic incentive
instruments such as taxes or emissions trading, because those policy
instruments provide powerful incentives for firms to innovate by finding
and adopting less costly means of compliance over time. If that kind of
error applies to studies that estimate the economywide costs of climate
policies, especially studies involving climate policies using economic
incentive instruments, then the cost figures cited above would need to be
adjusted downward.
The Impact of Regulatory Design on the Costs of Greenhouse Gas
Limitations. The costs of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions can be
reduced dramatically by sound regulatory design, including use of
regulatory instruments that allow flexibility to take full advantage of the
opportunities for achieving reductions at least cost. Those design elements
include the comprehensive approach, use of economic incentives such 
as emissions taxes or tradable emissions allowances, and flexibility in the
timing of reductions. In addition, costs depend heavily on the ambi-
tion and shape of the emissions limitation pathway chosen in setting
regulatory targets and timetables. We summarize these points here and
develop them more fully in chapter 5.
A comprehensive rather than a piecemeal approach. Global warming is
caused by increasing concentrations of a variety of different greenhouse
gases, all of which trap solar energy. Greenhouse gases are both emitted 
by sources (such as fossil fuel combustion) and sequestered in sinks (such
as forests). These circumstances invite use of a comprehensive approach
to regulating greenhouse gas emissions32 under which countries (and
regulated firms) must meet total greenhouse gas limitations obligations
but enjoy flexibility to focus their efforts on those greenhouse gases 
emission reduction or sink enhancement opportunities that, in their
particular circumstances, cost the least. To provide that flexibility, a cross-
gas index (such as the global warming potential index created by the
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) is needed to translate each
greenhouse gas emission or sink removal into a unit of carbon dioxide
equivalent; emissions limitations obligations are then defined in terms of
units of carbon dioxide equivalent based on the index.33 Because of 
varied greenhouse gas abatement opportunities across gases and sectors,
use of such a comprehensive approach could reduce the costs of global
greenhouse gas abatement by up to 60 percent (and even more if enhance-
ment of forests and other sinks that sequester greenhouse gases are count-
ed), compared with regulating carbon dioxide emissions alone.34
Although the practicality of the comprehensive approach has been chal-
lenged, as we discuss below, sound and workable means exist for address-
ing the uncertainties associated with measuring greenhouse gas emissions
and sinks.
Economic incentives in place of command regulation. Furthermore,
greenhouse gases are emitted throughout the world and mix globally.
Accordingly, to limit the total atmospheric stock of greenhouses gases, it
does not matter where on the earth limitations on net emissions are
achieved. That feature invites the use of the geographic flexibility
provided by economic incentive systems, such as emissions trading or
emissions taxes, to ensure that emissions reductions are carried out
wherever in the world they can be achieved at lowest cost, regardless of
the initial assignment of abatement responsibilities. In addition, econ-
omic incentive systems allow countries and firms the flexibility to use
whatever means they choose to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions.
Command regulatory approaches, by contrast, impose fixed emissions
limitations obligations on individual nations and firms. They also tend to
limit, directly or indirectly, the means for achieving those require-
ments and thereby significantly limit flexibility and drive up costs.
Economic incentive systems also provide firms with continuing incentives
to develop and adopt innovations to reduce emissions so as to reduce 
tax payments or free up emissions allowances for sale at a profit. Domes-
tic experience with emissions trading in the United States and elsewhere
has confirmed its practicality and its cost savings and other advant-
ages. While international emissions trading would involve additional
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complexities, it is, as we discuss below, nonetheless practicable, superior
to an international emissions tax regime, and far superior to a command
approach.
A number of studies have shown that, because of large variations in
abatement costs across countries, international emissions trading (involv-
ing all major emitters, including China) would dramatically reduce costs
compared with wholly domestic carbon dioxide emissions limitations—
on the order of 50 to 70 percent.35 Several studies have suggested that the
costs of the Kyoto Protocol to the United States in 2010 would be on the
order of 1 to 2 or even 3 percent of GDP without international emissions
trading but only about half that with Annex B trading and 75 percent less
(roughly .5 percent of GDP or below) with full international emissions
trading.36 Studies of the use of greenhouse gas emissions taxes have 
found similar cost reductions. Those estimates may overstate true savings
because they assume smooth and universal adoption and implementation.
Thus, it may not be feasible, at least initially, to implement tax or trading
systems for some greenhouse gas–emitting sectors involving many small
sources, and market imperfections and institutional barriers may prevent
full realization of potential cost savings. On the other hand, retrospective
analyses suggest that economic incentive instruments often reduce costs
more than initially predicted by inducing innovation.37
Flexibility in timing of limitations. Further cost savings may be offered by
allowing emitters flexibility in the timing of emissions limitations, includ-
ing accelerating reductions to take advantage of low-cost, near-term
abatement opportunities and postponing reductions to take advantage of
capital stock turnover and technological advances.38 Such flexibility
includes the opportunity to “bank” allowances saved by early abatement
for later use or to “borrow” future allowances for current use (ideally at an
interest rate reflecting the environmental cost of earlier emissions). That
flexible approach also allows setting targets in terms of cumulative emis-
sions over multiyear periods. The Kyoto Protocol follows such an
approach by framing emissions limitation obligations in terms of a multi-
year average for the first commitment period, rather than in terms of a
single specified year.
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Combining cost-effective mechanisms for achieving reductions. Considered
individually, the comprehensive approach, international emissions trading,
and measures allowing flexibility in the timing of reductions can each pro-
duce large savings in the costs of achieving a given emissions limitation tar-
get. Using those instruments together can cumulate the savings and make
them even larger. For example, as noted above, the costs of meeting the
Kyoto Protocol targets through wholly domestic measures to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions have been estimated at 1 to 3 percent of GDP in the United
States. With the 60 percent savings from the comprehensive approach (plus
more from sinks) and the 50 percent savings from Annex B trading, the com-
bined cost savings would be about 80 percent (compared with an energy and
carbon dioxide only policy with national caps and no trading). With the 
60 percent savings from the comprehensive approach (plus more from sinks)
and the 75 percent savings from full international emissions trading, the
combined cost savings could be 90 percent (compared with an energy and
carbon dioxide only policy with national caps and no trading). Indeed, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology model generated precisely that result:
it predicted that comprehensiveness (all greenhouse gases), plus full interna-
tional allowance trading, would reduce U.S. abatement costs under the
Kyoto Protocol from $360 per ton of carbon-equivalent (with a carbon diox-
ide only, no-trading policy) to only $40—that is, by about 90 percent.39 The
cost savings projected by those and other modeling studies may be over-
stated by assumptions of perfectly efficient application of the flexibility
mechanisms, but even where real-world implementation problems are taken
into account, the cost savings would be quite large.
Apparently, when the Bush administration decided in March 2001 not to
pursue the Kyoto Protocol,40 it relied on a study by the U.S. Energy
Information Administration that assumed no international trading and con-
trols on carbon dioxide only and thus forecast high costs of U.S. compliance
with the Kyoto Protocol. Full scope for cost-saving regulatory design would,
however, imply a dramatically lower cost of the Kyoto Protocol (and other
climate policies) and hence a more persuasive case for joining.
Sensible emissions limitations pathways. Of course, the fact that the costs
of limiting greenhouse gas emissions can be greatly reduced by sound
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regulatory design does not necessarily mean that regulation is justified.
Although reducing costs makes it more likely that regulation may be
appropriate, regulation must be justified by balancing its costs against its
benefits. Even if costs can be greatly reduced by the design features sum-
marized above, they may still be greater than the benefits afforded, espe-
cially if the regulatory targets to be achieved are unsound. In the case of
climate change, which involves long regulatory horizons extending over
decades, the limitations pathway used to reach a long-term objective may
be as important as the ultimate level of control.41 Studies of greenhouse
gas–emissions abatement that use integrated assessment models have
shown that policies (including those reflected in the Kyoto Protocol tar-
gets and timetables) whose aim is sharp reductions in the near future
involve costs that are far too high in relation to the benefits afforded.
Regulatory targets should be based on long-term regulatory pathways that
maximize the net benefits to society by balancing the costs and benefits 
of reductions at different times and taking appropriate account of the
stock-flow relation between atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases and annual emissions. The studies conclude that the net benefits to
society would be maximized by beginning with more modest reductions
and increasing regulatory stringency gradually over time.42
Balancing Benefits and Costs in Designing a 
Global Regulatory Regime
While many uncertainties remain regarding the future rate of warming
and its impacts, on the basis of what we know now, the risks of climate
change are sufficiently serious to justify beginning some reasonable, pru-
dent investment in regulatory insurance against such risks.
The risks of climate change are significant. They include not only the
risks of the harms predicted to occur from average predicted warming and
average ecological sensitivity, but the risks associated with higher warm-
ing levels (for example, 5 degrees Celsius over the twenty-first century)
and higher ecological sensitivity, which together could produce much
more serious harms, and also the risk of low-likelihood–extreme-impact
events that might occur because of nonlinear changes in climate-related
PRUDENT INVESTMENT IN REGULATION    33
earth systems. Meanwhile, some impacts of climate change may be bene-
ficial, especially those associated with modest and gradual warming and
carbon fertilization in some regions. If we take all those effects together
and account for the considerable uncertainties involved in such forecasts,
we nonetheless find that the net expected value of damages from the port-
folio of future climate scenarios is substantial and becomes significantly
more adverse as climate change becomes more severe and more rapid.
Two basic means of reducing the harms associated with these risks
exist. One is through adaptation measures to avoid adverse impacts 
by, for example, relocating human settlements away from low-lying
coastal areas or developing drought-resistant crops. The other is through
abatement measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions to reduce future
warming. Both types of measures must play a role. The costs of green-
house gas limitations on the scale required to reduce warming apprecia-
bly from that associated with business-as-usual emissions levels are not
small. If, however, regulatory costs are reduced by broad global participa-
tion, with flexible incentive-based instruments, a comprehensive
approach, and regulatory targets based on well-chosen emissions path-
ways aimed at maximizing net benefits, we believe that the costs of emis-
sions limitations become sufficiently reasonable in relation to the benefits
(reductions in risks of harm) to justify beginning some regulatory invest-
ments in climate insurance now.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change states in Article 2 that
its “objective” is the stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas concen-
trations at a level that will avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference”
with the climate. But such a stabilization objective (which could be
defined as maintaining the greenhouse gas concentration no higher than
a certain level after a given year, such as 550 or 650 parts per million by
2100) can be achieved through many different time paths of abatement,
some of which are much less costly than others. From that perspective,
the Kyoto Protocol targets and timetables—which call for sharp reduc-
tions within a short time, requiring a 16 to 24 percent reduction in the
business-as-usual emissions by Annex B countries by 2010—are exces-
sively costly in relation to the benefits, even when disregarding that the
protocol will in any event have only a small effect on warming trends
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because of its failure to include developing countries.43 A strategy of
requiring no abatement for some years (at least beyond 2010 and perhaps
2050 or later) and then reducing emissions sharply would greatly reduce
the cost of stabilization (by 50 percent or more relative to the Kyoto
Protocol) by taking advantage of capital turnover, new technologies, and
discounting.44
Stabilization of concentrations, however, is an essentially arbitrary
long-term objective and neglects the damages resulting from climate
change in the interim. An alternative approach, which we favor, is to set
emissions pathways and limitations targets by balancing the costs and
benefits of emissions limitations so as to maximize the net benefits to soci-
ety or, put another way, to minimize the sum of abatement costs and cli-
mate change costs. (Unlike the Framework Convention on Climate
Change stabilization objective, this approach takes into account the
adverse effects of near-term warming.) Under this approach, assuming
“average” climate sensitivity and damages and assuming cost-effective
strategies for global abatement, James Hammitt found that net social ben-
efits would be maximized by reducing global emissions 3 percent below
the business-as-usual level by 2010, 5 percent below the business-as-
usual level by 2025, and 20 percent below the business-as-usual level by
2100.45 That pathway calls for greater near-term abatement than implied
by the least-cost path to stabilization but substantially less near-term
abatement than required by the Kyoto Protocol.46
Because greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant, immediate measures to
curb current emissions will have relatively little immediate impact on
warming trends. This circumstance plus the potential for future develop-
ment of new, cost-effective technologies for limiting net greenhouse gas
emissions and the advantages of matching adoption of major new require-
ments with turnover of the capital stock seem to argue in favor of post-
poning regulatory action to limit greenhouse gas emissions to some
indefinite point in the future, when the problem is more serious and con-
trols are likely to be substantially less expensive. On closer examination,
however, those factors and others argue for beginning some regulatory
action now. The stock character of greenhouse gas pollutants means that
if we wait until adverse effects are manifest, immediate drastic cuts in
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emissions will come too late. Also, substantial time will be needed to build
the necessary international and domestic greenhouse gas regulatory insti-
tutions and to implement limitations measures. Furthermore, greenhouse
gas–efficient technologies will not be developed unless a price signal
encourages investment in such technologies; as long as the atmosphere is
treated as an open-access resource, such a price signal is unlikely to arise.
The incentive for greenhouse gas–efficient technologies will have to come
in substantial part from a credible greenhouse gas regulatory program that
limits emissions (either through price or quantity measures) and thereby
creates market demand for application of such technologies and provides
predictable guidance to firms making long-term investment decisions. 
A need also exists for extensive learning-by-doing to evolve successful
policies and institutions to deal with a regulatory challenge of such daunt-
ing complexity. Those factors reinforce the lessons of the cost-benefit
analysis summarized above: begin now with a comprehensive and flexible
institutional framework that delivers moderate regulatory limitations on
greenhouse gas emissions and builds them gradually over time in light of
developing information on science, impacts, adaptation, abatement
options, and progress in policy design.
In sum, a cost-benefit balancing approach indicates that, from a global
perspective, well-designed greenhouse gas regulation is justified and reg-
ulatory initiatives should begin now. (We discuss the issue from the
national perspective of the United States in chapter 4.) This cost-benefit
analytical approach provides the appropriate framework for setting regu-
latory objectives generally and is the approach embraced by the Bush
administration.47
Some proponents of the precautionary principle reject the use of cost-
benefit balancing in environmental regulatory decisionmaking under con-
ditions of substantial uncertainty. Preventive approaches to regulating
uncertain environmental risks are often warranted. The absence of scien-
tific certainty regarding the extent of warming and its effects should not
preclude the adoption of greenhouse gas regulations. Those propositions,
however, can be appropriately incorporated within the basic cost-benefit
balancing framework that we propose. Preventive regulation should take
into account social aversion to the risk of very large harms and our 
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ability to make improved regulatory decisions in the future with addi-
tional information developed in the interim.48 But beyond that, the pre-
cautionary principle provides little sound or beneficial guidance on
setting regulatory objectives.49 Thus, we do not ground our advocacy of
climate protection policy on the precautionary principle. An approach
that balances costs and benefits, broadly defined, in setting pathway goals
for greenhouse gas emissions is the soundest and the one best calculated
to win the broad assent needed to build an inclusive and effective global
greenhouse gas regulatory policy.50
The key challenge is getting the institutional design right. Getting the
institutional design wrong, out of haste or short-sightedness, would be far
worse than delaying specific abatement measures by a few years. Once
adopted, the institutional design may endure for decades and may be very
difficult to revise. The high costs of undoing early mistakes will be high—
as the outcry over even modest improvements to the Kyoto Protocol
suggests. Thus, getting the institutional framework wrong now will have
major costs—both economic and environmental.
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Participation by All Major Greenhouse
Gas–Emitting Nations in Climate
Regulation
A sound global climate regime must engage all nations with significant
greenhouse gas sources and sinks, including the United States and major
developing countries, in measures to limit future emissions, to ensure that
the climate is actually protected and that it is protected cost-effectively. If
major emitters including the United States, China, and other significant
developing countries (such as India, Brazil, and Indonesia) do not agree
to join the global emissions limitations regime, the efforts of the Kyoto
Protocol participants will be swamped by the unchecked emissions
increases of the nonparticipants.
While the need for an inclusive global greenhouse gas regulatory regime
is clear, significant obstacles to achieving it exist. Under the basic rules of
international law, countries are bound by international agreements only if
they consent to join. Each country generally decides whether to join on
the basis of broad judgments about its overall national interest. In the
climate change context, such judgments will, in the absence of specific
inducements to join, turn to a large extent on the disadvantages and
advantages—including economic costs and benefits, environmental bene-
fits, reputational considerations, domestic political pressures, and other
factors—to that country of participating or not participating in the Kyoto
Protocol or a similar international agreement. Thus far, the United States
and other countries have determined that it would not be in their
respective overall national interests to join an international greenhouse 
gas regulatory regime such as the Kyoto Protocol.
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Wide Participation to Make Regulation Effective and Affordable 
It is obvious that any climate protection regime that does not include the
United States—the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter—will be ineffec-
tive. But the participation of major developing countries is also essential. A
number of developing countries, including China, India, Brazil, and Indo-
nesia, are already major greenhouse gas emitters. China already accounts for
over 13 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, India about 5 percent,
South Korea 1.8 percent, Mexico 1.7 percent, South Africa 1.5 percent, Iran
1.4 percent, Brazil 1.4 percent, and Indonesia 1 percent.1 Developing coun-
tries as a group account for about 30 percent of global carbon dioxide emis-
sions.2 Their business-as-usual emissions levels are projected to increase
sharply in the future with economic growth, so that somewhere around
2020, developing countries’ emissions will equal and thereafter surpass the
emissions of the industrialized countries.3 Sixty-seven percent of the growth
in carbon dioxide emissions between 1999 and 2020 is forecast to come
from developing countries; China, the world’s most populous country and
the world’s largest producer and user of coal, alone will produce 28 percent
of the forecast increase in carbon emissions over the next twenty years.4
China also currently produces 25 percent of the world’s black carbon (dark
soot), a substance that may play a key role in global warming.5 China report-
ed a decline in carbon dioxide emissions from 1997 to 2000, but that
appears to be a temporary and overstated event.6 Land use changes such as
forest conversion in developing countries are likely to be a major source of
carbon dioxide emissions and sink contraction and a major source of
methane emissions as well.7 Because of the fast-growing importance of devel-
oping country emissions, an international agreement that restricts emissions
limitation obligations to the industrialized countries, as the Kyoto Protocol
does, will have only a very modest impact on limiting global emissions.
Unchecked emissions by major nonparticipating nations (including the
United States and major developing countries) will not only swamp the
limitation efforts of the Kyoto Protocol participants but greatly discourage
those Kyoto Protocol participants from maintaining or implementing their
commitments. Because of the global character of the greenhouse gas
problem, steps by some nations to limit their emissions benefit everyone,
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regardless of whether others join the control effort. That circumstance and
the attendant risk of free-riding make nations and businesses reluctant to
assume the burdens of limitations measures unless they are assured that
others will do likewise and bear an appropriate share of the burdens of
producing the global public good of reduced warming.
Inclusion of all major emitting countries is also necessary to prevent
cross-border “leakage” of emissions. Leakage is the process that occurs
when a subset of countries adopt regulations to limit their emissions:
emissions-intensive activities, driven by global economic competition and
changes in relative prices, tend to shift from regulated to unregulated
countries to avoid regulatory costs.8 As a result, the emissions of countries
without limitations will grow even faster. Thus, under the Kyoto Protocol,
developing country emissions will rise even faster and surpass industrial-
ized country emissions even sooner than in the absence of the Kyoto
Protocol. Leakage may be small when emissions limitations are modest,
but as emissions limitations become more stringent (and as world trading
markets become more integrated and economic competition intensifies),
the prospects of leakage (and its competitiveness effects) become more
significant. Recent studies suggest that the Kyoto Protocol–type emissions
limitations adopted in industrialized countries would be offset by some-
where between 5 and 30 percent as a result of leakage of emitting activities
to developing countries and a consequent increase in emissions in those
countries above what they otherwise would be.9 Such leakage has at least
three negative consequences. First, it undercuts the effectiveness of the
greenhouse gas limitations adopted by participating nations. Second, by
making unregulated countries’ economies even more emissions-intensive,
it further raises the costs to them of joining an international greenhouse
gas regulatory treaty as time goes on.10 Third, it further undermines the
willingness of the industrialized countries and their firms to adopt and
implement emissions limitations.11
Another highly important consideration is that inclusion of all major
emitting countries is necessary to ensure the widest scope for inter-
national emissions trading and thereby achieve the maximum cost savings
in limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The cost savings from emissions
trading will be greatly impaired if the low-cost abatement opportunities in
40 RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY
China and other developing countries are not available. Thus, emissions
trading limited to the industrialized Annex B nations is estimated to
reduce total costs of the Kyoto Protocol compliance by over 50 percent
relative to a regime with no international trading at all, but full global
trading including the developing countries is estimated to reduce total
costs by over 75 percent relative to a regime with no trading at all.12
Finally, expanding participation is also important to constrain the mar-
ket power that may be exercised in an allowance trading market. The
omission of major developing countries from the Kyoto Protocol’s emis-
sions limitation obligations is likely to confer significant market power on
Russia and Ukraine, the largest allowance sellers among industrialized
countries.13 Including China, India, and others would ensure a more
competitive global market in allowance sales.
Obstacles to Expanding Participation in 
Global Climate Regulation
Despite the imperative need for a system of global participation by all
major emitting nations and sources in an international greenhouse gas
limitations regime,14 important obstacles to achieving inclusive global
participation exist. Even if prudent regulatory limitations on greenhouse
gas emissions are justified from a global perspective, important individual
countries may conclude that it is not in their overall national self-interest
to agree to such limitations because the benefits to those nations of
reduced warming are significantly less than the costs of greenhouse gas
limitations, and the net costs are too great to be offset by other factors
(such as reputation, favorable treatment by other major participants on
other issues, and a nation’s positive disposition to global cooperation).
Because international agreements operate on the voting rule of consent by
each nation, the national determination of interest is pivotal. In economic
terms, international treaties, like contracts, must be Pareto-improving for
all signatories; treaties must not only be collectively beneficial but also
individually beneficial (compared with not joining).15 Moreover, even
countries that would benefit overall from joining an international green-
house gas regulatory regime may avoid joining and seek to free-ride on
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other countries’ efforts and thereby reap most of the benefits of participa-
tion while avoiding the costs of emissions limitations. Similarly, countries
may not comply with their agreed treaty obligations; cheating and defec-
tion may occur.16
Even if the free-rider and compliance problems can be solved, some
countries may still judge that it would not be to their overall national
advantage to join in an effort to limit global emissions. The costs and ben-
efits of greenhouse gas abatement vary widely across countries. Some
countries see strong net environmental benefits from greenhouse gas
abatement, while others may regard the net environmental impact of
warming as neutral or unclear. Still other countries may believe that they
will benefit from warming—for example, through enhanced agricultural
yields from a warmer and more carbon-rich atmosphere.17 If a country’s
perceived disadvantages of joining an emissions limitations regime exceed
its perceived advantages, that country generally will not be interested in
joining (absent other inducements).
The importance of national economic interests in this regard is 
reflected in the differing positions of industrialized countries with respect
to the Kyoto Protocol. As discussed above, the European Union has
already made substantial progress toward its Kyoto Protocol targets
because of fortuitous post-1990 reductions in carbon dioxide emissions in
the United Kingdom and Germany. Other industrialized countries,
including the United States and Japan, would have to make much 
sharper reductions below the business-as-usual level to meet their Kyoto
Protocol targets. The United States and Japan are also not expected to
suffer significant net adverse effects from warming over the next few
decades. Thus, it is not surprising that the European Union is a strong
advocate of the Kyoto Protocol targets, while Japan and the United States
have been much more reluctant or opposed.18 The former Soviet Union
countries have experienced significant declines in greenhouse gas–
generating economic activity since 1990 (or other relevant historical
baseline years) and have thus been happy to join the Kyoto Protocol with
the prospect of being able to sell large amounts of surplus allowances.
Vast differences in circumstances also exist among developing coun-
tries. The Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto
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Protocol effectively treat as “developing” all countries other than OECD
members and countries with economies in transition. Some countries thus
categorized as “developing” already have high per capita incomes, higher
even than those of some of the “industrialized” countries that are subject
to the Kyoto Protocol limitations on emissions,19 while many other devel-
oping countries are indeed quite poor. As a group, the developing coun-
tries will likely suffer significant adverse environmental impacts as a result
of substantial or rapid global warming. But some developing countries,
such as the small island states and those located in dry tropical regions,
will be much more significantly harmed than others. Other develop-
ing countries such as China may even perceive a benefit from warm-
ing over the next several decades because of longer growing seasons, 
carbon fertilization, and consequent enhanced agricultural productivity.20
Meanwhile, most developing countries fear that limits on their green-
house gas emissions would inhibit their economic growth. Even limits on
industrialized country emissions are likely to affect, in differing ways,
developing country economies.21
In general, many and probably most developing countries are likely to
view the costs of greenhouse gas regulation as quite high and the benefits
as relatively low. They typically have quite limited resources, and their
more immediate and pressing social priorities—dealing with hunger, dis-
ease, illiteracy, and violence—are more important than seeking long-term
climate protection.22 Moreover, the developing countries have strong equity
arguments against assuming emissions limitation obligations. The industrial-
ized countries, they point out, got rich by burning massive amounts of fossil
fuels, and the long atmospheric residence time of carbon dioxide and some
other greenhouse gases means that many of the emissions generated in the
past by the industrialized countries are still in the atmosphere and constitute
the principal proportion of the current warming effect.23 The developing
countries argue, understandably, that they are entitled to the same freedom
to develop as the industrialized countries have enjoyed. They oppose obliga-
tions to limit greenhouse gas emissions as a trap that will shackle them in
poverty.24 (Some developing countries that make such assertions, however,
may actually enjoy net benefits from limitations but simply wish to free-ride
on others’ efforts or voice opposition as a negotiating tactic.)
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Accordingly, for a variety of reasons, many major emitting countries,
including China, India, Brazil, and perhaps the United States, may per-
ceive greenhouse gas abatement as offering few or even negative national
net benefits. We argue in chapter 4 that in fact it is in the overall national
interest of the United States to join a well-designed global greenhouse gas
regulatory program. Enlisting U.S. participation will nonetheless be a
challenge. The challenges to enlisting developing country participation
are even greater. The industrialized countries must, we believe, provide
developing countries with side payments, such as financial inducements
or extra “headroom” allowances, to help underwrite the costs of emissions
limitations while simultaneously ensuring that the developing countries
limit their emissions. That is, the developing countries must participate in
limiting future emissions, but their abatement efforts should be financed
by industrialized countries. Such an approach would render the climate
treaty regime more effective than the Kyoto Protocol, while respecting the
fairness concerns and differing priorities of developing countries. As
explained more fully in chapter 5, the most efficient, effective, and credi-
ble method for providing such inducements to developing countries is not
through official government assistance payments or a global greenhouse
gas emissions tax system but through an international emissions trading
system that assigns developing countries allowances above their existing
emissions, providing “headroom” for future growth or profitable
allowance sales or both, while also reducing the costs of emissions limita-
tions to industrialized countries.
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U.S. Interests and Global Climate
Regulation
The United States cannot afford to ignore climate issues, do nothing about
greenhouse gas emissions, and sit on the sidelines while other countries
design and implement a global regime that the United States will later wish
that it had helped shape. The United States has strong environmental, com-
mercial, and strategic interests in the adoption of a responsible, well-
designed global regime for greenhouse gas limitations that includes major
developing country emitters, makes full use of international emissions
trading and the comprehensive approach, and sets prudent emissions lim-
itations pathways.
The advantages to the United States of joining the Kyoto Protocol as cur-
rently structured do not clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Even before 
the Bush administration withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, the Clinton
administration had decided not to submit the treaty to the Senate for
ratification. But well-designed improvements to the current Kyoto Protocol
arrangements, as we propose here, could offer the United States significant
additional benefits and cost reductions and thereby attract U.S. participa-
tion. For that to occur, the participation of key developing countries such as
China is especially important: it would improve the environmental effective-
ness of the treaty, prevent leakage and the fear of competitive disadvantage,
and reduce abatement costs by enlarging the scope for allowance trading.
Warming Effects and U.S. Welfare
The adverse environmental effects threatened by global warming are likely
to harm the welfare of U.S. citizens through a variety of mechanisms. Some
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of the environmental harms caused by rapid climate change would occur
in the United States and would directly decrease the welfare of U.S. citi-
zens. In the near term, those adverse effects will probably not be severe
and may be counterbalanced by beneficial effects, such as increased agri-
cultural productivity. But as the warming continues and accelerates, the
adverse effects are expected to increase over time and eventually to dom-
inate.1 Those impacts include the impairment of major forests in the
northern United States, the erosion of heavily settled coastlines, and the
intrusion of tropical diseases such as malaria in the southern United
States.2 Warming may also trigger disruptions of basic climate-sensitive
earth systems that would cause serious environmental harms in the
United States. Further, many U.S. citizens are concerned about the
adverse ecological and welfare impacts of climate change, whether they
occur in the United States or elsewhere.
In addition, the environmental impacts of warming in other regions of
the world could threaten political and economic destabilization and other
consequences that would be contrary to U.S. interests. In an intercon-
nected global economy, the U.S. economy could be harmed if other coun-
tries’ incomes falter because of damage from climate change (or, for that
matter, because of excessively costly climate policy). If the United States
is perceived abroad as the lone outlaw causing global warming, then
intense storms, coastal flooding, and crop losses in desperately poor
countries—whether or not actually caused by global warming—may
become flashpoints for anti-American backlashes. While the extent of
those risks is highly uncertain, they cannot be ignored.
The studies on the impact of climate change reviewed in chapter 2
suggest that domestic environmental harms due to unchecked climate
change could, as a best rough estimate, cost the United States from 1 to 2
percent of gross domestic product by the middle to the end of the twenty-
first century and could cost the world as a whole even more (not count-
ing the risks of high warming, high ecological sensitivity, and possible
nonlinear disruptions). The Kyoto Protocol (with all Annex B countries
participating, including the United States) is predicted to slow warming
by 4 to 14 percent below the business-as-usual emission level, which
translates into a reduction of .04 to .10 degree Celsius below a 1 degree
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warming forecast for 2050 and a reduction of .08 to .28 degree Celsius
below a 2.5 degree warming forecast for 2100.3 (One reason the Kyoto
Protocol would make such a small dent in future warming is the omission
of developing countries; another is the time lag between abatement
actions and the effects on future warming.) Those benefits might be 
worth roughly .1 to .3 percent of global GDP and about .1 percent of 
U.S. GDP or perhaps up to .2 percent with nonmarket benefits included.4
Marginal benefits, measured in economic terms, might be about $25 per
ton of carbon emissions avoided.5 In calculating benefits, we should 
add a risk premium to reflect the value to society of avoiding low-
probability risks of very large harms, including the risks associated with
high warming and ecosystem sensitivity and the risk of disruptive non-
linear consequences.
Meanwhile, the studies on the costs of the Kyoto Protocol reviewed in
chapter 2 suggest that the climate protection delivered by the protocol
(without emissions trading, the comprehensive approach, or temporal
flexibility) might cost the United States from 1 to 2 or even 3 percent of
GDP. With Annex B (industrialized country) emissions trading, the cost to
the United States of achieving the Kyoto Protocol limitations might fall
about 50 percent, to roughly .5 to 1.5 percent of GDP. With Annex B emis-
sions trading plus the comprehensive approach and temporal flexibility, the
cost to the United States of achieving the Kyoto Protocol limitations might
fall about 80 percent, to roughly .2 to .6 percent of GDP. With full global
emissions trading (including developing countries) plus the comprehensive
approach and temporal flexibility, the cost to the United States might fall by
90 percent or more, to roughly .1 to .3 percent of GDP or less.6
Thus, even if we optimistically assume maximally cost-effective means
for compliance, the domestic environmental benefits to the United States
of joining the Kyoto Protocol (roughly .1 to .2 percent of U.S. GDP) would
not exceed the domestic costs to the United States of joining the Kyoto
Protocol as currently written, authorizing Annex B trading but not full
global trading (roughly .2 to .6 percent of GDP). This conclusion could
well hold even if the negative economic and other consequences within
the United States of the adverse impacts of climate change elsewhere were
included in the analysis. It is therefore not surprising that presidents of
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both political parties have declined to seek ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol. But our proposal to engage the participation of major develop-
ing countries would raise the benefits (because of the greater reduction in
future warming as more of global emissions are covered) and would
reduce the costs (because developing country participation in full global
emissions trading would reduce U.S. costs to .1 to .3 percent of GDP or
below and would reduce the fear of competitive harms due to leakage).
Our proposals to ensure full scope for comprehensiveness (including
sinks) and to remove unnecessary restrictions on emissions trading 
would also ease costs. And our proposal to set limitations targets based 
on emissions pathways that better balance benefits and costs would fur-
ther increase net benefits. Hence, our proposals would substantially
strengthen the case for U.S. participation.
Commercial Benefits of U.S. Participation in 
Global Climate Regulation
Moreover, an analysis that considers only the environmental benefits to
the United States of participation in a global greenhouse gas cap-and-trade
system in relation to the economic costs of compliance with caps is exces-
sively narrow; it ignores important commercial benefits of U.S. participa-
tion that will be lost if the United States stays out.
At least in the short run, U.S. industry would escape regulatory burdens
if the United States refuses to subscribe to greenhouse gas emissions limita-
tions and could thereby enjoy a competitive advantage over firms in other
industrialized countries that are subject to such burdens. (Some business
leaders and scholars believe that the spur of greenhouse gas limitation meas-
ures would enhance U.S. firms’ total efficiency and competitiveness. Our
argument in favor of U.S. participation in global climate protection policy
does not rely or depend upon that view.) But U.S. nonparticipation will also
deprive U.S. businesses of many valuable commercial opportunities and
impose significant business risks. Those harms may to a considerable extent
offset the benefits to U.S. businesses of avoiding greenhouse gas regulation
and must in any event be considered in assessing the total advantages and
disadvantages to the United States of participation versus nonparticipation.
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Many U.S. firms have the technology and know-how to achieve green-
house gas limitations through products, processes, and techniques that
improve energy efficiency, enhance sinks, and otherwise reduce net green-
house gas intensity. A global greenhouse gas emissions trading system that
includes major developing countries would provide those firms with enor-
mous business opportunities. U.S. firms with the capital and the right tech-
nology and know-how would partner with ventures in foreign countries,
including China and other developing countries, to achieve greenhouse gas
limitations and to obtain valuable emission allowances as a part of the
return on their investments. They would use those allowances to meet
domestic regulatory obligations or sell them or both. Also, many U.S.–based
services businesses, including those providing financial products, project
finance, consulting, accounting, and legal services, and insurance and other
forms of risk management have the technology and know-how to help run
and use emissions trading markets and ventures effectively. For example, the
Chicago Climate Exchange opened for trading in early 2003. Those oppor-
tunities for U.S. business are likely to be foreclosed or sharply restricted if
the United States remains on the sidelines. London, not New York or
Chicago, will become the center of global emissions trading.
Ironically, the United States has championed emissions trading and the
comprehensive approach since 1990 but is now standing aside while oth-
ers move first. Without U.S. participation, a danger exists that the inter-
national greenhouse gas trading system will be designed and implemented
in ways that are adverse to U.S. interests, for example, by restricting full
scope for emissions trading and the use of sinks. The United Kingdom,
Denmark, Norway, and others are already launching their own domestic
carbon dioxide emissions trading systems, and the European Union has
adopted a Europe-wide emissions trading system, also limited to carbon
dioxide emissions.7 Without U.S. leadership, those European carbon
dioxide emissions trading systems may become the models for the global
trading system and disadvantage the United States if it decides to join
later. Vested interests will arise in the initial system that will make it
difficult to achieve future changes later. Such path dependence in the
design of emissions trading will not only deprive U.S. businesses of
market opportunities but may also restrict the full availability to the
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United States of international trading and the comprehensive approach,
including gases other than carbon dioxide, and sinks.
The lurking possibility of “carbon trade wars” also exists if the United
States does nothing to regulate greenhouse gases while other countries
move ahead. Competitiveness concerns may well lead the European Union
or other industrialized countries with domestic emissions limitations sys-
tems to impose trade measures on the United States, such as countervail-
ing duties or border tax adjustments on imports of American goods in
proportion to the amount of greenhouse gas emissions assertedly involved
in the production of those goods and the corresponding cost savings
enjoyed by U.S. businesses; under the World Trade Organization shrimp-
turtle precedent, such measures might be upheld against WTO challenge.8
Furthermore, firms based in Europe and other countries that are par-
ties to the Kyoto Protocol may require their suppliers and others with
whom they do business, including in particular businesses based in the
United States, to adopt greenhouse gas limitations. In addition, U.S. firms
are likely to be targeted for aggressive environmental group and consumer
publicity and boycott efforts aimed at major multinational greenhouse gas
emitters that are not subject to or do not otherwise adopt and implement
limitation programs. That could hurt U.S.–based multinationals that will
face pressure for limitations without any assurance that they will get credit
for reductions against any future U.S. regulations. U.S. multinationals may
also be subject to competition from other U.S. companies with fewer or
no international operations that are not targeted for such measures.
U.S. accession to a global greenhouse gas regulatory regime and adop-
tion of federal greenhouse gas regulation would also reduce the business
risks currently faced by U.S. firms that must make major investment deci-
sions in facilities and products that generate or use energy or that would
otherwise be affected by greenhouse gas regulation. Uncertainty in green-
house gas regulatory policies will create a bind for U.S. utilities and other
businesses that are already subject to increasingly stringent U.S. environ-
mental regulations aimed at air pollutants, including particulate matter,
sulfur oxide, and nitrogen oxide, generated by sources that also create
greenhouse gases as copollutants. Capital investments needed to comply
with those regulations may be rendered obsolete by the subsequent
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adoption by the federal government or states of greenhouse gas regulatory
controls that will require additional and different investments to limit car-
bon dioxide or other greenhouse gas emissions from the same facilities.
Unless greenhouse gases are added to the regulatory mix sooner rather
than later, those businesses will face a period of substantial uncertainty and
regulatory risk. The Bush administration and members of Congress have
made proposals for a new round of Clean Air Act legislation improving
additional limitations on emissions of three major pollutants (covering sul-
fur oxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury). States including North Carolina
are initiating stricter regulation on utility emissions of some or all of those
pollutants. It may well be more cost-effective over the longer run to adopt
a strategy that includes carbon dioxide as well,9 or even a strategy that
covers five or more pollutants (including methane and other greenhouse
gases), rather than to follow a piecemeal approach over time. That is the same
logic on which the United States advocated the cost savings of the com-
prehensive (multigas) approach to global climate policy in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Many in industry
might even prefer a single, integrated, multipollutant regime to a sequence
of separate fragmented and potentially inconsistent partial regulations over
time or across the states (or both), especially if a comprehensive regulatory
program is provided for interpollutant emissions trading.10 The U.S. auto
industry is facing analogous risks as a result of California’s imposition of
restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions from new automobiles. (It is
unclear whether such a measure will be held to be preempted by existing
federal law.) At the same time, the absence of credit for early investments
in greenhouse gas emissions abatement means that U.S. firms may be hold-
ing back on abatement investments, including investments that they would
have made irrespective of climate policy, to be able to obtain credits in the
future after regulatory controls on greenhouse gases are adopted. That drag
on investment may adversely affect U.S. economic growth.11
For all those reasons, U.S. accession to a well-designed international
greenhouse gas regulatory regime would provide significant commercial
opportunities for U.S. firms and reduce a variety of business risks; those
benefits must be weighed in the balance along with the disadvantages of
accession in determining overall U.S. national interest.
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Strategic Benefits of U.S. Participation in 
Global Climate Regulation
In addition to the environmental and business rationales just noted, a third
set of considerations relates to the strategic interests of the United States
across a broader range of global issues. Especially after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, the United States needs the cooperation of many
other countries across the globe to help achieve its objectives in national
security (including fighting terrorism and avoiding escalating regional
conflicts) and global economic and political stability. (As mentioned above,
adverse weather events could themselves become flashpoints for anti–U.S.
behavior if the United States appears to be the lone cause of global climate
change.) Many other countries upon whose cooperation the United States
depends are deeply concerned about climate change; they will bridle at
U.S. indifference or intransigence regarding climate issues. The United
States cannot easily aspire to be an effective leader and persuade others to
follow its views on other subjects while refusing any engagement on cli-
mate issues that are of major and legitimate environmental and economic
concern to Europe, Japan, other industrialized countries, Russia, other
members of the former Soviet Union, and developing countries. On the
other hand, if the United States successfully engages China and other major
developing countries and helps secure their participation in international
greenhouse gas regulation, the United States will gain leadership on an
important global issue and help strengthen multilateralism in ways that
should benefit the United States in other areas of international policy.12
Indeed, the United States may find benefit in pursuing a negotiating strat-
egy of issue linkage that trades sensible U.S. cooperation on climate policy
for others’ cooperation on issues of greater interest to the United States. 
In effect, the United States could receive in-kind side payments on other
strategic issues in return for agreeing to act on climate change.
Challenges to U.S. Participation in Global Climate Regulation
As discussed above, the advantages and disadvantages to the United 
States of joining the Kyoto Protocol “as is” appear to us to be fairly 
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closely balanced. The changes in the global greenhouse gas regulatory
regime that we propose, however, would tip the scales in favor of U.S. 
participation by greatly reducing the costs to the United States and
expanding the benefits, including commercial and strategic as well as
environmental benefits. The United States would, however, face signifi-
cant international challenges in securing such changes if it sought to do
so. There are also great domestic political challenges in getting the
American government and people to support measures to address green-
house gas emissions, especially given the long time horizon and interna-
tional dimensions of the problem. In the near term the United States is
expected to enjoy net agricultural benefits from warming and carbon
fertilization, and the ecological effects of warming in the United States are
expected to be less serious than in many other regions. A number of
important and well-organized economic interests also exist, particularly
firms and workers in the coal industry and certain other energy sectors as
well as transportation, that would be adversely affected by greenhouse gas
regulation and have strongly and successfully opposed it.13
Beyond public attitudes and perceived national net benefit, which are
the primary factors in national choices to join a treaty or not, special fea-
tures of the U.S. legal and political system may make ratification of inter-
national environmental treaties more difficult than in Europe or other
countries. The United States has a long history of ambivalence toward and
nonparticipation in multilateral treaties in many subject areas. The current
U.S. posture reflects considerable hostility, suspicion, or indifference to
many multilateral treaties and governance regimes, including environ-
mental treaties and other regimes.14 That broad pattern may reflect a 
long-standing U.S. tendency toward isolationism (although one wants to
know the reasons that sustain any such tendency). It may reflect U.S.
dominance as the lone superpower after the cold war, while Europe is
geared toward building international institutions to redress the power
imbalance.15 It may reflect the perception in the United States that 
Europe is seeking costly international treaties to “raise its rivals’ costs” in
international trade competition.16 It may also reflect important domestic
institutional factors. The separation of powers between the president and
Congress adds a hurdle to international treaty accession not found in
U.S. INTERESTS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE REGULATION    53
parliamentary systems. Also, the United States is often regarded as having
a more adversarial and rigid domestic legal system, one in which citizens
can sue to enforce the law.17 That circumstance tends to lead U.S. treaty
negotiators to resist environmental regulatory treaties that they fear would
be more rigorously applied in the United States than elsewhere.18 Those
and other features of the legal and political systems in the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere may explain part of the story of the Kyoto
Protocol, the Bonn and Marrakech accords, the talks at The Hague, and
the challenge of leadership involved in securing U.S. engagement in global
and domestic greenhouse gas regulation.19
Nonetheless, the United States has been an engaged, major participant
in numerous multilateral regimes, including the creation of the United
Nations, the Marshall Plan, the WTO, international peacekeeping, and
many international environmental treaties such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species and the Montreal Protocol—
and the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change. The American
public seems likely to support a responsible approach to climate change,
as it has with respect to other international and environmental problems,
if well informed by forward-thinking leaders of the national advantages 
of participation. The new Bush climate policy proposals, while eschewing
any regulatory measures, recognize that climate change is a problem that
requires a response and thereby open the way for more ambitious meas-
ures. Prominent voices in Congress are advocating further steps, provided
that they meet concerns about competitiveness and net benefits. A num-
ber of states are initiating greenhouse gas regulation. Some major U.S.
firms have formed voluntary programs to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
The Chicago Climate Exchange will soon begin handling allowance trades
among a group of volunteer businesses. A strategy such as we propose, to
bring major developing countries into a global greenhouse gas regime at
the same time as the United States, together with other needed modifica-
tions in global climate regulatory design, could provide a further signifi-
cant and successful impetus to U.S. participation.
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The Elements of Sound Regulatory
Design for Climate Policy
In this chapter we set forth the elements of a sound strategy for limiting
greenhouse gas emissions at both the domestic and the international
levels. Ideally, such a strategy should achieve emissions limitations at the
lowest cost by providing maximum flexibility in the location, means, and
timing of reducing net emissions. It should provide strong incentives for
innovation in low greenhouse gas–emitting technologies. It should maxi-
mize net social benefits by setting emissions limitations pathways based
on a balancing of the costs and benefits for both the level and timing of
the limitations. At the international level the regulatory regime should be
“participation efficient,” designed to attract the widest possible participa-
tion of major greenhouse gas–emitting countries, including developing
countries, subject to the cost of securing such participation. It should be
politically, environmentally, and financially credible. It should be designed
to be implemented and administered in a practical manner and include
effective arrangements for monitoring and compliance assurance. In prac-
tice, real-world arrangements will inevitably fall short of fully realizing
those various goals because of conflicts among the goals, transactions
costs, political and administrative constraints, and other factors.
Nevertheless, those goals should guide the design of greenhouse gas reg-
ulatory policy. They can best be realized by a design that makes maximum
use of economic incentive instruments for achieving limitations, in par-
ticular, tradable permit systems.
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Market Failures in Use of the Atmosphere 
for Greenhouse Gas Disposal
An effective climate policy will involve government policies that gradually
reduce the addition of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. That will
require legal rules and regulatory programs including monitoring, report-
ing, sanctions, liabilities, and other incentives for compliance. The Kyoto
Protocol’s critics have questioned whether legal measures to limit green-
house gas emissions are necessary or appropriate, at least at the present
time.1 They maintain that we should rely on (unmodified) markets and on
voluntary measures by firms. We disagree. Just as property rights and nui-
sance law are necessary to regulate conflicting land uses, similar rules,
backed by the force of law, are needed to prevent wasteful overuse of the
atmosphere. Legal rules backed by compliance assurances are needed
internationally to cement cooperation and to police free-riding and defec-
tion among countries in addressing the global consequences of unrestrict-
ed use of the atmosphere to dispose of greenhouse gas emissions.
Today, the global atmosphere is being treated as an open-access
resource and as a result is being overused in a classic “tragedy of the com-
mons.”2 Those who generate greenhouse gases have little or no incentive
for voluntary restraint because they bear only a fraction of the climate
risks that they generate but would bear the full costs of abatement efforts.
Accordingly, the atmosphere is overexploited, and climate risks are greater
than they would be if the full social costs of emissions were appropriately
reflected in the decisions of those using the atmosphere for greenhouse
gas disposal. This is a classic market failure, one that ordinary market
operations and voluntary firm behavior will not correct. Because govern-
ment regulation is also costly, not all market failures necessarily justify a
regulatory response.3 In the case of climate change, however, the risks are
sufficiently great and the costs of regulation can (through sound design)
be made sufficiently low that some restrictions are warranted to prevent
collective harm. Such restrictions could take the form of centralized com-
mands on conduct, government purchases of reductions, emissions taxes
designed to limit emissions, or quantity caps on emissions with transfer-
able emissions rights. The latter approach—which amounts to globally
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agreed recognition and parceling of property (use) rights—is the founda-
tion of current global climate policy.4 In that light, the Bush administra-
tion and others should see the basic design of the Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol—a framework of marketable
property rights—not as an intrusion on economic growth or sovereignty
but rather as a kindred effort to the familiar parceling of property rights in
land, oil, and other resources that enabled prosperity and stability to
thrive in America. If properly designed and implemented, such systems
are generally the most efficient and effective means of addressing the sig-
nificant externalities that occur under open-access arrangements and of
promoting social welfare. Such systems, like all property rights systems,
depend on law—and on the compliance machinery that backs it up.
Legal regulation of emissions is, to be sure, only one tool among sev-
eral in a sound climate policy. Investment in low greenhouse gas techno-
logical innovation needs to increase in both the public and private sectors.
The scale for international cooperation in that effort is wide. The empha-
sis of government spending should be on basic science and transforma-
tive new technologies, in which private markets would not yet invest.
Government must also identify and correct existing governmental policies
and institutional failures that blunt the economic incentives that pro-
ducers and consumers would otherwise have to conserve energy and
economize on net greenhouse gas emissions. They include perverse
government subsidies that exacerbate fossil-fuel extraction, consumption,
and clearing of forests.5 They also include current regulatory regimes,
such as the New Source Review program under the Clean Air Act, that
inhibit firms’ flexibility to invest in greenhouse gas abatement options.6
Information-based strategies, including mandatory public reporting by
firms of net greenhouse gas emissions, may also be useful as a means of
generating incentives, especially in the early years before a full-fledged
regulatory system is implemented. Public visibility of such information
would encourage firms to reduce net emissions, and the information
would also be useful for developing the national greenhouse gas invento-
ries and methods of measuring sources and sinks. Further, governments
should invest in adaptation assistance, especially for vulnerable and poor
regions that lack affordable insurance or access to adaptive technologies.
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Such measures, however, will not be enough to secure reductions in 
the business-as-usual level of emissions on the scale required to moderate
the climate risks resulting from the common pool character of the atmos-
phere. For example, although energy intensity has declined with econ-
omic development, carbon dioxide emissions have nonetheless increased
significantly because of the increase in total economic activity.7 Moreover,
the appropriate new technologies will not be developed and adopted
unless market actors, including both producers and consumers, have an
incentive to demand and adopt them. For open-access collective goods,
regulation is needed to provide such incentives at an adequate level. The
essence of externalities is that they are not taken into account in market
transactions. Although large insurance companies may adjust premiums
(for example, on coastal real estate) to reflect increased risk of losses from
adverse weather events, that move would influence the behavior of climate
change victims rather than emissions sources. In general, the transaction
costs of Coasean bargains between those adversely affected by climate
change and greenhouse gas emission sources—which are separated by
great distances and by uncertainties about specific causes and specific
impacts—are far too high to expect much market-driven abatement. The
same transaction costs inhibit the use of tort liability litigation and third-
party liability insurance to internalize the costs of greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Incorporating adequate climate protection into market-based
decisions and transactions will therefore require new legal rules.
The Need for Maximum Flexibility of 
Means for Limiting Emissions
Climate policy must, as discussed below, set sensible greenhouse gas
limitations objectives and pathways; it must also embrace the most cost-
effective means for achieving emissions limitations goals. Because the
costs of achieving significant limitations on rising greenhouse gas emis-
sions are large, it is especially important to design greenhouse gas regula-
tion to minimize those costs and to avoid wasting scarce social resources.
Minimizing costs will also help to attract wider global participation in
greenhouse gas regulation.
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Cost-effectiveness requires flexibility in what, how, where, and when
emissions are reduced. “What” flexibility involves the ability to achieve
limitations benefits by limiting net emissions of any or all of the several
greenhouse gases, weighted by their relative contribution to adverse cli-
mate change, rather than by confining abatement to one or a few gases
and ignoring sinks. In other words, it requires a comprehensive approach.
“How” flexibility relates to the choice of technical measures to reduce net
emissions of the several greenhouse gases, such as fuel switching (for
example, from coal to gas or nuclear or solar), energy conservation,
process and materials changes in manufacturing, improved agricultural
practices, sequestration in greenhouse gas sinks such as forests and soils,
removal and storage of carbon from fuel inputs or emissions, and other
options. “Where” flexibility denotes the ability to choose the locations
where emissions reductions can be achieved at least cost. Because the cost
of abatement varies significantly across locations both within a given
nation and among nations, while the global climate impact of greenhouse
gas emissions is essentially equivalent regardless of location, allowing
where flexibility domestically or internationally can achieve the same cli-
mate protection at much less aggregate cost than a system of limitations
targets without such flexibility.
“When” flexibility pertains to the timing of abatement. Because of tech-
nological change, capital turnover, and other variables, investments in a
given unit of abatement may be more cost-effective at some points in time
than at others. One form of “when” flexibility is provided by the right to
bank extra emissions abatement credits achieved today for use to satisfy
emissions limits in the future. A converse form, borrowing, involves the
right to emit extra emissions in the present in return for assuming the
obligation to achieve extra abatement in the future. Setting emissions tar-
gets for a nation or a firm as cumulative limits over multiyear periods (for
example, summed emissions over ten years) rather than annually gives a
nation or firm the flexibility to allocate limitations and thereby to bank or
borrow within the more extended time period. The flexibility in the tim-
ing of limitations investments thus provided can create significant cost
savings. On the other hand, the intertemporal flexibility to borrow height-
ens the need for effective compliance assurance measures to deter a nation
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or firm from doing little to reduce emissions in the early years and then
failing to accelerate abatement in the later years to meet the aggregate
limit.8
In the following two sections, we discuss more fully two key mecha-
nisms for achieving cost-effective “what”, “how”, and “where” flexibility in
greenhouse gas limitations: the comprehensive approach and economic
incentive systems, especially emissions trading. Those mechanisms have
been at the centerpiece of U.S. policy since 1990 and have spurred con-
siderable international controversy and debate over climate regulatory
design; they accordingly justify more extended consideration.
The Benefits of a Comprehensive Approach
On both environmental and economic grounds, it is imperative that a
comprehensive approach that includes all gases, sources, and sinks be
adopted in regulatory strategies to limit greenhouse gas emissions. The
comprehensive approach has been advocated by the United States since
1989 and is embodied in both the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol.9 Under the comprehensive approach,
emissions limitation targets are defined in terms of a common unit of
measurement that includes all the greenhouse gases. That unit is typically
expressed as a metric ton of carbon or the equivalent. The equivalencies
among the various greenhouse gases are determined by their relative con-
tribution to atmospheric warming on the basis of their heat-trapping
power (radiative forcing) and residence time. Emissions of different green-
house gases by different sources and the contributions of sinks in seques-
tering greenhouse gas can be estimated and compared.10 Under the
comprehensive approach, emissions limitation targets are expressed in
metric tons of carbon equivalent. A nation or source may select what-
ever mix of limitations of different greenhouse gas emissions and sink
enhancements it chooses to achieve its net greenhouse gas emissions lim-
itation target.
Because there is so much variety in greenhouse gas limitation opportu-
nities across gases and sectors, the comprehensive approach would yield
large cost savings—up to 60 percent or more—relative to an approach
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that fixes limits for carbon dioxide alone.11 The comprehensive approach
is also environmentally necessary to prevent perverse shifts in emissions that
would otherwise occur from regulated gases (such as carbon dioxide) and
sectors to unregulated ones (such as methane), which could exacerbate
climate change.12 Further, the comprehensive approach yields valuable side
benefits in reduction of other pollutants.13 Criticisms of the comprehensive
approach as too complex and difficult to implement are misplaced.
Simplified default rules can be adopted to deal with cross-gas comparison
indexes and the uncertainties presented in measuring greenhouse gases
such as agricultural methane and carbon dioxide sinks; those rules can be
revised as monitoring and measurement techniques improve.14
Environmental Benefits of the Comprehensive Approach. The com-
prehensive approach provides significant environmental benefits by
avoiding the perverse shifts in emissions that would arise from piecemeal
regulatory approaches. The essence of the environment is its intercon-
nectedness. But the complexities of policymaking often push decision-
makers toward narrow, piecemeal solutions that address one obvious
symptom or cause of an environmental problem. Advocates of narrow
solutions claim that limited incremental steps are easier to accomplish
than broader comprehensive approaches.15 While that point has merit, in
many situations piecemeal regulatory strategies may, by ignoring the full
scope of a problem, miss alternative, lower-cost options to achieve the
same overall goal and produce unintended side effects that confound 
well-intentioned policies.16 More comprehensive approaches strive to
match the regulatory response to the full dimensions of the environmen-
tal problem, although informational, administrative, and political con-
straints often limit the extent to which such matching can be achieved in
practice. Regulatory policy will always include a degree of episodic “mud-
dling through” in establishing regulatory ends and means; full compre-
hensive rationality is unattainable. Nonetheless, policy measures should
be guided by a comprehensive perspective and avoid being locked into
short-run strategies that will be quite inferior over the longer run.17
The extent to which environmental regulatory policy should focus
incrementally on discrete, tractable parts of a larger problem or should
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take a more comprehensive approach depends on the specific context.
The circumstances of climate issues and greenhouse gas regulation argue
powerfully in favor of a comprehensive approach. Discussions about global
climate policy in the late 1980s centered on reducing the amount of fossil-
fuel carbon dioxide emitted from the energy sector, because carbon dioxide
was the most plentiful greenhouse gas, the energy sector was the largest
source of carbon dioxide, and the administrative and monitoring costs of
regulating fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions were significantly less than
for other gases or for sinks. The initial negotiating positions of the European
Union and a number of major countries proposed a treaty calling for cuts in
energy-sector carbon dioxide. But scientists were at the same time demon-
strating that carbon dioxide was only one of several important greenhouse
gases. Although the volume of carbon dioxide emitted far exceeds that of
other greenhouse gases and has a long atmospheric residence time, each car-
bon dioxide molecule is a relatively weak absorber of infrared radiation.
Other greenhouse gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, are important
contributors to global warming potential because they are roughly 20 and
300 times more potent per unit of emissions, respectively, than carbon diox-
ide at retaining heat in the atmosphere over time, even though their emis-
sion volumes are far lower. In total, anthropogenic emissions of carbon
dioxide make a greater contribution to atmospheric warming than the other
greenhouse gases in the aggregate, but the role of greenhouse gases other
than carbon dioxide is far too important to ignore.18 Furthermore, the rela-
tive influence of methane and nitrous oxide is expected to increase in the
future as the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere rises and
more and more of the infrared radiation at the wavelength blocked by car-
bon dioxide molecules is being absorbed. Because of that “saturation effect,”
additional emissions of carbon dioxide, the most abundant greenhouse gas,
will have decreasing marginal warming impacts relative to those of less
abundant gases such as methane. Thus, narrowly targeting a greenhouse gas
regulatory program solely at fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions and omit-
ting the other salient greenhouse gases would seriously undermine regula-
tion’s effectiveness in averting climate change.
Experience with environmental problems that are analogous to green-
house gas regulation underscores the risk that piecemeal strategies,
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adopted in the name of practicality, may prove self-defeating because
efforts to solve one aspect of a problem often intensify other, neglected
aspects.19 Thus, during the 1970s the United States enacted piecemeal,
separate environmental regulatory laws addressing discharges of residuals
to the air, the water, and land. But restrictions targeted on one medium
induced disposal into other media.20 Like squeezing one end of a balloon,
that approach shifted the problems elsewhere and delayed the attainment
of the primary goal of a clean and safe environment.21
Similarly, focusing solely on energy sector carbon dioxide would induce
perverse shifts in greenhouse gas emissions. For example, controlling
energy sector carbon dioxide alone would invite fuel switching from coal
to natural gas, because burning coal emits about twice as much carbon
dioxide per unit of energy produced as does natural gas. But natural gas
is almost pure methane, and methane is roughly twenty times more 
potent than carbon dioxide per mass at causing global warming. Hence,
as little as a 6 percent rate of fugitive methane emissions from natural gas
systems would be enough to offset fully the carbon dioxide–related bene-
fits of that fuel switching.22 In the United States, natural gas systems rarely
release more than 2 percent of their methane, but in parts of Europe the
methane leakage rate has been much higher, often exceeding 6 percent—
especially in Russia, from which much of the natural gas to replace
European coal would come. In such circumstances an exclusive focus on
fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions could actually yield a net increase in
the contribution to global warming.23 Another example of the adverse
environmental side effects of regulating only carbon dioxide is provided
by replacement of fossil fuels with biomass fuels, such as ethanol made
from corn.24
To prevent such perverse consequences, programs to limit greenhouse
gas should aim to be comprehensive and to encompass all the major green-
house gases (including methane and nitrous oxide as well as carbon diox-
ide) and all sectors (including agriculture and forests as well as energy). A
comprehensive approach would give sources the incentive to find ways to
reduce all those greenhouse gases across all sectors. It would also yield
valuable reductions in other pollutants.25 And firms would have incentives
to invest in conserving and expanding sinks such as forests to sequester
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carbon and would thereby potentially aid biodiversity conservation as well
as climate protection.26
Economic Benefits of the Comprehensive Approach. In addition to its
important environmental benefits, a comprehensive approach provides
significant economic advantages through the cost savings afforded by
“what” flexibility. Because so much variety exists in opportunities to limit
greenhouse gas across sectors and nations, the comprehensive approach
would yield large cost savings as compared with a piecemeal approach
that fixes limits for fossil carbon dioxide alone or for each gas separately
or that ignores sinks.
For example, the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that meeting an
emissions target for the United States of 20 percent below 1990 levels by
the year 2010 by comprehensively addressing all greenhouse gases,
instead of just controlling energy sector carbon dioxide alone, would
reduce costs by 75 percent; adding the option of sink enhancement would
reduce costs by 90 percent compared with the energy sector carbon diox-
ide emissions policy.27 Similarly, a World Bank study found that India
could reduce its costs by 80 percent by controlling all greenhouse gases
instead of energy sector carbon dioxide alone.28 The most recent and
thorough study confirms the economic advantages of a comprehensive
approach. Using an integrated assessment model of the world economy, a
research team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that a
comprehensive approach to all greenhouse gases and sectors reduces the
global costs of meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets by at least 60 percent.29
The MIT study also noted that the multigas approach, in addition to
sharply reducing costs, could actually be more effective at protecting 
the climate than the approach regulating only carbon dioxide. First, as
explained above, because of the carbon dioxide saturation effect, the 
relative global warming impact of the non–carbon dioxide gases is ex-
pected to increase in the future. Second, carbon dioxide emissions fertil-
ize plant growth and hence stimulate carbon storage, which reduces
global warming.30 Because emissions of other gases do not have this
climate-beneficial feedback loop, it would, other things being equal, be
preferable to target reductions on them. A study by National Aeronautics
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and Space Administration climate scientist James Hansen and his col-
leagues offers further support for the comprehensive approach. The study
shows that control of non–carbon dioxide greenhouse gases would be
cost-effective and would yield significant side benefits to human health
from the reduction of local air pollutants.31
Practicality of the Comprehensive Approach. Some observers have wor-
ried about the administrative practicality of the comprehensive approach
based on a greenhouse gas equivalence index, because of difficulties in
measuring emissions of non–carbon dioxide greenhouse gases and in
measuring sink uptake of carbon dioxide. They have proposed 
initially regulating only fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions, which are 
relatively easy to determine on the basis of fuel inputs to combustion
processes. They argue that such regulation could be expanded into a more
comprehensive program addressing additional greenhouse gases and sinks
sometime later on.32 The asserted uncertainties in measuring greenhouse
gas sequestered by sinks were repeatedly invoked by EU representatives
and other parties in the international negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol
implementation rules to justify sharply limiting any recognition of carbon
sequestration by land use change and forestry measures, at least until such
uncertainties are resolved. Although the European Union grudgingly
receded partway on that issue, the implementation rules of the Bonn and
Marrakech accords retain limits on the use of land use change and forestry
measures to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions.33
While the comprehensive approach involves substantial additional
monitoring and administrative costs relative to an approach regulating
only fossil-fuel carbon dioxide, those additional costs are far less than the
enormous environmental and economic benefits of the comprehensive
approach and are therefore amply justified.34 Practicable default values
that take appropriate account of monitoring uncertainties, with proce-
dures that reward improved monitoring with greater abatement credit,
can be developed for the major sources of all the greenhouse gases and for
most sinks.35 A piecemeal fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions strategy
would forfeit the huge cost savings (60 percent or more, as discussed
above) to be had from comprehensiveness and would fail to provide
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incentives for innovation in the monitoring and abatement methods for
emissions of greenhouse gases other than fossil-fuel carbon dioxide and
for sink enhancement. Without such incentives for improved monitoring
and abatement, the promise of including the excluded activities in regula-
tion at the point when such methods are developed could prove a mirage.
The better route is to begin with comprehensive coverage by using appro-
priate default factors for emissions other than fossil-fuel carbon dioxide
and for sink uptake while enabling nations or sources to secure more
credit for their abatement efforts by developing and demonstrating
improved measurement methods. The measurement of non–carbon diox-
ide gases and nonenergy sectors would improve in response to that incen-
tive. Improvements can also be made in the greenhouse warming potential
index.36 On the other hand, ignoring the non–carbon dioxide gases and
the role of sinks does not make them go away.37 Furthermore, the politics
of international economic competition would likely delay or thwart the
promised subsequent evolution from piecemeal to comprehensive. The
countries and interest groups enjoying a relative advantage by reason of
the initial narrow design would become entrenched in their favored posi-
tions and would resist expansion to a more comprehensive approach later.
The European Union has, for example, opposed credits for land use
change and forestry measures in part because the European Union has
fewer opportunities to use such measures than the United States and other
global economic rivals.
Accordingly, in the specific context of climate policy, it is far better to
begin with a comprehensive approach by using the best available methods
for monitoring, estimating, and indexing with appropriate adjustments for
uncertainties and to continue updating and improving over time, as
incentives for improved methods bear fruit. Here as elsewhere, it is cru-
cial to get the institutional design right at the outset.
Maximizing the Use of Economic Incentives—Emissions Trading
Sound climate policy also requires maximum use of economic incentive
systems—in particular, emissions trading or taxes—rather than command-
and-control regulatory instruments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. 
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In principle, both types of economic incentive systems can promote miti-
gation at least cost and promote essential low–greenhouse gas technology
development and investment. There are, however, important differences in
the operation, performance, and political and administrative implications
of emissions trading and taxes in the international greenhouse gas regula-
tory context. Some scholars have strongly advocated use of greenhouse gas
taxes to mitigate climate risks.38 Whatever the case may be in domestic
contexts, greenhouse gas emissions trading has a number of decisive
advantages over taxes, including greater implementation credibility, greater
compatibility with national sovereignty concerns, and superior capacity to
enlist the participation of developing countries in a more inclusive global
greenhouse gas regulatory effort.
Advantages of Economic Incentive Systems over Command Alter-
natives. The choice among policy instruments depends on several factors
that influence their environmental effectiveness, administrative and polit-
ical feasibility, and cost in the context of specific environmental problems
and institutional settings.39 In the case of greenhouse gas abatement, tax
and emissions trading systems are much superior to command-and-
control regulatory approaches, whether at the domestic or international
level.
Incentive-based instruments such as taxes and tradable allowances
provide “how” flexibility because they are directed at greenhouse gas
emissions and allow individual sources to choose any means they please
to limit emissions, in contrast to command regulations, which impose
specific limitations requirements on each source and generally limit,
directly or indirectly, the means by which limitations can be achieved.40
Economic incentive systems, again in contrast to command regulations,
also allow “where” flexibility by allowing sources with high costs of con-
trol in one location to emit relatively more greenhouse gas while provid-
ing incentives for sources elsewhere with low control costs to control more
and thereby lower the total costs to society of abatement. (As previously
noted, because greenhouse gases mix globally, where emissions limitations
occur is environmentally irrelevant to global impacts.) Because of those fea-
tures, economic incentive systems are significantly more cost-effective than
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command-style technology standards or fixed command performance
standards.41 Experience at the domestic level with U.S. emissions trading
programs, including most notably the Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emis-
sions trading program, shows that well-designed trading programs can cut
costs by up to 20 to 50 percent compared with uniform emissions limits
and even more compared with technology standards.42 Because the range
of greenhouse gas abatement costs across countries is so wide, the cost
savings for international greenhouse gas emissions trading (compared
with fixed national targets) are quite large. Several studies have found that
emissions trading among the Annex B industrialized countries would
reduce costs by about 50 percent, and full international emissions trading
(involving all major emitters, including China and other developing coun-
tries) would reduce costs by 75 percent compared with wholly domestic
greenhouse gas emissions limitations.43 For example, one prominent
model found that the costs of the Kyoto Protocol target to the United
States in 2010 would be about $80 billion (just under 1 percent of fore-
cast gross domestic product) without any international emissions trading
and about $20 billion with full global emissions trading, for a cost savings
of 75 percent.44
Incentive instruments such as emissions trading and taxes would also
be more effective than command regulation in stimulating greenhouse
gas–efficient technological and other innovation. Economic incentive
systems give sources a continuous motivation to improve abatement
methods. Sources can increase profits and gain competitive advantage by
devising or adopting new abatement methods that are less costly than
paying the tax or buying emissions permits. Under trading, firms that
reduce emissions can sell surplus allowances at a profit, a result that pro-
vides a powerful incentive to innovate.45 Technology-based command
requirements, by contrast, generally provide no incentive for a firm to
invest in improved abatement methods beyond what the regulator
requires. While repeatedly ratcheted, tightly targeted command regulation
may in some cases succeed in “forcing” technologies (for example, in
upgrading equipment to control conventional pollutants from new auto-
mobiles), the innovations required in the climate context are far broader
and cut across a very wide range of activities and sectors. The broad, deep,
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and continuous innovative incentives of emissions trading and taxes are
far superior to command regulation in that context.
Incentive instruments do not entail undue administrative costs, espe-
cially considering the total cost savings that they provide. Technology
standards require government officials to gather and analyze detailed engi-
neering and economic information to devise hundreds of different com-
mands for different types of sources. Tax and trading systems, relying on
the price system, relegate those decisions to firms. The highly successful
U.S. sulfur dioxide trading system, which has achieved a 50 percent
reduction in U.S. sulfur dioxide emissions from 1990 through 1999 at a
cost savings of several billion dollars per year,46 is administered by a staff
of twenty. Of course, economic incentive systems, like command regula-
tory systems, must monitor and enforce compliance. Because of the
greater flexibility economic incentive systems afford sources, a greater
need may exist to monitor actual emissions. Monitoring and verifying
actual emissions can sometimes be costly, but doing so is worthwhile if it
improves environmental effectiveness and is often needed under com-
mand controls as well.47 Also, it will be substantially more complex and
difficult to establish a successful operating emissions trading or emissions
tax system at the international level—involving many different countries—
than domestically within a single country. Yet developing a well-functioning
international regime of command regulation presents similar challenges.
And even if implementation of economic incentive systems did involve
greater total administrative costs than technology standards48 (a point we
do not concede), the advantages in the climate context of economic incen-
tive systems in cost-effectiveness and stimulus for innovation would far
exceed such administrative costs. Moreover, technology standards would
offer no incentive for developing countries—especially those that see
abatement as very costly—to participate.
Emissions Trading versus Taxes. Policy analysts have engaged in signif-
icant debate as to which of the two major economic incentive instruments,
tradable emissions allowances and emissions taxes, should be used to reg-
ulate greenhouse gas emissions at the international level.49 In principle,
those two instruments can yield identical environmental and economic
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results. Under conditions of uncertainty about actual abatement costs,
however, taxes limit cost escalation but may allow emissions to rise, while
tradable allowances (which generally involve a cap on aggregate emis-
sions) limit emissions escalation but may allow costs to rise.50 These char-
acteristics imply that the choice between the instruments depends on
which error (relative to the emissions goals initially selected and the costs
initially envisaged for the regulatory program) one fears more: cost over-
runs or emissions exceedances. Some climate policy analyses have found
that because greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant (annual emissions
affect atmospheric concentrations only gradually), the marginal damages
from increasing emissions rise more slowly than the marginal costs from
progressively more stringent restrictions on emissions. Analysts argue that
the risk of cost overruns is therefore more serious than the risk of emis-
sions exceedances and that accordingly taxes should be preferred to emis-
sions trading.51
But even if the marginal damage function is flatter than the marginal
cost function (an issue of some uncertainty, particularly if emissions may
trigger nonlinear earth system disruptions), that consideration alone
would not be dispositive. A number of other important considerations
exist in choosing between taxes and trading in the international green-
house gas context. In those other respects, trading programs enjoy great
and ultimately decisive advantages. Further, policymakers can build
additional flexibility into trading systems to address the problem of cost
overruns. The strong conclusion is that global greenhouse gas regulation
should use emissions trading rather than taxes.
First, there are significant sovereignty-based political and institutional
obstacles to international administration of greenhouse gas taxes. A sys-
tem of taxes levied and collected by an international institution would cut
sharply against traditional principles of national fiscal sovereignty and
would not be accepted. Alternatively, national administration of green-
house gas taxes might be harmonized to have nations impose the same, or
at least mutually agreed, taxes on domestic emissions, in the context of
widely differing tax systems and economic structures across countries. No
precedent exists for such a system or for an international agreement that
requires nations to impose new taxes on their citizens. Cap-and-trade
70 RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY
systems, on the other hand, bear a much closer resemblance to established
international environmental regulatory agreements.
Second, the credibility and effectiveness of an international system of
greenhouse gas taxes would be severely compromised by “fiscal cushion-
ing” games undertaken by participating nations. Countries would attempt
to soften the impact of greenhouse gas taxes on domestic industries and
consumers by adjusting other taxes and subsidies. Those strategies would
reduce the effective greenhouse gas tax rate and increase actual emissions.
The same cushioning games could be played under emissions trading to
ease the burden on domestic industries, but those strategies could not
affect actual emissions because of the quantity cap.52 Hence, greenhouse
gas taxes (whether administered internationally or by each national gov-
ernment) are likely to achieve much less in actual climate protection than
are tradable allowances. Furthermore, tax-and-cushion games will distort
fiscal policy in inefficient ways and thereby undermine the credibility of a
global greenhouse gas tax program.
Third, and perhaps most important, greenhouse gas emissions trading
has significant advantages over greenhouse gas taxes in attracting devel-
oping country participation by facilitating transfers of capital and tech-
nology to such countries to underwrite net greenhouse gas emissions
limitations. The private sector would play a major role in effecting those
transfers by identifying the most promising and cost-effective greenhouse
gas reduction opportunities throughout the world and by mobilizing
resources and know-how to achieve reductions with local partners. Those
investments would further sustainable development in the host countries.
To accomplish those objectives, emissions trading systems can be struc-
tured to assign developing countries “headroom” allowances in excess of
their current emissions, perhaps up to or even above their forecasted
business-as-usual emissions levels (sometimes called a “no harm” alloca-
tion).53 Such an arrangement would enable poorer countries to grow
economically through several means: undertaking new economic activities
whose greenhouse gas emissions would be covered by headroom
allowances; hosting greenhouse gas–reducing projects funded by invest-
ments and technologies from abroad in exchange (in part) for a portion of
the allowances that become surplus as a result of the reductions achieved;
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and obtaining revenues from selling allowances to others. At the same
time, such an arrangement would address the problem of international
leakage of emissions-intensive activities to developing countries by
adopting a cap on emissions. That approach is far more effective and 
“participation-efficient”54 than pure financial payments (which are 
subsidies for abatement and invite perverse increases in aggregate emis-
sions),55 or greenhouse gas taxes (which offer no incentive for nonbenefi-
ciary countries to join), or taxes coupled with financial payments (which
would undermine the incentive effect of the tax).56
An inclusive international greenhouse gas trading system would bene-
fit poorer societies by giving them a revenue stream on the order of sev-
eral billion dollars per year and enhanced foreign investments and
technology transfers.57 It would oblige richer countries to “take the lead”
by financing emissions reductions worldwide (yet in a way that is also
economically preferable to them compared with purely domestic abate-
ment).58 Moreover, the basic logic of voluntary exchange (that is, market
trading) means that allowance sales would not occur unless both parties
viewed the trade as desirable. (It will, therefore, be necessary to ensure
that the developing countries participating in international greenhouse
gas trading have the capacities to be informed and effective players.) On
the other hand, insisting that industrialized countries must control their
emissions primarily at home (as in proposals for “supplementarity” ceil-
ings on use of trading, or allowance reserves) would increase global costs
substantially and would deprive developing countries of the benefits of
investments in greenhouse gas–reducing projects and allowance sale
revenues. It would be like insisting that rich people must spend their
money only in rich neighborhoods.
The extra allowances used to deliver side payments should be seen as
headroom, not “hot air.” They represent the necessary price to engage
participation by major emitting countries that perceive no net benefit to
participation and to meet developing countries’ equity claims. Headroom
allowances were used to engage participation by Russia and Ukraine in the
Kyoto Protocol. Without that inducement, Russia and Ukraine would
likely have stayed out of the agreement, which would have made their
potential future emissions even higher.59 Without the inducement of
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headroom allowances, China and many other major developing countries
are most unlikely to agree to join any international greenhouse gas regu-
latory effort and thus will cripple its environmental effectiveness.
Moreover, their nonparticipation would increase the abatement costs to
the remaining signatories and could in turn induce them to neglect or
relax their targets and further weaken the treaty.60
The use of headroom allowances to attract participation, whether of
countries from the former Soviet Union or developing countries, runs the
risk that such countries will abandon the international cap-and-trade
agreement after selling their headroom allowances. That risk can perhaps
be reduced by requiring that sales of headroom allowances be matched by
sales of allowances generated by emissions reductions. More important,
the current and future stream of allowance allocations should be struc-
tured so as to provide continuing incentives for participation by offering
greater trading-based inflows of investment and technology to countries
that participate honestly for longer periods of time. Those inflows will also
help build political and economic constituencies within the country for
continued participation. A country that withdraws will suffer reputational
losses and risk unfavorable treatment from other nations on other issues
of concern to it.
Because it involves significant transfers of resources to developing
countries, emissions trading raises issues of domestic political feasibility
for participating industrialized countries, including the United States.
Those transfers, however, are simply a part of the costs that must be
incurred in achieving greenhouse gas limitations; as discussed previously,
in deciding whether to participate in a global greenhouse gas regulatory
effort, countries must decide whether such costs are justified in relation to
the benefits obtained. Emissions trading significantly reduces those costs
relative to command alternatives. It also provides markets for the export
by industrialized country businesses of greenhouse gas technologies and
services to developing countries and thus creates domestic political con-
stituencies in favor of participation. By promoting environmentally sus-
tainable economic growth in developing countries, emissions trading
could also serve the broader strategic interests of the United States and
other industrialized nations.
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Some have questioned the credibility of the financial flows associated
with emissions trading and headroom allowances by comparing them
with official overseas development assistance. For example, Mustafa
Babiker and his colleagues have remarked:
The flows [under the Kyoto Protocol with U.S. participation] are very
large, with an annual transfer from the United States to Russia and
Ukraine of near $20 billion. The fact that total U.S. overseas devel-
opment assistance to all countries in 1999 was only $9 billion, and
had declined at a rate of some 4 percent per year through the 1990s
. . . , raises serious questions about the realism of the Kyoto Protocol,
even if the United States would have been willing to go along on
other grounds. . . . [T]hese flows were not likely to prove politically
sustainable, particularly when a substantial portion of the funds
would be paying for hot air. The idea that governments will allocate
permits in such a way that their citizens must first send abroad large
amounts of money to get them back as permits is most generously
viewed as unrealistic.61
But the comparison with overseas development assistance is inapposite.
The financial flows under emissions trading would be via multiple small
transactions by private firms, not large centralized government outlays.
They would be trade and investment, not aid. They would involve, in
return, imports of a new, commercially valuable global property right
(greenhouse gas allowances). And they would be far less expensive than
obtaining the equivalent abatement services domestically. Hence, the bet-
ter comparison is with all U.S. imports, purchases of services abroad, or
foreign direct investment outlays. Those sums would utterly dwarf $20
billion in U.S. allowance purchases. Of course, $20 billion for greenhouse
gas allowances may still be too high; that figure is an artifact of the abrupt
Kyoto Protocol targets, which would require a 30 percent or more reduc-
tion in U.S. emissions below the business-as-usual level in 2010 (and the
assumptions of the economic model used to make this estimate).62 A
reconstructed climate regime, with better balanced targets and with par-
ticipation by China as well as the United States and India, would likely
exhibit financial flows from the United States to China, Russia, and other
nations of less than $20 billion (and, in any case, would amount to a small
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fraction of total U.S. foreign direct investments or imports), while still
adequate to secure their participation.
Emissions taxes are far inferior to emissions trading in attracting the
participation of developing countries. Developing nations would never
agree to adopt greenhouse gas tax rates at the same level as those adopted
by the developed countries; at best, they might agree to adopt taxes at
sharply lower rates. Significantly lower tax rates in developing countries
would, however, result in significant leakage of emissions-intensive activ-
ities to those countries and consequent increases in their emissions and
would undermine the global regulatory regime. A theoretical alternative is
to adopt uniform rates and channel the major share of aggregate proceeds
to developing countries. But no prospect exists that the industrialized
nations would agree to taxation by an international authority that would
dispose of a large share of the proceeds through payments to developing
countries. National systems of taxation and international redistribution
would encounter the problem of fiscal cushioning games and, potentially,
official aid displacement games.63 Also, trying to couple side payments to
major developing countries (such as China) with taxes will undermine the
incentive effect of the taxes on emissions, because the side payment must
compensate the country for both its net cost of abatement and its net
incremental cost of paying the tax (otherwise the country would probably
not participate in the regime).64
Another option for inducing participation by relevant developing coun-
tries is the use of pure financial subsidies for abatement in the form of a
cash side payment for reduction of the business-as-usual levels emis-
sions.65 The Kyoto Protocol “clean development mechanism” resembles that
approach. It provides credits that can be sold for cash, with no limit on
total national emissions in selling countries. Unfortunately, subsidies for
abatement, even assuming that they would be politically feasible at the lev-
els required, can generate perverse incentives for countries to increase
aggregate emissions.66 Emissions trading surmounts that problem by
coupling side transfers with a quantity constraint on aggregate emissions.67
A conceptually elegant approach has been suggested by David Bradford:
countries interested in preventing climate change would contribute sums
of money to a central fund, and that fund would then purchase abatement
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reductions from the business-as-usual emissions level worldwide on the
economically most advantageous terms.68 Countries would not adopt
quantity limits on emissions; all the abatement would be accomplished
through the central fund’s purchases of abatement efforts. Hence, the total
quantity of abatement would depend on the total amount of money con-
tributed to the fund and the price of abatement. Bradford’s approach nicely
illustrates how a “beneficiaries pay” model could work.69 And it shows
how the total amount of abatement (resource allocation) and its location
can be distinguished from each country’s degree of contribution (distribu-
tional equity). But Bradford’s approach has important difficulties. Although
international negotiations on national targets (allowance allocations) would
be unnecessary, there would have to be international agreement on the
business-as-usual emissions for each country over a number of years (the
baseline for purchases of reductions by the central authority), which may
be almost as difficult. The administration of a huge central fund would
raise strong concerns about national sovereignty, international organiza-
tional power, and corruption. Also, reliance on a central purchasing agency
rather than on a decentralized trading market could undermine cost-
effectiveness; political pressures could force the fund to spread abatement
purchases “equitably” among countries and sectors rather than target the
lowest-cost abatement opportunities. In addition, the central fund would
act as a monopsonist; with no competition in the market to purchase
abatement efforts, it might fail to find the most cost-effective abatement
opportunities or might seek to depress purchase prices or both. Finally,
the central fund would act as a pure subsidy for abatement, with no quan-
tity cap on aggregate emissions. As discussed above, subsidies for abate-
ment can have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate emissions.
Issues in Implementing Emissions Trading. Despite its superiority to
emission taxes and other alternatives, international greenhouse gas emis-
sions trading faces several potential implementation difficulties. They
include the risks (previously noted) that quantity limits on emissions
could result in unexpectedly high compliance costs or that countries
could sell allowances and withdraw; potential problems of market power
and transaction costs; and the compatibility of international emissions
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trading with domestic regulatory systems that rely on other instruments.
While those issues need attention, reasonable means for addressing them
are available.
Cap-and-trade allowance trading systems, like all quantity-based regu-
latory systems, create the risk of excessive costs when compliance with the
quantity limit proves more expensive than was expected at the time that
the quantity limit was set.70 Policymakers can address that problem in
several ways. Most obviously, keeping the targets modest in the near term
will keep costs down while allowing the development of more informa-
tion useful for setting future targets so as to avoid costly surprises. Second,
ensuring wide participation by developing countries in a global green-
house gas trading system will help ensure a large supply of allowances at
low costs.71 Third, “when” flexibility through banking and borrowing can
ease risks of cost overruns.72
A fourth means of avoiding excessive costs with emissions trading is
use of the flexibility afforded by a hybrid system, dubbed a “safety valve,”
in which governments supplement an emissions trading system with a
promise to sell unlimited additional allowances at a predetermined trigger
price.73 In effect, the safety valve converts a cap-and-trade allowance sys-
tem into a trading system that becomes a tax once the price of allowances
rises to the trigger price. Alternatively, the safety valve price can be viewed
as the penalty (a fine per ton of emissions) for noncompliance with the
allowance limits. It can also be seen as a version of borrowing (emitting
more now while promising to emit less in the future), but at a fixed trig-
ger price rather than at an interest rate reflecting the time value of abate-
ment. Critics of the safety valve concept fear that it would open the
climate policy to unlimited increases in emissions. A more accurate char-
acterization is that the policy would act as a tax and discourage emissions
by imposing a price (but without the firm quantitative assurance provided
by a cap), while avoiding the risk of cost escalation presented in a pure
cap-and-trade allowance system.74 One question about the safety valve is
whether it would be administered by national governments or by an inter-
national institution.75 If the former, revenue-seeking governments might
compete to sell the extra allowances by setting lower trigger prices (or
competing on nonprice variables), which would contribute to emissions
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escalation. If the latter, the problems associated with international taxation
and international handling of revenues would arise anew. Alternatively,
the trigger price might be set by international agreement. The notion of a
safety valve is intriguing and deserves further consideration. Such an
approach might be especially attractive in enlisting developing countries;
by eliminating a cap on emissions, the approach should ease the fear that
greenhouse gas limitations will impose a ceiling on economic growth that
will subject developing countries to perpetual underdevelopment.76
A fifth way to moderate the risk of unduly high costs under quantity
caps is to set targets in terms of “emissions intensity,” or emissions per unit
of economic output (GDP), rather than in terms of emissions. For exam-
ple, all countries could be required to reduce their emissions per GDP by
a designated percentage by a designated year or suite of years. The Bush
administration’s economic advisers advocated such an approach,77 and
President Bush proposed it in February 2002, along with a set of tax cred-
its and voluntary measures intended to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions by 500 million metric tons of carbon-equivalent by 2012.78
Such an approach provides flexibility by allowing increased emissions when
the economy grows rapidly (and hence contains costs). But the approach
also has difficulties. By allowing emissions to grow as the economy grows,
this approach could result in less climate protection than would be justi-
fied on the basis of a consideration of the relevant costs and benefits. In
addition, this approach could provide incentives to countries to exagger-
ate their GDP to satisfy their emissions intensity target; monitoring com-
pliance would thus be more complicated than under a quantity limit
where one need measure only emissions. Further, it is conceivable that an
emissions intensity target could encourage countries to overheat their
economies to increase GDP faster than emissions are growing and thereby
reduce their intensity ratio; in domestic regulatory programs, an analo-
gous incentive can lead firms to overproduce output when constrained by
an emissions-per-unit-of-output standard.79 Those problems, however,
are not necessarily fatal. Eliminating the risks of high costs posed by emis-
sion caps and helping to dispel the specter of a ceiling on development
through targets based on emissions intensity could help attract the partic-
ipation of developing countries and might even lead countries to adopt
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targets that are in general more stringent than comparable targets based
on emissions.
While a variety of problems exist with the specific measures proposed
by the Bush administration to implement the emissions intensity con-
cept,80 there seems no reason in principle why such an approach could
not be made compatible with the principles of sound greenhouse gas reg-
ulation that we advocate here: the approach could be comprehensive
(covering net emissions of all greenhouse gases), it could be implemented
through legally binding allocations of emissions intensity allowances to
nations and sources, and there could be a system of domestic and inter-
national emissions intensity allowance trading.
In addition to concerns about cost escalation, a system of tradable
allowances, like any market in commodities, faces the potential problem
of market power.81 For example, a country could try to amass enough
allowances to corner the market on emissions allowances, create an artifi-
cial shortage, and exact monopolistic rents. Or a small group of countries
might function as an oligopoly. That is a particularly knotty potential
problem in greenhouse gas emissions trading at the international scale,
where there is no antitrust law and where large emitters like Russia or
China might enjoy substantial market power. Indeed, under the Kyoto
Protocol, Russia and Ukraine might be the only major sellers of
allowances; one estimate suggests that such a situation would raise costs
to the United States by 25 percent compared with full global trading with
competition among several sellers.82 Enlisting the major developing coun-
tries in participation is the most obvious solution to that problem.
Another potential problem for a greenhouse gas allowance market, like
any market, is transaction costs.83 The costs of finding trading partners,
negotiating deals, monitoring and enforcing contract performance, and
insuring against nonperformance can hinder efficient transactions. Formal
allowance trading seeks to reduce transaction costs by making allowances
fungible and enforcing aggregate performance through comprehensive
emissions monitoring and reporting and enforcement against noncomply-
ing sellers (possibly supplemented by buyer liability) rather than through
regulatory review of each individual trade. The U.S. experience with sul-
fur dioxide allowance trading shows that the transaction costs of a system
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of formal allowance trading can be quite low. But case-by-case emissions
credit trading systems, such as those contemplated by the Kyoto Protocol
provisions for joint implementation and the clean development mecha-
nism, may face high transaction costs.84
Some critics have asserted that negotiating the assignment of greenhouse
gas emissions allowances (and the corresponding allocation of abatement
burdens) among countries would be so difficult that the system would never
get off the ground.85 But that concern applies to any regulatory instrument:
all forms of regulation, including command requirements and greenhouse
gas taxes, allocate burdens among those regulated; and all forms of interna-
tional regulation require a burden-sharing negotiation under the consent
voting rule for international treaties. While climate agreements involve dif-
ficult negotiations over burden sharing or asset distribution, so do many
other successful negotiations, such as corporate mergers, arms control talks,
and international monetary policy accords. If the joint gains are large
enough, the distributional issues can generally be worked out. The real
question for climate policy is the relative difficulty of negotiating the initial
assignment using the alternative policy instruments, given the consent
framework for international treaties.86 In the global greenhouse gas regula-
tory context, use of tradable allowances should ease rather than impede the
problem of negotiating the allocation of regulatory burdens. As Ronald
Coase taught, the lower the impediments to subsequent contractual reallo-
cations of entitlements among the parties, the less the risk that an initial
assignment will lock the parties into an inefficient situation that reduces the
welfare of one or more parties relative to the status quo and undermine the
potential for agreement; that risk is much greater if the initial assignment is
binding.87 Technology standards and fixed taxes provide no flexibility for
subsequent reallocations of burdens among nations. On the other hand,
allowance trading both permits and facilitates postagreement reallocations
and thus reduces the risk of excessively costly or otherwise inefficient lock-
ins and thus eases initial negotiations.88
A further potential obstacle to international greenhouse gas regulatory
agreements is that developing countries may fear that agreeing to any quanti-
tative limitation on emissions will constrain their long-term ability to develop
economically. That concern is best addressed by structuring the emissions
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trading system, as described above, so that developing countries receive extra
headroom allowances, perhaps up to or above their business-as-usual fore-
cast. In addition, limitations might, as discussed above, be expressed in terms
of the greenhouse gas intensity of GDP rather than emissions, which would
further ease concerns that limitations would unduly crimp economic growth.
Such arrangements would presumptively leave developing countries no
worse off than the status quo ante and make them better off because the
tradable allowances are a new asset that they can trade or sell at a profit
(though still at prices attractive to industrialized countries). Put another way,
future economic growth on a lower–greenhouse gas path can be financed by
allowance trades or sales, so that an emissions trading system can enhance
rather than limit developing countries’ growth prospects. Concerns may still
exist with long-term lock-in. The practical answer is that allowance alloca-
tions will be renegotiated from time to time; the pace of renegotiations must
balance investment and other interests in stable expectations with the need
to respond to new information and changed circumstances.89
A final issue is the compatibility of international emissions trading with
the domestic policy instruments adopted in each country. If countries
adopt technology standards, fixed performance standards, or taxes rather
than emissions trading to achieve domestic abatement, the cost savings
expected under full global trading could be curtailed.90 The beneficial role
of the private sector in trading would be reduced. One solution is for the
international treaty to provide that signatories must employ emissions trad-
ing domestically, at least in the sectors likely to be involved in interna-
tional greenhouse gas–related transactions. An alternative is to rely on the
economic and administrative gains from compatibility with international
emissions trading to motivate countries to adopt emissions trading domes-
tically. Countries with domestic emissions trading systems would stand to
benefit more from international emissions trading—the gains both from
selling and from buying—than those with alternative domestic policies.91
Balancing Costs and Benefits in Setting Regulatory Targets
Wise greenhouse gas regulatory policies must not only use the most cost-
effective means for achieving greenhouse gas emissions limitations, but
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must also set sensible limitations objectives that balance relevant costs and
benefits. They must strike a balance between prevention measures and
adaptation measures.92 They must appropriately time investments in
greenhouse gas emissions limitations by taking into account the relations
among the stringency and timing of emissions limitations, the atmospheric
greenhouse gas stock, the damages associated with changing atmospheric
temperatures, the differences in the costs of achieving different levels of
emissions reductions at different time periods (incorporating an appro-
priate discount rate to translate into net present value costs incurred and
benefits afforded in future years), and capital stock turnover and techno-
logical innovation.
As previously noted, several efforts have been made to quantify the
path of emissions reductions over time implied by such a climate policy.
Those efforts, of course, involve very large uncertainties, but they provide
a sound framework for setting informed and wise regulatory targets.
Studies have identified two basic approaches: the least-cost path to
stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at designated levels
(as suggested by the objective in Article 2 of the Framework Convention
on Climate Change),93 and the net benefits maximizing path. As already
noted, Hammitt has found that the net benefits maximizing path involves
more stringent near-term emissions reductions below the business-as-
usual emissions forecast (roughly 3 percent below the business-as-usual
level by 2010, 5 percent below that level by 2025, and 20 percent below
that level by 2100) than does the least-cost path to stabilize atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations at 750, 650, or even 550 parts per million
by the period 2100 to 2150. (Current atmospheric carbon dioxide con-
centrations are at about 375 parts per million.) Both paths call for sub-
stantially less stringent near-term emissions reductions than required
under the Kyoto Protocol.94
We believe that the approach of maximizing net benefits is conceptu-
ally preferable to the stabilization strategy, which is based on an arbitrarily
chosen stabilization target and timetable. With expert advice, countries
would negotiate a schedule of future aggregate global emissions targets
(with targets set for, say, every ten years over the next three or four
decades) on the basis of the principle of maximizing net benefits. That
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would require judgments about the expected value of damages from emis-
sions and the costs of abatement. Targets would be set on assumptions of
workably cost-effective implementation with comprehensiveness, global
trading, and temporal flexibility. Setting such pathways confronts signifi-
cant uncertainties about both future costs and future benefits of alterna-
tive pathways. Sensitivity analysis (as performed, for example, by
Hammitt in his studies) can help inform judgments about how to address
such uncertainties. Our limited ability to assign economic values to many
types of impacts also complicates the task of setting pathways based on
maximizing net social benefits. The degree of social risk aversion to adopt
with respect to risks of catastrophic harms and the discount rate or rates
to use with respect to costs and to benefits accruing at different times pre-
sent additional issues. Thus, the setting of pathways will necessarily
involve substantial social and political elements and judgments.
Nonetheless, the judgments involved would be disciplined and made
more transparent by the social benefit-cost framework for the decision
and the facts and analysis generated in implementing it. And the pathways
would be revised on a periodic basis in light of experience and new infor-
mation. Thus, the pathways could be used to set targets for successive
periods (say, ten years). The targets would then be divided into national
allowance allocations for each period. Such allowances could then be
subassigned by national governments to private firms and other emitting
entities and traded internationally. Such an approach would be similar in
concept to the schedule (with allowance trading and banking) successfully
employed in the U.S. lead phasedown in the 1980s. 
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Assessing and Correcting the Kyoto
Protocol’s Flaws
How well does the design of the Kyoto Protocol accord with the principles,
outlined in chapter 5, for the design of a sound greenhouse gas regulatory
system? Here we address this question and conclude that the protocol’s
basic regulatory design is sound but that the protocol suffers from three
basic flaws. They include the adoption of limitations obligations without
deciding the means for achieving and ensuring compliance (including in
particular the role of sinks, the scope for emissions trading, and remedies
or sanctions for noncompliance); the total omission of obligations for any
developing country to limit emissions, now or in the future; and the selec-
tion of arbitrary, excessively stringent emissions limitation targets. The
Bonn and Marrakech accords have remedied to a considerable extent
though not entirely the first of those flaws, but unjustified restrictions on
the use of the comprehensive approach and emissions trading remain, and
many issues related to compliance assurance are still unresolved. Further,
the delay and acrimony that have occurred in the process of addressing
those gaps have been quite costly. The second flaw, the omission of devel-
oping country obligations, and the third, arbitrary targets, persist and must
be remedied.
Sound Basic Regulatory Design
The Kyoto Protocol’s basic regulatory design is sound. It embraces the
comprehensive approach and provides for international trading in green-
house gas emissions allowances (limited to Annex B countries) as well as
two project-based credit trading systems (joint implementation among
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Annex B countries, and the clean development mechanism in which
developing countries may participate).1 As discussed below, however, the
implementation measures adopted at Bonn and Marrakech impose some
unjustified limitations on the use of the comprehensive approach and the
trading mechanisms. Another beneficial feature of the basic Kyoto Protocol
design is providing for intertemporal flexibility in limiting emissions by
defining limitations obligations for the initial compliance period in terms
of the average of a country’s emissions over a five-year period; that feature
allows countries the flexibility to balance higher emissions in some years
with lower emissions in others.
Those basic design elements—a comprehensive approach to gases and
sinks and international emissions trading—have been espoused consis-
tently by the United States across administrations of both parties. They
were initially advanced in the first Bush administration by the authors and
others.2 They are nonpartisan ideas for good policy. As discussed above,
those design features dramatically reduce the costs of achieving green-
house gas limitations relative to approaches that use command regulation
and focus on fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions. The Kyoto Protocol’s
use of cost-effective means for achieving limitations does not, however,
mean that its regulatory targets are justified. But their use is an essential
first step in devising a sound climate strategy.
The comprehensive approach and emissions trading have been
attacked as too complex and difficult to implement and enforce. As dis-
cussed above, that criticism is misplaced. As the U.S. sulfur dioxide trad-
ing experience shows, emissions trading can work very well if regulators
adopt simple, straightforward, transparent rules. While it is substantially
more difficult to establish the institutional arrangements for successful
emissions trading at the international than at the domestic level, that
would be true for any regulatory strategy. It should be feasible to build,
with appropriate participation from the business and nongovernmental
organization sectors, the basic arrangements to implement the interna-
tional emissions trading program authorized under Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol.3 Simplified default rules can be adopted to deal with difficult-to-
measure greenhouse gases such as agricultural methane and carbon diox-
ide sinks. Monitoring, implementation, and enforcement problems are
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significant at the international level, but that would be true of any regula-
tory strategy that might be adopted.
Failure to Set Ground Rules for Implementation and 
Compliance Simultaneously with Regulatory Targets
Although the Kyoto Protocol’s basic regulatory design is sound, the
protocol as negotiated and signed in 1997 was seriously flawed because 
it set quantitative emissions limitations obligations without agreement 
on the ground rules for determining reductions of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, enhancement of greenhouse gas sinks, emissions trading and joint
implementation–clean development mechanism projects, and arrange-
ments to ensure compliance. The failure to resolve those important issues
made many countries, including the United States, unwilling to ratify the
protocol, because the ultimate costs of compliance remained highly uncer-
tain, and that hampered assessment and development of the requisite
measures for national implementation.4 Achieving even partial resolution
of those open issues required several further rounds of acrimonious nego-
tiation that left the United States on the sidelines. That approach was a
serious mistake that should not be repeated in future agreements. Ends
(emissions targets) and means (regulatory design, flexibility options, and
methods of ensuring compliance) for achieving them should be negotiated
simultaneously, at least in cases such as greenhouse gas regulation, where
the costs of achieving the ends are very large and depend critically on the
means allowed.
Setting targets without agreement on the means for compliance gave
free rein to those nations that opposed full scope for international emis-
sions trading and the use of sinks to obstruct their negotiation and then
claim that the demands of the United States and others in favor of such
measures amounted to a weakening of the initial targets, notwithstanding
the general authorization of such flexibility in the Kyoto Protocol. In the
post–Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the European Union sought to restrict
emissions trading at the international level (such as by insisting that trad-
ing could be only a minor “supplement” to domestic abatement) while
simultaneously proceeding with plans for unrestricted emissions trading
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within Europe. And at The Hague in December 2000, the European Union
balked at minor increases in sink credits. It blocked agreement, claiming
that it could not accept the risk of increased emissions while refusing to
take any steps to bring major emitting developing countries into the treaty.
Later, at Bonn and Marrakech, the European Union agreed to allow trad-
ing unrestrained by “supplementarity” and agreed to large increases in
allowed credit for sinks. Those paradoxes demonstrate that the European
Union’s objections to the comprehensive approach and to global emis-
sions trading were in large measure political and strategic in character,
rather than opposition on the merits. They appear to have been aimed at
least in part at placating domestic “Green” constituencies by shaming the
United States and at the same time securing relative competitive advan-
tage over the United States and other international economic rivals.5
The United States must bear a share of the blame for creating that situ-
ation by not insisting that the means for achieving compliance be resolved
simultaneously with the adoption of the quantitative emissions targets and
by signing the Kyoto Protocol notwithstanding the gaps in the protocol.
Furthermore, the absence of any U.S. policies to manage domestic emis-
sions during the Clinton administration—the result in part of differences
between the president and Congress—contributed along with strong
economic growth to rapid increases in U.S. emissions, a trend that the
Bush-Cheney administration has not acted to curb. U.S. reservations
about the Kyoto Protocol (in both the Clinton-Gore and Bush-Cheney
administrations) reflect factors previously discussed: the disproportionate
emissions reductions burdens faced by the United States, the failure to
include developing countries, and uncertainties regarding the availability
of lower-cost abatement options through international emissions trading
and the comprehensive approach. It also reflects U.S. fear that interna-
tional greenhouse gas limitations obligations will be more effectively
implemented and enforced in the United States than in other countries
that are its trade rivals, a fear exacerbated by the failure of the Kyoto
Protocol to specify compliance arrangements.6
After years of contentious negotiation, agreement on some of the
important issues left open in the Kyoto Protocol was eventually reached
through the Bonn and Marrakech accords, which establish some basic
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ground rules for emissions trading and the use of sinks and some (but far
from all) compliance arrangements. Those arrangements, however,
impose a number of unjustified limitations on the use of emissions trad-
ing and the comprehensive approach that should be removed. The Kyoto
Protocol does not give credit for conservation of existing forests. Also,
Appendix Z to the Bonn accord lists specific quantitative limits on the use
of sinks by each Annex B country to meet its targets under Article 3,
although at Marrakech Russia negotiated an increase in its Appendix Z
limit from 17 million to 33 million tons of sink enhancement. Further, the
Marrakech accord prohibits the banking of sink enhancement credits
(emission removal units).7 It also limits to 1 percent of its base year emis-
sions the amount of clean development mechanism credits that a selling
country can derive from sink activities.8 In addition, the Bonn accord lim-
its trading by imposing a sellers’ reserve requirement that restricts the
amount of emissions allowances that a country can sell (which we discuss
further in chapter 7). Moreover, compliance arrangements are incomplete
and inadequate. The current authorized penalty for a country that exceeds
its first commitment period emissions limitation targets is a reduction in
its second commitment period allowances in an amount 1.3 times the first
commitment period exceedance (the second commitment period
allowances, however, are not yet negotiated and could be adjusted to viti-
ate the effect of that sanction) and loss of eligibility to participate in the
flexibility mechanisms.9 Further, application of those sanctions is in the
“facilitative” branch of the Compliance Committee. The “enforcement”
branch of the Compliance Committee as yet has no powers; they are to be
discussed in future negotiating sessions.
The delays and controversies involved in the process of filling in the
gaps in the Kyoto Protocol have been costly in several ways. Protracted
rearguard opposition by the European Union and others to full scope for
emissions trading and the comprehensive approach was undoubtedly one
factor in the eventual U.S. refusal to continue engagement in the Kyoto
Protocol process. The delay in filling the Kyoto Protocol gaps has also
delayed the process of implementing the protocol and actually beginning
serious efforts to limit emissions. For example, the protocol envisaged that
the clean development mechanism, which allows voluntary participation
88 RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY
by developing countries in project-based greenhouse gas credit trading,
would be open for business by 2000.10 But the year 2000 has come and
gone as the design and ground rules of the clean development mechanism
have been mired in bickering. While opponents of full scope for emissions
trading and the comprehensive approach justify their positions by the
need to ensure that emissions are actually reduced, their actions have only
succeeded in postponing the achievement of that goal.
Ducking the Vital Issue of Developing Country Participation
The Kyoto Protocol’s failure to face more squarely the issue of limiting
developing countries’ emissions was a second major flaw. The Kyoto
Protocol does not just omit the developing countries from initial emis-
sions limitations. It absolves them of any meaningful substantive respon-
sibilities, even in principle, now or in the future. In that respect the Kyoto
Protocol is contrary to all prior global environmental treaties, including
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Ramsar
Convention, the Basel Convention, the Montreal Protocol, the Biodiversity
Convention, and most notably the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change itself, to which the Kyoto Protocol must ostensibly con-
form. The Framework Convention on Climate Change obligates all parties
to “common but differentiated responsibility,” which envisages that all
parties will assume some obligations, even if the specifics of magnitude
and timing differ.
As discussed in chapter 3, omitting developing countries from any emis-
sions limitation commitment drastically undermines the Kyoto Protocol in
several ways. First, given the significant forecasted growth in developing
country greenhouse gas emissions, their omission means that the treaty
will hardly affect global emissions at all.11 Second, omitting developing
countries means forfeiting the opportunities that they offer for low-cost
abatement. Third, omitting developing countries while constraining
industrialized country emissions will give rise to cross-border leakage of
greenhouse gas emissions. Such leakage will increase the amount of
unregulated developing country emissions12 and raise concerns about
competitiveness within industrialized countries.13 Fourth, the absence of
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developing countries from the emissions trading system raises the risk
that the remaining allowance sellers (chiefly Russia and Ukraine) will
exercise significant market power and raise allowance prices and global
costs. In short, the omission of developing countries makes the treaty
much less (if at all) environmentally effective and much more costly.
On the other hand, as also discussed above, developing countries have
strong equity arguments, reinforced by practical economic and political
considerations, that the industrialized countries should take the lead and
the principal burden of limitations. Accordingly, the industrialized coun-
tries must, to a large extent, finance emissions limitations efforts in devel-
oping countries to enlist their cooperation. The richer industrialized
countries’ incentive to do so lies in their desire to insure against climate
change risks and in the cost savings that can be achieved by securing
emissions reductions in developing countries rather than at home. The
developing countries’ principal incentives are the economic benefits from
selling allowances and attracting new sources of capital and technology;
they will also benefit environmentally from reduced global warming and
from cleaner production and consumption technologies that will reduce
local pollution.
In such circumstances international law can develop techniques for fos-
tering mutually advantageous agreements between industrialized and
developing countries. The Montreal Protocol, for example, has used “car-
rots,” in the form of side payments and technical assistance, as well as
“sticks,” in the form of potential trade sanctions, to enlist the participation
of developing countries in the global regulatory effort to phase out or limit
ozone-depleting substances. Those provisions have invested the Montreal
Protocol with significant credibility and contributed importantly to its
ability to attract developing country participation and to its effectiveness.
The Biodiversity Convention also provides for assistance grants by indus-
trialized countries to developing countries to enlist their participation.
Under both treaties, the developing countries’ discharge of their treaty
obligations is contingent on the provision by the industrialized countries
of assistance. A similar quid pro quo contractual approach, backed up by
monitoring and compliance assurances, can be used to build an inclusive
and credible global climate regime. For reasons explained previously, the
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best way to implement such a strategy for enlisting developing country
participation in the global greenhouse gas regulatory effort is to arrange
for transfers of capital and technology from the industrialized to the devel-
oping countries through an international greenhouse gas emissions trad-
ing program in which the private sector would play a major role and in
which developing countries would be given headroom allowances over
and above their existing emissions.
Currently, the only Kyoto Protocol mechanism for developing country
participation in international greenhouse gas emissions trading is the
clean development mechanism established in Article 12 of the Kyoto
Protocol. Article 12 provides for certification of emissions reduction cred-
its for investments in projects in developing countries that reduce emis-
sions below what they otherwise would be. Article 12 provides explicitly
for private sector participation in those arrangements. Industrialized
countries can use clean development mechanism project credits to help
meet their Kyoto Protocol limitations obligations, and, pursuant to
domestic legislation, private firms could use those credits to meet domes-
tic regulatory obligations. Participation by developing countries is volun-
tary, and no caps are imposed on such countries’ emissions. Examples of
clean development mechanism credit projects include investments in
energy efficiency, fuel switching (for example, conversion of urban buses
from diesel fuel to natural gas), and afforestation measures.14 The clean
development mechanism is a potentially constructive arrangement for
involving developing countries in the global greenhouse gas limitations
effort by helping them make investments in technologies and practices
that will enable them to shift to an economic growth path that involves
lower greenhouse gas emissions. Yet the clean development mechanism,
like any project-based credit system, suffers from a number of inherent
limitations and other drawbacks and should be regarded as a transitional
measure toward full developing country involvement in an international
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system.
As previously noted, although the clean development mechanism 
was supposed to be up and running by 2000, it has been hindered by
squabbling over ground rules, by opposition from those objecting to emis-
sions trading and the comprehensive approach, and by some developing
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countries that view it as the opening wedge of greenhouse gas limitation
obligations. In addition, the clean development mechanism could be
overly centralized and politicized in its administration in contrast to a
decentralized market in greenhouse gas allowances. The clean develop-
ment mechanism is to be governed by an executive board, accountable to
the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, which will set policies
for determining which clean development mechanism credits can count
and, perhaps, which investments and individual projects may go forward.
Those arrangements could bog down the clean development mechanism
in political battles over the allocation of projects and undermine the
economic advantages of trading. Further, the clean development mecha-
nism is likely to involve high transaction costs because of the need for
project-by-project administrative determinations of project eligibility,
baselines, and certification of credits. Transaction costs would be much
lower in a global cap-and-trade allowance program that does not require
such determinations for each individual transaction.
Another fundamental problem with the clean development mechanism
is that it accords regulatory credit for local abatement projects in countries
without total emissions caps, a structure that leads to unintended but pre-
dictable and counterproductive side effects from cross-project leakage.
Greenhouse gas emissions abatement in one location—such as growing a
new forest on what was previously farmland—may be offset by increases
in emissions at other locations within the same country—such as the
clearing of forests at other locations, spurred by the market demand for
farmland, the supply of which has been contracted at the clean develop-
ment mechanism project. And the clean development mechanism also
risks the fate of subsidies for abatement: reducing marginal emissions at
specific firms or locations but also reducing the average cost of operating
in the emitting sector and thereby inducing an increase in the total size of
the emitting sector in the recipient country.15
A further drawback of the clean development mechanism is that it may
undermine the incentives for developing countries to join an international
cap-and-trade system. If developing countries can sell clean development
mechanism credits at a price close to the price they would receive for
selling formal allowances under a cap-and-trade system, then there is little
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added gain to joining the cap-and-trade regime. To address that problem
and the problems of cross-project leakage and growth of emitting activi-
ties, the value of clean development mechanism credits ought to be sig-
nificantly discounted compared with the price for formal allowances to
reflect the difference in real environmental value of the two commodities;
a clean development mechanism ton is not equal to a cap-and-trade
allowance ton. Perhaps the higher transaction costs of the project-based,
centrally supervised clean development mechanism (and the adaptation
fund surcharge on clean development mechanism credits imposed pur-
suant to Article 12) will achieve that price differential anyway. In the
absence of such a differential, proposals to make the clean development
mechanism competitive and fully compatible with Annex B emissions
trading run the risk of undermining the ability to attract developing coun-
tries to the cap-and-trade system in the future.
Accordingly, while the clean development mechanism can play a useful
transitional role in introducing developing countries to a limited form of
emissions trading, it is a distinctly second-best approach relative to a cap-
and-trade system with headroom allowances and is not a viable long-term
means for enlisting developing country participation in an effective global
climate regulatory effort. Priority should be given to enlisting major
developing countries in some form of international greenhouse gas trad-
ing program.
Unjustified Short-Term Targets
Even with enhanced flexibility in the means of achieving compliance, the
Kyoto Protocol targets would still demand too much in the way of emis-
sions reductions too soon to be justified or even feasible. As noted previ-
ously, the Kyoto Protocol requires the Annex B industrialized countries 
to reduce their emissions by an average of between 16 and 24 percent
below projected 2010 business-as-usual emissions. The United States, if it
joined, would be required to make around a 31 percent reduction. A
number of other major Annex B countries, including Japan, face the need
to make similar large reductions, and even the European Union faces a
substantial challenge despite the fortuitous greenhouse gas reductions that
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it has enjoyed since 1990. Compliance by all Annex B countries would
require major purchases of headroom allowances from Russia and Ukraine
by the other Annex B industrialized countries. The emissions trading sys-
tems to make those transfers, as well as the monitoring and other machin-
ery to determine and ensure compliance (including compliance by Russia
and Ukraine), have yet to be set up, which raises important questions
regarding the Kyoto Protocol’s credibility. If such systems are established,
they would enable Russia and Ukraine to exercise the significant market
power that they would enjoy under such circumstances and provoke
potentially serious conflicts.
Even if the Kyoto Protocol targets could be achieved with the benefit of
a well-functioning international trading system, the costs involved would
exceed the benefits. As discussed above, the Kyoto Protocol requires that
participating countries achieve much sharper (and more costly) near-term
emissions reductions than those required by a net-benefits-maximizing
path. The Kyoto Protocol targets for industrialized countries, combined
with unrestricted emissions in developing countries, translate to a global
emissions reduction of roughly 15 to 20 percent below the business-
as-usual level in 2010. Assuming “average” sensitivity and damages,
Hammitt’s net-benefits-maximizing path, by contrast, requires global
emissions to be 3 percent below the business-as-usual level by 2010, 
5 percent below that level by 2025, and 20 percent below that level by
2100.16 Although the net-benefits-maximizing paths that result from 
conservative assumptions of high climate sensitivity or high damages
would require greater near-term reductions than “average” assumptions,
the Kyoto Protocol requires substantially more aggressive and costly near-
term reductions than even those pathways.17
The most fundamental flaw in the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions reduction
targets, however, is that they were arbitrary. They were insensitive to costs
(including the costs associated with high emissions growth due to high
economic growth and other changes in the interim between establishing
targets in 1997 and implementing them a decade and more later) and the
relation between costs and benefits. They were established without refer-
ence to any articulated, sustainable climate policy. They do not corre-
spond to the “objective” of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations at a
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level that is not “dangerous,” advanced in the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which is itself vague and lacking an articulated basis.
They were set for only one initial compliance period without any guide-
lines or principles for establishing subsequent limitations objectives. We
believe that the soundest approach in principle for establishing interna-
tional emissions limitations obligations, and the one most likely to win
wide and lasting adherence by different countries, is by reference to a
longer-term pathway that seeks to maximize net global benefits; the inter-
national distributional and equity issues involved should be addressed
through the allocation of allowances. By maximizing total net benefits,
that approach has the best promise of being able to generate and then dis-
tribute substantial gains widely enough to attract broad participation and
also absorb the transaction costs involved in such an arrangement. The
Kyoto Protocol fails to measure up to that principle; it requires reductions
that are too steep too soon and therefore too costly to be justified in rela-
tion to the benefits afforded. The proper alternative to the Kyoto Protocol
is not, however, to postpone regulatory action to the distant future. The
net-benefits-maximizing approach, which we favor, calls for beginning
some emissions reductions in the near future. As Hammitt notes, we need
to start building the international and domestic institutional structures for
climate policy now, to send credible policy signals that will in turn stim-
ulate the needed shifts in private and public sector investments, practices,
and technologies.
Accordingly, the principle of net benefits maximization should be used
to set, as goals, long-term emissions pathways that would provide the
framework for setting emissions targets for successive specific time peri-
ods and that would in turn form the basis for aggregate and national emis-
sions caps. As discussed previously, setting pathways would confront
significant uncertainties and other difficulties in estimating the relevant
costs and benefits, and social and political elements would play a sub-
stantial role in the ultimate judgments made in setting pathways.
Nonetheless, the net-benefits-maximizing principle, supplemented by
sensitivity analysis and other established decision analytical methods, is
normatively sound and would provide salutary direction and discipline to
the decision process. The pathways would, of course, have to be revised
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and updated periodically in light of new information and circumstances,
and targets adjusted accordingly. There would also have to be arrange-
ments to provide flexibility to deal with shorter-term changes in circum-
stances, including fluctuations in economic growth, at both the global and
national levels. Setting emissions targets and obligations as an average
over a multiyear period to provide flexibility in timing should be adopted
to address that need. Setting national obligations in terms of emissions
intensity, as discussed above, is an additional possibility that merits care-
ful consideration. The safety valve concept is another.
Of course, specific emissions limitations obligations will inevitably be
the product of difficult, contingent political negotiations. But those nego-
tiations should take place in the context of a clearly acknowledged, basic
long-term principle—emissions pathways based on net benefits maxi-
mization. The circumstances that national emissions allocations would be
negotiated to deal with distributional issues, and that allowances would
subsequently be transferable, should further improve the attractiveness of
the net-benefits-maximization principle for establishing total limitations
obligations. As we state in chapter 7, the Kyoto Protocol should be mod-
ified to incorporate that principle as the fundamental lodestar, and its
initial targets should be modified accordingly.
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U.S. Leadership in Reconstruction
In light of the shortcomings as well as successes of the Kyoto Protocol and
the Bonn and Marrakech accords, the global interest in effective, efficient,
and fair climate policy, and the strong U.S. national interest in a sound
international climate regime, the United States should lead a reconstruc-
tion effort to build and join an improved international climate regime. The
role of the United States is pivotal because of its large share of global emis-
sions and of global economic activity (about 25 percent of each). Its efforts
should proceed simultaneously at the international and national levels.
As noted in chapter 1, attention has focused on two paths from the
Bonn and Marrakech accords. The United States could stay out of the
Kyoto Protocol regime and international climate agreements altogether
and thereby thwart any effective global climate policy. Or the United
States could join the Kyoto Protocol and the Bonn and Marrakech accords
essentially as currently drafted and then work within the treaty group to
promote the comprehensive approach and trading, developing country
participation, and optimal target setting. The first option is unrealistic and
contrary to the interests of the United States as well as those of the world.
The second option would require an unlikely about-face by the Bush
administration (but might be pursued by its successor) and is unlikely to
result in developing country participation or other fundamental improve-
ments anytime soon.
We urge consideration of a third option that would involve U.S. acces-
sion together with China (and additional developing countries) to an
international greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system within a number of
years. The United States would take serious domestic actions to prepare
to join such a regime, while insisting that it will join only if major devel-
oping countries join as well (though on differentiated terms); if emissions
U.S. LEADERSHIP IN RECONSTRUCTION    97
targets are set on a sound, longer-term basis; and if full scope is provided
for use of the comprehensive approach and emissions trading to achieve
targets under arrangements providing compliance assurance. Under one
possible scenario for implementing that approach, the United States,
China, and perhaps other developing countries, such as India, Brazil, and
Mexico, would initially establish one or more separate cap-and-trade
systems independent of the Kyoto Protocol (in which some industrialized
countries other than the United States, such as Canada and Australia,
might participate), which would eventually be merged with a modified
Kyoto Protocol regime. Such an approach would have the benefit of pro-
viding experience with different versions of an international greenhouse
gas trading program. Alternatively, the United States, China, and other
developing countries might work together to join a suitably modified
version of the Kyoto Protocol without the interim stage of creating a sep-
arate trading system or systems. Under either scenario (or other variations
on them), the United States and China and other major emitting develop-
ing countries would eventually join a reconstructed global cap-and-trade
regime with the Kyoto Protocol parties, a regime that would yield a much
greater collective contribution to climate protection at far less cost than
would the Kyoto Protocol and the Bonn and Marrakech accords without
the United States or even with the United States.
Our suggested approach is likely to be of interest to the industrialized
Kyoto Protocol parties—the European Union, Japan, Russia, and others.
They will have important environmental and economic interests, based on
the price of tradable allowances, to prefer accession to the Kyoto Protocol
by the United States and China together (rather than either joining alone).
Without emissions limits on the United States and China—the world’s
two largest emitters—the Kyoto Protocol will amount to little. Accession
by both countries together will maintain price stability, balancing allow-
ance supply and demand by matching a major allowance buyer (the
United States) and a major seller (China). 
We recognize that for the United States to join the global regime down
the road, special terms will be needed to enable accession without meet-
ing the requirements just agreed to in Marrakech for the first commitment
period. But better late than never. Moreover, better “later with substantive
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improvements” than either never or now without such improvements.
Further, the United States and China (and perhaps others) would, together,
represent such an overwhelming share of global emissions and global
economic activity that they would likely have sufficient influence to per-
suade the European Union, Japan, Russia, and others to revise the treaty
regime as a condition of full participation.
The hardest part in that third path will not be persuading the United
States (although that may prove difficult, at least in the near term, even if
the basic elements of a sound global climate regime were satisfied), but
attracting participation by the major emitting developing countries
through arrangements that are environmentally, economically, and politi-
cally credible. As explained above, the best way to attract China and oth-
ers to join the abatement regime will be through assignments of headroom
allowances, just as was done in the Kyoto Protocol and the Bonn and
Marrakech accords to engage Russia. We emphasize that we are not sug-
gesting that the United States demand that China limit its economic
growth. We recognize that such a demand would fail to engage China’s
participation.1 Rather, we are suggesting a plan for mutual benefit. Under
our proposal, the United States and other industrialized countries would,
through the assignment of headroom tradable allowances to China,
finance China’s greenhouse gas abatement and its transition toward a
lower-emitting growth path. China would thereby reap significant net
benefits from joining the cap-and-trade system. A similar approach would
be taken with other major developing country emitters.
By taking such a path, the United States can exercise real leadership in
global environmental affairs: leadership viewed not just as aggressiveness
or “first-mover” prominence, but as wisdom, judgment, and resolve. The
United States and China could lead the world toward a more effective,
efficient treaty framework. Such a strategic collaboration with China could
also be helpful in improving U.S.–China relations.
International Components of U.S. Climate Strategy
As detailed in chapter 3, participation of all major emitter nations in a cap-
and-trade system is crucial to ensuring the environmental effectiveness of
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the global climate policy regime, preventing leakage, and reaping the 
full cost savings available from international trading. Other critical features
of international greenhouse gas regulatory design are unrestricted interna-
tional trading, comprehensive coverage of all greenhouse gases and sinks,
and regulatory targets based on emissions pathways aimed at maximizing
net social benefits.
We do not propose abandoning the Kyoto Protocol to obtain those
objectives. The strategy should be evolution from the current Kyoto
Protocol and the Bonn and Marrakech arrangements. That evolution could
occur through the interim development of a separate cap-and-trade system
or systems involving the United States (and possibly other industrialized
countries) and China (and possibly other developing countries) that is
eventually merged with a revised version of the Kyoto Protocol or through
the direct joint accession of such countries to a reconstructed Kyoto
Protocol. There are already indicia that evolution from the Kyoto Protocol
is possible. For example, at Marrakech in November 2001 Kazakhstan pro-
posed to join Annex B and hence to join the cap-and-trade system. Korea,
which is treated as a developing country under the Kyoto Protocol, has
recently announced that it will set targets and take steps to reduce its
greenhouse gas emissions. And at Marrakech the conference agreed to con-
sider a process at the eighth Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (November 2002) to evaluate
commitments by developing countries—a preliminary move but in the
direction of expanded global participation in the cap-and-trade system.
A rich literature addresses the evolution of law and institutions.2 But
that literature is largely retrospective and descriptive and shows how legal
systems did evolve. Our current challenge is prospective and prescriptive:
to design institutions so that they will evolve in the future in a sound man-
ner. The Montreal Protocol provides an example of successful evolution in
global environmental regulation; it added several ozone-depleting sub-
stances, progressively tightened its targets, and attracted follow-up partic-
ipation by China and India and other developing countries in regulatory
limitations (through a phased approach and various inducements for their
participation, including an assistance fund).3 Given the character of the
greenhouse gas problem, where any annual change in greenhouse gas
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emissions has a quite small effect on the global stock and sharp near-term
emissions reductions are not the appropriate goal, an evolutionary
approach is especially appropriate for climate policy.
If, as seems likely as of this writing, the Kyoto Protocol is ratified by a
sufficient set of countries (though not the United States) and enters into
force in 2003, what then? New entrants must consent to join, which
means that they must perceive net gains to joining; they will assess the
advantages and disadvantages of joining or staying out of the Kyoto
Protocol as the Kyoto Protocol parties attempt to implement it.4 The cur-
rent Kyoto Protocol parties may block new entrants by withholding the
votes required to amend the treaty or to add countries to Annex B. If the
United States, China, and other developing countries sooner or later form
a single global cap-and-trade regime with the current Kyoto Protocol par-
ties, the Kyoto Protocol will have to be significantly modified or a new
successor agreement adopted to provide for a larger number of partici-
pants and to establish new emissions limitations targets and obligations
and other changes in existing Kyoto Protocol arrangements. The new
arrangements will require the negotiation of a structure that will provide
sufficient net benefits to the new participants to attract them and at the
same time also offer sufficient net benefits to the current Kyoto Protocol
parties to persuade them to agree to needed modifications and not to
defect and free-ride on the contribution of the expanded group of partic-
ipants.5 An individual country’s accession may not satisfy both of those
criteria, but joint accession by appropriately matched sets of countries—
in particular, the United States and China—might.
Participation by the United States. First, we start from the premise that
the United States will not join an international cap-and-trade regime (or
adopt serious domestic controls) until at least China, and perhaps other
major emitting developing countries, do so also (though on differentiated
terms). That is clearly the position of the current Bush administration, but
it was also the position of a unanimous U.S. Senate that in 1997 voted
ninety-five to zero to announce that it would not ratify a treaty omitting
meaningful participation by major developing countries.6 Further, that
view was buttressed by the stance of the Clinton-Gore administration,
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which stated the day after the Kyoto Protocol talks ended that it would 
not even submit the treaty to the Senate until the participation of devel-
oping countries was obtained. (Clinton never did send the treaty to the 
Senate.)7
The reason for that consistent position is often professed to be fairness—
that it would be unfair to impose costs on Americans if Chinese and Indian
citizens did not also shoulder similar burdens. We find that claim unper-
suasive. Americans are far better off economically than the citizens of China
or India. If fairness means the Rawlsian version, then the climate regime
ought to help elevate the least-well-off and not add to their burdens.8 If
fairness corresponds to causal responsibility, the United States and Europe
have, through past emissions, contributed an even greater share of the
buildup of current atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations than they
contribute to annual emissions today, which implies a correspondingly
greater abatement responsibility for the rich industrialized nations.
Accordingly, the notion of fairness based on causal responsibility would
imply much greater abatement action by the United States and Europe than
by China and India. Reflecting perhaps the Rawlsian approach and perhaps
the notion of fairness as causal responsibility, the Framework Convention
on Climate Change (which the United States has fully ratified) calls on the
wealthier countries to take the lead in preventing future climate change.
Whatever the moral or political potency of those fairness claims,9 we
doubt that they or other principles of fairness explain the real basis of the
American stance. The deeper reasons for U.S. reluctance to join the Kyoto
Protocol relate to environmental benefits and economic costs. As detailed
in chapter 4, without China and other major developing countries partic-
ipating, the Kyoto Protocol is likely to yield minor environmental benefits
at significant costs; the participation of China and other major emitting
developing countries would substantially increase the benefits and decrease
the costs of the Kyoto Protocol as a whole and of U.S. participation in par-
ticular. The U.S. reluctance to join the Kyoto Protocol also clearly reflects
fear of leakage and the resulting threat of excessive costs and competi-
tiveness impacts, both nationally and in the electoral districts of key mem-
bers of Congress, if the United States joins a cap-and-trade system but
major developing economies (which offer low-cost abatement options if
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they participate) do not.10 The 1997 Senate resolution expressly noted
cost and competitiveness as the basis for its position.11 If that analysis is
correct, then it has been a strategic error for the European Union to try to
cajole U.S. participation and limit use of the comprehensive approach and
emissions trading, while neglecting China (whose inclusion would ease
U.S. compliance costs and competitiveness concerns). The result has been
to push the United States away from rather than toward ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol.12 Merely browbeating the United States seems futile. The
European Union should accordingly support our proposal, which would
significantly enhance the environmental and economic benefits to the
United States of participation.
Attracting Participation by China and Other Major Developing
Countries. As long as the United States is out of the Kyoto Protocol,
major developing countries will almost certainly not join. The flip side of
the fairness concerns voiced by U.S. politicians is that China, India, and
other developing countries will surely perceive great unfairness in being
asked to limit their emissions if the United States does not. Moreover, if
China’s or India’s costs of participation exceed that country’s environmen-
tal benefits (both global and local cobenefits) and other possible benefits
of participation, then that country will need to receive side payments to
attract its participation. That may well be the case, because the costs of
abatement to China or India, albeit low in monetary terms compared with
marginal abatement costs in the industrialized countries, may represent a
high social opportunity cost to those countries in terms of the forgone
investments in other more pressing priorities such as poverty alleviation,
education, nutrition, and health care. Moreover, at least in China, higher
greenhouse gas concentrations and global warming could yield benefits
(extended growing seasons and carbon fertilization) to agriculture, so that
global environmental benefits of greenhouse gas abatement to China
could be perceived to be negative.13
For those reasons, we believe that major emitting developing countries
(such as China, India, and Brazil) will require side payments or other
incentives to secure their participation. That was the experience with
Russia and Ukraine under the Kyoto Protocol and with China and India
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under the Montreal Protocol regarding chlorofluorocarbons. The amount
of side payments necessary to attract developing country participation
would need to cover at least their net costs of participation. Those net
costs would consist of the costs of abatement, plus any forgone benefits of
warming, plus the costs of forgone leakage to the country, minus the
benefits of participation including the benefits of reduced warming and
the local environmental cobenefits of abatement (such as reducing other
pollutants and their associated adverse health effects). The use of head-
room allowance allocations to make those side payments would provide
additional benefits in the form of profits from allowance sales and trans-
fers, enhanced inflows of investment and technology, and the gain in
export sales of ordinary goods to industrialized countries as wider emis-
sions trading reduces abatement costs and raises import demand in indus-
trialized countries. The amount of those additional benefits would have to
at least exceed a developing country’s net costs to attract its participation.
The corresponding willingness of the rich industrialized countries to
make such side payments will depend on the net benefits of attracting
developing country participation, including the environmental benefits of
a more effective global greenhouse gas regulatory regime, the economic
benefits of an expanded supply of allowances at lower cost, reduced leak-
age, reduced market power by Annex B allowance sellers, and expanded
markets for technologies and services relating to net greenhouse gas abate-
ment and global emissions trading.
Will the aggregate environmental and economic benefits of an
expanded greenhouse gas trading regime that includes major developing
countries and the United States be sufficient to support the level of side
payments by the industrialized nations that will be needed to attract
developing country participation (as well as to cover the transaction costs
involved)? While further studies are needed on that vital question, the
very large abatement cost savings to be gained through an expanded trad-
ing system along with the environmental and other economic benefits to
the rich industrialized countries of a more inclusive global cap-and-trade
system strongly suggest an affirmative conclusion. Indirect support for
such a conclusion is provided by the successful Kyoto Protocol negotia-
tion of “headroom” arrangements for Russia and Ukraine; the European
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Union’s adoption of a burden-sharing agreement among its wealthier and
less-developed member states; and the successful U.S. experience with
headroom allowance assignments to electric utilities in reluctant states in
the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments adopting a sulfur dioxide trading
system.
Economic models developed at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology suggest that under a system of international emissions trading
limited to Annex B countries, the major net beneficiary is Russia and other
former Soviet Union countries, while under global emissions trading
China would profit even more than Russia. Under the Kyoto Protocol with
trading limited to Annex B countries (including the United States), in
2010 the former Soviet Union sells allowances for 345 million metric tons
of carbon at $127 per ton for revenues of $43.77 billion and enjoys a 
net gain from trade, after domestic abatement costs are subtracted, of 
$33.2 billion; the only other seller, Eastern Europe, sells only 6 million
metric tons of carbon. Hence, the former Soviet Union controls essentially
the entire supply of allowances available for sale. By contrast, under the
Kyoto Protocol with full global trading, in 2010 China would sell 437 mil-
lion metric tons of carbon at an allowance sale price of $24 per ton, for
revenues of $10.4 billion and a net gain from trade of $6.17 billion; India
would sell 102 million metric tons of carbon for revenues of $2.44 billion
and net gains from trade of $1.49 billion; the former Soviet Union would
sell 211 million metric tons of carbon for revenues of $5.03 billion and a
net gain of $4.22 billion.14 Hence, global trading markedly reduces the
market power of Russia and Ukraine and spreads sales and gains across
China and India and other countries.
Under Annex B trading, the industrialized countries would spend
about $43 billion on allowance purchases but save $32 billion compared
with achieving their targets domestically; the United States would buy
$13.44 billion in allowances and save $3 billion in costs; Japan would 
buy $12 billion and save $19.49 billion; the European Union would buy
$13.5 billion and save $7.27 billion. Under full global trading, the indus-
trialized countries would spend about $22 billion on allowances and save
$94 billion compared with achieving their targets domestically. The
United States would buy $9.27 billion and save $26.69 billion; Japan
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would buy $3.15 billion and save $31.08 billion; the European Union
would buy $5.57 billion and save $24 billion.15 After the Kyoto Protocol
first commitment period, the net profits to China, India, and the former
Soviet Union (and the percentage savings to the richer industrialized
countries) could expand as the global emissions trading system operates
under tightening limits on emissions.16 If necessary to attract their partic-
ipation, China and other developing countries could be assigned
allowances up to their business-as-usual level emissions (as assumed in
the MIT model) or perhaps even extra headroom above the business-as-
usual level (as Russia received in its Kyoto Protocol assignment), depend-
ing on the net surplus generated by expanded trading.
Steps to expand the global cap-and-trade system to include China and
other major developing countries would generate conflicts of interest
between Russia and Ukraine and the new entrants, whose entry will
undercut the market power of the former Soviet Union countries and
reduce allowance prices; the extent of that impact will depend on the
extent of headroom allowances allocated to the new entrants. Conflicts
among potential new entrants in the allocation of headroom allowances
will also exist, as the industrialized countries will want to minimize the
total amount of such allowances granted. Thus, there will be hard bar-
gaining over the terms under which major developing countries will join
a global cap-and-trade system. The potential gains to all parties from
expansion of the system should, however, permit ultimate resolution of
those issues.
With those considerations in mind, why have China and India, which
would be two of the primary beneficiaries of a global emissions trading
system, and other developing countries, which could similarly benefit
economically by participating, consistently refused in international nego-
tiations even to discuss participation in a global cap-and-trade system?
Several hypotheses are plausible. Those countries may feel as a matter of
fairness that “industrialized countries should take the lead”—but under
our scenario they would do so, by financing abatement through allowance
purchases and investments in developing countries. For a variety of rea-
sons, developing countries may also doubt that emissions trading will
work in practice to their advantage. Because of their relative inexperience
106 RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY
with trading, they may face higher costs of learning how to operate suc-
cessfully in such a system, if it does work. They may fear being outnego-
tiated by savvy emissions traders from the industrialized nations (a fear
that may be linked in the historical experience of developing countries
with exploitation of their natural resources by colonial powers). Those
fears suggest that transparency and competition (antitrust) rules should be
applied to global emissions trading and that the industrialized countries
and multilateral financial institutions should assist developing countries
with capacity-building efforts to help assure the developing countries that
they will be able to participate effectively and confidently in a global emis-
sions trading system.
China and India may also fear that adopting any cap on greenhouse gas
emissions will inhibit their economic growth. One way that could happen
is that, even if the cap is at the business-as-usual level, that level can be
difficult to forecast, and actual growth might turn out to be higher.17
Especially when regulatory targets are set long in advance of the period for
implementation, and future emissions and abatement costs are highly
uncertain, developing countries may demand allowance allocations based
on worst-case assumptions. That fear could be allayed by several means,
including allowance assignments even above their business-as-usual level,
adopting a cap in terms of greenhouse gas intensity of output, use of a
safety valve mechanism, and providing for interim revisions of targets
based on specified criteria or triggers or both. It should also be empha-
sized that economic growth can occur with less than proportionate growth
in greenhouse gas emissions, especially through inputs of greenhouse
gas–efficient investments and technologies under the trading system.18
China and India may also fear selling low-cost abatement options now
and then needing them later to comply with future emissions limitations.
If so, sellers should charge a price that reflects the net present value of the
allowance, including its future option value. That evaluation, of course,
would be up to the selling country and its business firms and other entities
involved in emissions trading and related transactions; if they think that
the allowance price is too low, they need not sell. One might expect poor-
er countries, with higher discount rates because of more immediate prior-
ities, to prefer cash now rather than distant options. Some developing
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countries may face the added risk that corrupt or short-sighted govern-
ment officials will sell off a nation’s emissions allowances in such a way as
to cripple its economic future. One response to such risks is to issue
allowances for relatively short periods or make them leasable only, or
both.19
In addition, China and India may decline to entertain a cap-and-trade
system because they believe that the clean development mechanism will
provide them with similar revenues without a cap. But clean development
mechanism sales are unlikely to yield revenues nearly as high as would
formal allowance sales in a cap-and-trade regime, because of the higher
transaction costs of clean development mechanism deals and the sur-
charge for adaptation funds to be imposed on clean development mecha-
nism credits. Also, as noted in chapter 6, the Kyoto Protocol parties or
authorities should consider adopting a discount on clean development
mechanism credits to reflect their lower environmental value relative to
cap-and-trade allowances. The clean development mechanism should be
viewed as a transitional measure, to be phased out as developing countries
graduate to national caps and emissions trading.
Finally, the emphatic public opposition of China, India, and other
developing countries to emissions trading may also be part of a negotiat-
ing tactic of holding out for a better deal. If so, the U.S. decision to stay
out of the Kyoto Protocol opens the door for direct negotiations between
the United States and India and China on what such a deal would involve.
Certain recent developments may affect China’s willingness to partici-
pate in a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system. The apparent decrease in
China’s carbon dioxide emissions over the 1997–2000 period20 may indi-
cate a new willingness by the Chinese government to restrain emissions,
although more likely that decline was not for emissions reduction pur-
poses and instead reflects the effects of other economic changes unrelated
to climate or other environmental policies, such as a slowdown in eco-
nomic growth, a restructuring of the economy, a reduction of coal subsi-
dies, and other changes. Given the limited reliability of Chinese economic
data and the continued heavy role of the state in the energy sector, it is dif-
ficult to know just what has happened to China’s carbon dioxide emis-
sions and the reasons for and significance of any departures from earlier
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trends. If there was a substantial decline because of significant decreases
in greenhouse gas intensity, that experience may foster confidence by
Chinese leaders that decreases in emissions below the business-as-usual
level can be accomplished without hindering economic growth as much
as might have been feared and that allowance sales could accordingly be
quite profitable and not hinder economic development. On the other
hand, the emissions decline may be temporary; China’s marginal abate-
ment cost curve may be rising, as the lower-cost abatement options such
as reductions in coal subsidies are being used up and only more costly
abatement options remain; if so, such a circumstance may discourage
Chinese accession to a cap or imply that a greater side payment is needed
to secure Chinese participation.
China’s move to embrace markets, both domestically and through its
entry into the World Trade Organization, may make it more receptive to
market-based environmental policies. China has begun to experiment with
domestic emissions trading markets.21 And WTO membership may bring
greater confidence that international economic arrangements will help
shield China from industrialized countries’ market power or sharp deal-
ing in a greenhouse gas allowance market. Further, the Chinese govern-
ment’s assessment of the impacts of climate change on China may be
changing; instead of perceiving gains from warming, China may now be
worrying more about harms.22 Finally, the experience of the 1997–1998
Asian financial crisis suggests that China might undertake some possible
economic sacrifice to build its role as a world leader and a player in inter-
national economic regimes.23
Our expectation is that China and India (and other major developing
countries) will come to appreciate the benefits to them of joining a cap-
and-trade regime in which they can sell allowances and enjoy other eco-
nomic and environmental benefits at a profit. But such a view depends on
U.S. participation as well, not only for reasons of fairness but also because
the profits from allowance trades and sales will be much diminished if the
United States does not add its demand for allowances to the global mar-
ket. In addition, the international greenhouse gas cap and trading market
must be credible, politically, economically, and environmentally. That 
will require good monitoring and reporting of emissions and adequate
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compliance assurance arrangements. Meeting those requirements will be
a challenge in the case of many developing countries, but also in some
industrialized countries such as the former Soviet Union nations. There
will need to be an effective international system of quality assurance for
emissions monitoring and reporting (which should probably include a
major role for nongovermental organization and private certifying bodies).
Developing countries and other allowance seller countries that failed to
meet quality assurance requirements could be prohibited from selling
allowances, or the value of their allowances could be discounted by an
international supervisory authority. A system of buyer liability with serial-
ized allowances would provide additional market-based incentives for
quality assurance (although at higher transaction costs).
One of the advantages of a multiple track approach under which China
and other developing countries would first participate in one or more
emissions trading agreements with the United States (and possibly other
industrialized countries), before merger with a reconstructed Kyoto Pro-
tocol in a single global cap-and-trade system, is that the distinctive issues
and problems presented by developing country participation could be
addressed for a period through regimes that involve far fewer parties and
can be more readily modified to adapt to the lessons learned by experi-
ence before negotiating and undertaking a global regime that includes par-
ticipation by all of the Kyoto Protocol parties. Targets based on emissions
intensity and the safety-valve approach are examples of new approaches
that might be tested in a separate regime, parallel to the Kyoto Protocol.
Interests of the Initial Kyoto Protocol Parties. The arguments just
offered for joint accession by the United States and China, India, and
other countries could have been made in 1997 as well as today, but they
would probably have been less persuasive to the European Union and
other Annex B parties then than they would be today. After the U.S. with-
drawal in 2001 and in light of the likely ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
by sufficient other Annex B countries to enable the protocol to enter into
force in 2003, the situation has changed. We believe that now the Kyoto
Protocol parties—the European Union, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, Canada,
and others—will, as a group, strongly prefer the United States and China
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(and India and other major developing countries) to join the Kyoto Pro-
tocol regime together rather than separately.
The Kyoto Protocol parties are implementing an international emis-
sions trading system without the United States or China but with head-
room allowances assigned to Russia and Ukraine. Without U.S.
participation, the price of allowances within the Annex B trading system
will most likely be lower than had the United States joined the Kyoto
Protocol. In the MIT model of emissions trading among Annex B countries
(including the United States and with no clean development mechanism),
Russia and Ukraine sell 345 million tons of allowances, and Eastern
Europe sells a total of 6 million tons, for a total of 351 million tons. The
other Annex B countries buy 350 million tons of allowances, of which 106
million tons are bought by the United States, 106 million tons by the
European Union, 95 million tons by Japan, and 43 million tons by other
OECD nations. The price of an allowance is $127 per ton.24
With U.S. demand for 106 million tons of allowances removed from
the market, allowances would presumably sell at a lower price. New
model runs are necessary to gauge the effects of such a change on the sup-
ply, demand, and price of allowances, but interpolating from the MIT
study, a fall in demand of 106 million tons (from 351 to 245 million tons
sold) would intersect the supply curve somewhere near $60 per ton.25
Thus, without U.S. participation, the former Soviet Union stands to sell
fewer allowances at a much lower price than $127, and the European
Union, Japan, and others stand to pay less for allowances.26 It is accord-
ingly conceivable that the European Union and Japan decided to go ahead
with the Kyoto Protocol because they realized that their costs would be
much lower under the Kyoto Protocol regime with former Soviet Union
allowances available but without the United States in as a buyer.27
Recent analyses support the conclusion that U.S. nonparticipation in
the Kyoto Protocol will result in large reductions in allowance prices. For
example, William D. Nordhaus estimates that under the Kyoto Protocol
with U.S. participation, the price of an allowance in 2010 would be about
$55 per ton of carbon, but under the Kyoto Protocol without U.S. partic-
ipation the price would fall to about $15.28 Other recent model runs sug-
gest that the allowance price under the Kyoto Protocol without the United
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States would be somewhere between $0 (zero) and $35 or even $65,
depending on the former Soviet Union’s market power, choices to bank
allowances, and other factors.29 Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels pro-
ject that allowance prices under the Kyoto Protocol with full Annex B par-
ticipation (including the United States) would be about $140 in 2010 but
that without U.S. participation the price in 2010 would drop drastically.30
Assuming that U.S. nonparticipation would substantially lower the price
of allowances (to, say, $65 or less) relative to the price with U.S. participa-
tion, then subsequent U.S. accession to the Kyoto Protocol would raise the
allowance price significantly, perhaps back to $127 or even higher. That
would clearly harm the European Union, Japan, and other Annex B nations
that were buying allowances for much less before U.S. accession.
Alternatively, if China joined alone (or with India, Brazil, and other
nations), it would flood the market with low-cost allowances (as low as
$24 per ton in the MIT model or lower without U.S. demand). That would
harm Russia and Ukraine, which had been selling allowances for much
more. The precise impact of accession by the United States, China, and
others on allowance prices would depend on several factors, including the
targets assigned to new participants.  
Accordingly, taken together, the Annex B parties to the Kyoto Protocol
will have strong incentives to avoid accession by the United States alone
or by China and other major developing countries alone. They will be
highly likely to prefer joint accession by the United States, China, and
such other countries to keep allowance prices stable, so that neither the
Annex B sellers (former Soviet Union nations) nor the Annex B purchasers
(Europe, Japan, and other wealthy industrialized country parties) are seri-
ously harmed by changes in allowance prices.31
As noted above, conflicts of interest will exist between the former
Soviet Union countries and potential developing country entrants to a
global cap-and-trade system over their entry and the amount of
allowances they will receive; conflicts between potential new entrants as a
group and the industrialized countries regarding the total amount of
allowances the latter will agree to provide the former; and conflicts among
the potential new developing country participants regarding the allocation
of allowances. The implications of accession by the United States, China,
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and other major developing countries need to be assessed through new
model runs that take account of U.S. withdrawal, banking, clean devel-
opment mechanism sales, China’s apparent emissions decline from 1997
through 2000, and various scenarios for individual or combined accession
by the United States, China, India, and other countries, with different tar-
gets and at different points in time. Such scenarios should be modeled and
compared in terms of their effects on emissions, temperature change, cost,
resource flows, and other outcomes. In addition, the analysis should
examine the net economic and (to the extent feasible) environmental gains
owing to participation by the various groups of countries under the alter-
native scenarios to help design arrangements that will maximize aggregate
net benefits while also providing substantial net benefits for each partici-
pant to enhance the possibility of negotiating a broadly inclusive global
cap-and-trade regime.
Despite the incentives for the Kyoto Protocol parties to favor combined
accession by the United States and major developing countries, they
might have reasons to resist such a step if it meant allowing the United
States to sign on to targets less stringent than those accepted by the initial
parties or making other significant changes to the provisions of the Kyoto
Protocol and the Bonn and Marrakech accords. Also, other developing
countries, less well equipped to participate in international trading than
China or India, might resist their accession and the precedent that it
would set for developing country caps. But with the United States, China,
India, and other developing countries accounting together for 50 percent
of global emissions and growing, their leverage to obtain joint accession
and changes in the current agreement would be high.
International Components of a U.S. Strategy for the Evolution of
Global Climate Policy. The need to correct the Kyoto Protocol’s omission
of developing countries is compelling. But any approach to engaging
developing countries must be sensitive to their legitimate economic, polit-
ical, and equity concerns and to the positions of other industrialized
countries. We cannot say here exactly how much in the way of commit-
ments from developing countries would be appropriate or realistic to
expect in the near future and what in the way of headroom allowances or
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other inducements might be necessary to secure their participation. We
do, however, believe that principles could be devised to attract sufficient
developing country participation over time, provided that the industrial-
ized countries also make credible international commitments to emissions
limitations and begin to implement them.
In addition to taking initiatives to enlist participation by major devel-
oping countries, the United States should seek to ensure that any more
inclusive global greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system eliminates the cur-
rent Kyoto Protocol restrictions on the comprehensive approach and
emissions trading, has adequate compliance assurances, and sets targets in
the context of long-run emissions pathways based on maximizing net
social benefits. To accomplish those objectives, U.S. policy at the inter-
national level (matched by domestic initiatives discussed below) should
seek to promote reconstruction of global climate policy, either through
one or more independent cap-and-trade systems with China and other
developing countries (possibly including other industrialized nations as
well) that would later be merged with a revised version of the Kyoto
Protocol, or by directly joining, along with major developing countries, a
reconstructed Kyoto Protocol. In doing so, the United States should aim
eventually to secure a global cap-and-trade system with the elements that
follow.
Individual country accession. The new arrangements should explicitly
adopt a principle of voluntary accession to international commitments
and participation in a cap-and-trade system by any interested country,
including developing countries. Such action would remove the implicit
obstacle to such accession created by the omission of any such provision
in the Kyoto Protocol and by the politics of the G-77 plus China negoti-
ating bloc. The agreement could go further, by adopting quantitative
emissions limitation criteria for accession, but that should probably be
avoided as too contentious a matter to resolve in advance of individual-
ized negotiations over actual quantitative emissions limits and associated
headroom allowance assignments for individual developing countries.
The agreement could also allow for a country’s participation in emissions
trading on a sector-based approach that would permit participation at
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scale without the full adoption of total national caps, although that would
create a potential for leakage from capped to uncapped sectors.
Developing country graduation. The new global regime would also adopt
the principle that developing countries will automatically but incremen-
tally join the cap-and-trade system once their per capita income passes
certain agreed levels. Such a principle of “graduation” will help bring
developing countries into the regime on a fair basis, while addressing their
concern that poorer countries not be subject to obligations to correct a
problem originally caused by and of primary concern to wealthier coun-
tries. The specific emissions limitations taken on by developing countries
through that graduation process could include headroom to grow further.
Joint accession by the United States and major developing country emit-
ters. The United States and China (and perhaps India, Brazil, Australia,
and others) would join an expanded and improved global cap-and-trade
regime together, by one or a combination of the scenarios previously
sketched. Most likely they would join on a time frame to meet emissions
limitations in a second commitment period (perhaps around 2016–2020).
Those new parties would begin to participate in emissions trading before
the time when they must achieve limitations under the agreement. For
China, India, Brazil, and other countries, caps would be at or near their
business-as-usual level (perhaps with some headroom above their business-
as-usual level as a side payment); for the United States the cap would be
below its business-as-usual level (though not necessarily with reference to
1990 levels).
Capacity-building in developing countries. Although developing coun-
tries and their firms participate effectively in many international financial
and commodity markets, it would be appropriate to establish arrange-
ments to help, as needed and appropriate, developing countries (especially
the less developed countries) participate in emissions trading without 
fear of being disadvantaged by more knowledgeable market participants
from industrialized countries. That could involve the creation of a new
fund or additions to the capacity-building funds established under the
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Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech accord or adaptations of other exist-
ing assistance mechanisms for that specific purpose. The World Bank,
regional development banks, and agencies of the United Nations could
play a role in implementing those efforts.
Emissions pathways and regulatory targets. The agreement should set a
time path of emissions reductions based on net-benefits-maximizing cri-
teria, not on an arbitrary basis such as reductions from a given base year,
nor the most cost-effective path for achieving an arbitrary atmospheric
greenhouse gas stabilization target and timetable. For example, a net-
benefits-maximizing path based on “average” warming and climate sensi-
tivity might call for global emissions reductions of roughly 3 percent
below the business-as-usual level by 2010, 5 percent below that level by
2025, and 20 percent below that level by 2100. A path based on a more
conservative assumption of high climate sensitivity might call for global
emissions reductions of 8 percent below the business-as-usual level in
2010 but still remain 40 percent above 1990 levels through 2100 before
declining.32 The pathway would be revised from time to time in light of
new information. The emissions pathway would provide the basis for set-
ting (and revising) a schedule of stepwise emissions limits over time,
rather than (as in the Kyoto Protocol) one target with no future path indi-
cated. The initial targets would have to strike a balance; they would have
to call for reductions that are large enough to make the new regime cred-
ible, stimulate business innovation and investment, and create sufficient
demand to jump-start international emissions trading, while at the same
time avoiding unrealistically stringent and excessively costly short-term
cuts.33 Pathways and future targets would be revised from time to time in
light of new information and changed circumstances. They would form
the basis for determining individual country allowance allocations.
Simultaneous agreement on targets and implementation. Regulatory tar-
gets and obligations should not be adopted without simultaneous agree-
ment on implementation and compliance methods (including flexibility
mechanisms) so that implementation costs and assurances of mutual com-
mitment to recognize flexibility mechanisms would be known at the time
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that emissions limitations are agreed to. The circumstance that no limita-
tions commitments could be made until the basic elements of implemen-
tation and compliance-assurance arrangements were resolved would
provide a strong impetus for prompt resolution of those matters. There
are, to be sure, limits to how far such arrangements can be specified in
advance. Some details of implementation rules may not be resolvable until
the trading system comes into operation. Compliance arrangements in
particular present many difficulties in the context of a global cap-and-
trade system involving many diverse nations and private sector actors.
Eliminating unjustified restrictions on use of sinks. Existing restrictions
on the use of sinks to meet the Kyoto Protocol emissions limitations obli-
gations should be removed. Those include the Bonn accord Appendix Z
country-by-country limits on credit for sinks; the denial of credits for con-
servation of existing forests (at least until such time as emissions from for-
est removal or alteration are included in emissions inventories and
reporting); and the Marrakech accord prohibition on banking of sink
credits. Consideration should also be given to removing the Marrakech
accord restriction on the sale of sink credits under the clean development
mechanism (no more than 1 percent of the selling country’s base year
emissions).34 Appropriate default sequestration factors and accounting
rules should be adopted to address special uncertainties in determining
the effects of such activities on net emissions.
Improving the comprehensive approach. To include all emissions that
affect global warming, international arrangements should build on the
multigas approach adopted in the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and in the Kyoto Protocol by including black carbon, sulfur diox-
ide, particulate matter, and other relevant emissions, at least in reporting
and possibly in abatement-credit provisions. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change should be asked to initiate a sustained, continuing
process to revise or replace the global warming potential index (specifing
the equivalency for regulatory purposes of the various greenhouse gases
and sinks) to account for factors such as the following: changing marginal
impacts under future atmospheric concentrations (saturation and intergas
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effects), discounting, damages rather than just physical effects, the dam-
ages associated with the rate of warming as contrasted with the level of
warming, and nonwarming impacts (such as local health effects and car-
bon dioxide fertilization of plant growth). Uncertainty-weighted abate-
ment credits (for both domestic abatement and international trading)
should be adopted by employing appropriate default factors that take due
account of relevant uncertainties for measuring source reductions and
sink enhancements for different greenhouse gases, with an opportunity
for countries (and, domestically, for sources) to justify claims for greater
net emissions reductions by developing and demonstrating more accurate
measurement methods.
Relaxing the Kyoto Protocol emissions trading “commitment period
reserve” requirement. The Marrakech accord adopted an emissions trad-
ing reserve requirement that prohibits an Annex B country from selling
emissions allowances or credits if by doing so it would retain less than 
90 percent of its assigned amount for the five-year commitment period, or
100 percent of five times its most recently reviewed emissions inventory,
whichever is lower.35 That commitment period reserve requirement will
limit abatement by countries with low marginal abatement costs and tend
to inhibit aggressive investment in abatement technology innovation. It
will also raise the transaction costs of allowance sales, which will all need
to be checked against the treaty system’s transaction log to ensure that the
reserve requirement is not violated. The reserve requirement is clearly
intended to prevent selling of “hot air” allowances in excess of current
emissions, but that goal is dubious; it limits the value of headroom
allowance assignments and in effect prevents the delivery of the side pay-
ments necessary to attract participation and thereby curtails the evolution
toward global participation. Further, if Russia and Ukraine do not sell
their “hot air,” they will use it domestically, perhaps by increasing coal
combustion to replace natural gas that they export to Europe, in which
case limiting sales of hot air will not reduce global emissions; the reduc-
tion in emissions in Europe will assist the European Union in meeting its
international obligations, but emissions in Russia and Ukraine will
increase. The prospect of that parochial benefit for Europe may help
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explain the adoption of the reserve requirement. The effort to limit
Russian and Ukrainian “hot air” may also be a move by non–Annex B
countries to gain a greater share of sales revenue for the clean develop-
ment mechanism. If the concern motivating the reserve requirement is
that governments will be excessively optimistic about their ability to make
up current sales of emissions allowances with future reductions or that
unscrupulous government officials might oversell allowances and pocket
the revenues (in official or underground bank accounts) while the coun-
try fails to curtail emissions in the future and as a result fails to comply,
the better solution is to devise effective compliance-assurance arrange-
ments (which are needed in any event), including buyer as well as seller
liability, rather than to set an arbitrary limit on allowance transfers.
Reforming the clean development mechanism. A number of modifications
to the clean development mechanism should be adopted. It should allow
host country designation of sectorwide programs as clean development
mechanism projects, such as a program to reduce emissions from the elec-
tric power sector in a country. Such an approach would improve the basis
for certifying emission reduction credits under the clean development
mechanism, reduce the potential for delays due to case-by-case clean
development mechanism project reviews, reduce transaction costs, reduce
the risks of project failure by diversifying risk across a broader portfolio of
abatement investments, reduce the problem of emissions leakage, and
reduce the potential for the clean development mechanism to function as
a perverse subsidy for abatement that increases aggregate emissions. A
sectorwide approach could also set the stage for large-scale bilateral or
multilateral assistance agreements between a developing country and one
or more industrialized countries and their firms, which would provide
capital and technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on a sector or
subsector level in exchange for credits. The clean development mecha-
nism should be structured around a decentralized, market-based approach
to investment decisions; its executive board should accredit monitoring
and certification entities (including commercial firms and not-for-profit
nongovernmental organizations) but resist allocating or managing invest-
ments. Clean development mechanism credits would be expected to sell
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at a lower profit than other tradable greenhouse gas emissions units
because of the 2 percent adaptation fund charge and the higher transac-
tion costs of the clean development mechanism. In addition, a discount
should be imposed on the certified abatement value of clean development
mechanism credits to reflect the lower environmental effectiveness (due to
in-country leakage) of project-based reductions in a country without caps.
The consequent lower profit of clean development mechanism credits
would help remove the disincentive for developing countries to join a
formal cap-and-trade regime.
Simplifying and strengthening the international trading system. The
Kyoto trading system creates four different types of tradable units:
assigned amount units for emissions trading under Articles 3 and 17;
emission reduction units, which are project-based emissions credits rec-
ognized under the joint implementation provisions in Article 6; certified
emission reduction credits, which are project-based emissions credits
recognized under the clean development mechanism provisions in Article
12; and emission removal units for sink activities. The Marrakech accord
treats those as fully fungible, so it is unclear why they should be denom-
inated separately. Certainly, assigned amount units and emission reduc-
tion units should be merged. Certified emission reduction credits could
remain distinct commodities (although traded in markets with assigned
amount units and emission reduction units) to recognize the differential
value of such credits. Further, joint implementation and the clean
development mechanism would be phased out as the formal cap-and-
trade system expands. To reduce transaction costs, the global emissions
trading system would employ formal allowances traded on accredited
organized exchanges.36 Parties would agree not to interfere with interna-
tional trade in allowances. Allowance trading would also be governed by
WTO rules, perhaps as goods, as services, as investments, or as a new type
of asset.37 Parties would agree not to exercise market power in the allow-
ance trading market and to be subject to remedies for market power, either
under a special competition-antitrust agreement for the green-house gas
cap-and-trade regime or under emerging cooperative multilateral approach-
es to applying and enforcing competition-antitrust policies generally.38
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Improving the compliance-assurance regime. Compliance measures in
the context of a global greenhouse gas regime include centralized strate-
gies based on seller liability, under which nations or firms that sell
allowances in excess of their actual abatement are subject to multilateral
sanctions or other liabilities to induce compliance and to correct non-
compliance. They also include more decentralized strategies such as buyer
liability, under which allowances sold in excess of actual abatement are
rendered invalid or discounted in value. That approach encourages buy-
ers to police compliance and provides incentives for sellers to provide
credible compliance commitments to boost the salability and value of
their allowances. Buyer liability, however, would raise transaction costs. It
could also discourage participation by developing countries whose politi-
cal risk would be rated as high in trading markets. It is also possible to
combine seller liability and buyer liability arrangements.39 Some of the
details of compliance-assurance arrangements may also have to be devel-
oped only as the trading system comes into operation, but the basic
arrangements must be sufficiently established to make the trading system
credible both for nations and for private actors.
The current Kyoto Protocol compliance arrangements should be
strengthened by giving authority to the “enforcement” branch of the
Compliance Committee to impose financial penalties and adverse public-
ity (shaming sanctions) for emissions exceeding allowances. Those could
include a fine per ton of exceedance set at a rate higher than the expected
market price for allowance purchases. Consideration should be given to
requiring advance posting of assurance bonds to secure penalty payments.
In addition, measures for buyer liability or a combination of seller and
buyer liability arrangements should be seriously considered. Given the
inevitable weaknesses of most treaty-based sanctioning and compliance
regimes, a strong argument exists for also enlisting market-based incen-
tives for compliance through a system of buyer liability. Financial penal-
ties for exceedances could be dedicated, in whole or in part, to abatement
investments, in the form of allowance purchases; that could be one means
of implementing the “safety valve” concept.40 Those and other measures,
which are essential to ensure the environmental and economic integrity of
tradable allowance rights, should be designed to ensure a comparable
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degree of compliance among parties to overcome U.S. fear of differential
commitment. Private sector firms, investors, and other entities that will be
important players in global trading are an important constituency that
should support credible and consistent monitoring, reporting, and com-
pliance arrangements.
Adaptation assistance. The industrialized countries should provide for
assistance for poorer countries to take adaptive measures against adverse
weather events and climate effects, whether due to anthropogenic global
warming or to “natural” variability, with no need to determine causal
responsibility. Such assistance would benefit poorer countries in the near
term, rather than make them wait for decades for the long-term benefits
of reduced global warming. Greater adaptive resilience would also help
shield poorer countries against a wide range of adverse conditions (such
as storms, floods, droughts, and disease) that are of immediate concern,
regardless of whether they are caused by global warming.41
Mechanisms to foster evolution and updating of the global climate regu-
latory system. The participants in the global climate regime should con-
tinue investment in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and
link its findings to treaty talks through periodic updating of emissions
pathways and regulatory targets, global warming potential indexes, and
monitoring and accounting procedures and rules, as discussed above.
Adaptive management—learning and updating—is particularly valuable
in cases such as climate change regulation that involve fundamental
uncertainty about how the relevant ecological and social systems work.42
Climate policy should be based on an evaluation of multiple scenarios
regarding business-as-usual emissions levels, the warming effects of pre-
dicted emissions, climate sensitivity, the impacts of climate change on the
environment and human welfare, and the cost of abatement and mitiga-
tion measures, rather than on a single “best” scenario. One approach is to
use a collage of several conceptually different models, with predictions
weighted by experts’ relative confidence in the different models. In the
face of uncertainty, policy measures should begin by instituting those that
would be desirable under all the scenarios, either for reasons of climate
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protection or otherwise. Such measures could include reducing subsidies
for energy use, reforming incentives for forest clearing, supporting basic
research into low–greenhouse gas energy systems, improving the capacity
for technology diffusion and application in developing countries, reduc-
ing emissions of air pollutants in ways that both protect human health
from local and regional air pollutants and help prevent climate change,
and making social and environmental systems more resilient against the
effects of climate change.
To carry out that agenda, support should be sought from the market
sector and its political allies within developing countries and from inter-
national development, poverty relief, and forest conservation organiza-
tions that may not worry primarily about climate change but that could
see major benefits from greenhouse gas abatement investment flows to
developing countries.
Domestic Components of U.S. Climate Strategy
We propose a two-step process for the adoption of domestic U.S. measures
in tandem with the U.S. approach at the international level. The domestic
first step would not impose binding greenhouse gas limitations but would
lay the groundwork for adopting such measures in the near future, encour-
age voluntary emissions limitations and trading, and launch some of the
nonregulatory elements of a serious U.S. climate policy. The February 2002
Bush administration climate policy proposals, including a national green-
house gas intensity goal, strengthened mechanisms for registration of vol-
untary greenhouse gas reductions, potential development of credits against
future regulation for early voluntary reductions, and tax and other incen-
tives, can be regarded as making a beginning on that first step, but much
more needs to be done. In conjunction with that first step, the United
States would begin exploratory discussions with China (which might sub-
sequently include other developing counties) about joint cap-and-trade
arrangements. As the second step, the United States would adopt domes-
tic greenhouse gas limitations using the comprehensive approach and
domestic and international trading to the maximum feasible extent. Those
limitations would be adopted only in conjunction with U.S. accession to an
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international climate agreement or agreements (either independent of the
Kyoto Protocol or a substantially modified version of the Kyoto Protocol)
with binding limitations, adequate compliance assurances, maximum
scope for flexibility, developing country participation, and a sensible incre-
mental time path to net greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
A U.S. commitment to adopt domestic limitations is essential for its
international credibility and ability to promote a sound global climate
regime. Emissions trading requires emissions caps at some level. The
United States cannot persuasively advocate such flexibility mechanisms
unless it eventually adopts caps itself. Nor, for similar reasons, can it
persuade developing countries to join the emissions limitation effort unless
it does so itself. On the other hand, the United States would not want to
adopt a domestic regulatory program requiring significant emissions
limitations except in conjunction with an international regime that
includes the essential elements that we have identified. Thus, the timing
and sequence of developments at the domestic and international levels 
will have to be carefully orchestrated. That will be a challenging task, 
given the need of a U.S. administration to persuade Congress and the 
number of other nations that must also be involved as participants or 
otherwise.
Domestic Step One: Goals, Monitoring, and Early Action Incentives.
The first step in the domestic components of a U.S. climate policy would
undertake measures to jump-start voluntary emissions reductions and
emissions trading by using the power of information and the prospect of
second-stage regulation to provide incentives for early limitations efforts.
First-step measures would include eight elements.
Organization and planning. Policymakers should establish a government-
wide Climate Policy Office, headquartered in the White House, that
would lead an intensive program of information gathering and analysis on
policies to limit net greenhouse gas emissions. That office would also
study needed changes or consolidations in existing federal agencies’
authorities and programs and the potential creation of new agencies,
authorities, and programs. Such an office has already existed for several
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years (in both the Clinton-Gore and senior Bush administrations) under
the rubric of a task force or working group.
In addition, policymakers should adopt a national plan for limiting
U.S. net greenhouse gas emissions with quantitative goals and timetables
(expressed in terms of greenhouse gas intensity of output as well as emis-
sions), set, for example, over a ten-year period (as in the Bush proposal)
but with interim milestones. Such a plan would form the basis for the U.S.
proposals on its international emissions limitations commitments.
Policymakers should restructure the administration’s National Energy
Strategy to address greenhouse gas limitations goals and means. The
country may need to expand the supply of energy, especially cleaner ener-
gy, by freeing up regulatory bottlenecks and other steps, but at the same
time it needs to redirect energy supply and demand toward lower green-
house gas intensity, at least or especially where private markets lack the
long-term planning horizon and collective action to invest in such long-
term collective goals. Greater greenhouse gas efficiency will require both
more energy efficiency and greater use of cleaner energy.
Government fiscal initiatives. Policymakers should develop a program of
low–greenhouse gas technology R&D, with an emphasis on basic science.
The focus should be on research projects that provide long-run benefits,
surmount coordination hurdles, and would not otherwise be undertaken
by the private sector. Elements of such an initiative would include pub-
licly funded research programs, tax and other incentives for private sector
undertakings, and private-public partnerships.
Federal and state governments should also invest in programs to reduce
net greenhouse gas emissions by the government sector.
Removing barriers. Policymakers should identify and correct market bar-
riers and nonmarket barriers (including existing government programs
and policies) to the adoption of measures to reduce energy use and oth-
erwise reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including barriers that blunt
market incentives that would otherwise operate to promote adoption of
such measures. Examples could include reducing government programs
that subsidize excess energy consumption; easing Clean Air Act New
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Source Review restrictions on modifications of facilities that would reduce
greenhouse gas emissions; and devising a “pay at the pump” method for
collecting automobile insurance premiums.43
Informational measures. Policymakers should create a national climate
protection scorecard. Once a national plan with goals for limiting U.S. net
greenhouse gas emissions had been established, a year-to-year national
scorecard would be created by the White House Climate Policy Office and
publicized by the president. The scorecard would rate progress in meet-
ing the national plan goals in light of fluctuations in the level of econom-
ic activity and other major variables.
Policymakers should also establish comprehensive greenhouse gas
emissions monitoring, record keeping, and reporting procedures for
domestic sources and sinks. That information would be used to establish
a Climate Release Inventory, akin to the Toxics Release Inventory, to
record and publicize net emissions of greenhouse gases by U.S. entities. It
would also be used to construct the national climate protection scorecard.
That information system should include default values for hard-to-
measure gases, sources, and sinks that take into account measurement
uncertainties and a procedure for private entities to demonstrate more
accurate measurement methods. Policymakers should phase in mandatory
monitoring and reporting for domestic sources and sinks.
Voluntary limitations programs for the private sector. Policymakers
should establish subsidiary goals for net greenhouse gas limitations by
industry sectors.
The president would be authorized to contract (perhaps through a fed-
eral agency such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the
Department of Energy) with business and other private entities to achieve
reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions relative to specified baselines,
in return for certified reduction credits that could be applied against
future emissions limitation regulations.44 Credits would be accorded to
actions taken outside as well as within the United States and would be
recorded in a central registry, on terms comparable to the Kyoto Protocol
emissions trading systems. A major challenge in such a system of credit
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for early action is how to establish the baseline for credits and prevent
gaming of the baseline. The credit system should award credit only to
early abatement actions that meet exacting criteria for additional, verified,
actually achieved reductions below baseline net emissions.45 Such a sys-
tem could also accord favorable government publicity and recognition for
those who make and meet voluntary limitations commitments. Clearly,
firms already interested in reducing emissions would favor such a pro-
gram; the challenge is to engage firms to do more than they would have
done otherwise and engage additional firms. One step in that direction is
to accord cost-saving regulatory flexibility to voluntary actions that go
“beyond compliance” by reducing air pollutants (including greenhouse
gases as copollutants) more than required by existing law (similar to the
EPA’s Project XL). If such regulatory flexibility is or could be restricted by
law (as it has often been under Project XL), new statutory authority for
according such flexibility could be provided.
Multipollutant regulatory legislation. Policymakers should adopt multi-
pollutant legislation that would regulate carbon dioxide and possibly
other greenhouse gases, as well as a number of air pollutants already reg-
ulated, through an integrated cap-and-trade system for selected sectors,
such as utilities and industrial sources, that emit those gases in large
quantities, or for the entire economy. Current bills in Congress would enact
a new air pollution regulatory law with a three pollutant strategy (sulfur
oxides, nitrogen oxides, and mercury) or a four pollutant strategy (those
three plus carbon dioxide) for electric power plants. The administration’s
“Clean Skies” proposal calls for legislation on the three pollutants; it
would provide for major reductions in sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and
mercury. If, however, such legislation were enacted, a separate law for car-
bon dioxide and possibly other greenhouse gases might be adopted only
a few years later. A “three pollutant plus carbon dioxide later” approach
threatens to be inefficient; it requires investments in plants and equipment
to reduce sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and mercury that may later need
to be scrapped or retrofitted to reduce carbon dioxide. Also, some efforts to
reduce sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides may increase carbon dioxide emis-
sions; for example, stack gas scrubbers may require more fuel combustion
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per energy output to yield equal energy output (a risk-risk tradeoff). Thus,
legislation that includes carbon dioxide and perhaps other greenhouse
gases may be more efficient by giving industry a consistent, single set of
regulatory requirements to guide investment in measures that reduce all
four pollutants in concert.46 Indeed, legislation should probably include
at least five pollutants (including methane and possibly other greenhouse
gases as well) or include at least the option to offset carbon dioxide emis-
sions with methane and other greenhouse gas reductions as well as sink
enhancements. But limits on greenhouse gases may be premature in this
domestic first step, pending international agreement and the domestic
second step (described below). Another option might be a “three and a
half” bill that sets limits on sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and mercury
and imposes informational requirements on carbon dioxide and credits
against future regulations. Any legislation addressing carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases domestically should provide maximum scope for
sink enhancement and allowance trading, both domestically and interna-
tionally. Such legislation would make a start on greenhouse gas regulation,
limited to one or a few sectors, with the expectation that regulation of
greenhouse gases could be extended to other sectors subsequently.
Initiatives to promote domestic and international emissions trading. To
help establish a sound infrastructure for international emissions trading,
the United States should encourage international emissions trading by
U.S. firms and support the development of international monitoring pro-
tocols, accounting rules, and registries to support international trading by
and with participants in domestic trading. In the first-step phase, the
United States could allow certified early reduction credits to be traded
domestically and internationally (subject, as discussed above, to the chal-
lenge of defining and enforcing credible baselines). In addition, the
United States could establish a registry for all net greenhouse gas emis-
sions and reductions, including reductions achieved abroad as well as
domestically. The United States could establish comprehensive green-
house gas monitoring, record keeping, and reporting procedures for proj-
ects financed outside the United States (by building on experience with
transnational project-level initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
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and clean development mechanism discussions in cooperation with evolv-
ing international arrangements). The United States could also extend
credit recognition (good against future U.S. greenhouse gas emissions lim-
itation regulation) to allowances or credits generated by the domestic reg-
ulatory systems of other countries, including developing countries, on a
principle of mutual recognition (that is, if other countries commit to rec-
ognizing U.S. credits or allowances). The United States could coordinate
the U.S. registry to record credits, trades, and holdings with registries
maintained by other governments and international organizations in a
move to establish a single international registry. The United States could
actively support the development of such an international registry for
emissions credits and allowances.
Designing a U.S. greenhouse gas regulatory program. Policymakers
should design a domestic U.S. cap-and-trade system, including consider-
ation of sectoral design (for example, electricity and transportation); point
of application (upstream, downstream, mixed designs); and other regula-
tory or incentive measures for sectors and activities where trading may 
not be feasible. In addition, policymakers should study the design and
feasibility of a hybrid trading and fee system, in which target exceedances
trigger a noncompliance penalty that is equivalent to a price at which 
the government will sell extra allowances (a “safety valve”) and possibly
use the revenue to invest in abatement efforts both domestically and
internationally. Policymakers should also study trading in emissions inten-
sity allowances, options for incorporating sink enhancement credits in an
allowance trading system, and the design, equity, and efficiency charac-
teristics of programs (such as allowance allocations) to ease impacts on
sectors and localities that will be hard hit by greenhouse gas regulation.
Domestic Step Two: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program.
Building on the groundwork established in the first step of domestic green-
house gas policy, and in conjunction with accession to an international
greenhouse gas emissions limitation and trading system that incorporates
the basic elements previously discussed, the United States would take five
measures.
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First, it would adopt domestic regulatory net emissions limitations,
with primary reliance on a cap-and-trade regime using a comprehensive
approach to all greenhouse gases, plus supplemental regulatory measures.
Ideally, that regime would be part of an integrated multipollutant strategy
also addressing sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and related emis-
sions, as described above. Caps would be set as cumulative limits for a
substantial period (for example, five or ten years, or with banking and
borrowing), on the basis of national and sectoral emissions limitation tar-
gets expressed in terms of emissions amounts and emissions intensity.
Maximum opportunities for international as well as domestic trading
should be incorporated into the system. Allocation of allowances could be
by auction or government issuance without charge or a combination of
the two; issuance by the government without charge has potential effi-
ciency drawbacks but can contribute significantly to securing legislative
adoption of greenhouse gas regulation.
Second, greenhouse gas regulation could be phased in by sector—for
example, utilities and transportation might be first. But other sources
should have opportunities to opt in (as in the U.S. sulfur dioxide trading
program).
Third, maximum opportunities for international trading should be
built into the system by designing and operating it to allow ready import
and export of allowances (or other tradable units) with full fungibility of
domestic and foreign allowances and appropriate recording and regula-
tory credit and debit arrangements. The United States should have much
to gain and can set a useful precedent for the world by establishing a
domestic trading system that is as open and integrated with international
trading and the domestic trading system of other countries as possible.47
Fourth, penalties for noncompliance with net emissions reductions
targets set by the federal government could include financial penalties,
debiting of future allowance allocations, tightening of caps, raising the
safety valve (excess allowance purchase) price, and other measures. The
potential domestic U.S. policy implications of an international regime of
buyer liability should be carefully considered.
Fifth, the United States could possibly adopt programs (beyond
issuance of allowances without charge) to ease the impact of greenhouse
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gas emissions limitations on the most adversely affected sectors (including
especially workers) and localities; funds might be provided by recycling
revenues from sales of excess permits. A better way of addressing this dis-
tributional issue may be to assign extra allowances to sectors and locales
likely to be more heavily burdened by the cap-and-trade regime. Such an
approach was used in the sulfur dioxide allowance trading system created
in 1990 to reduce acid rain. Initial research indicates that only modest
allowance allocations would be needed to shield the hardest-hit industries
(and thereby overcome their opposition to the program).48
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Conclusion
With the Kyoto Protocol likely to enter into force in early 2003, the major
climate policy issues remaining are the potential participation of the United
States, China, and other major emitting developing countries, as well as
further improvements in the Kyoto Protocol’s regulatory design and the
development of a rational target-setting process. Unexpectedly, the gaps in
the Kyoto Protocol and the Bonn and Marrakech accords and the failure of
the United States to join have set the stage for an even better result: the
simultaneous accession of the United States and China (and other major
developing country emitters) to a global cap-and-trade regime, along with
improvements in the existing international climate regulatory regime.
Those changes will not be easily accomplished. The U.S. government
and public must take an appropriately broad view of the national interest.
They must take account of the substantial cost savings from the compre-
hensive approach and global emissions trading as well as the multiple
benefits of securing participation by China, India, and other developing
countries. The European Union and other current participants in the
Kyoto Protocol regime must give priority to ensuring that the planet’s
health and well-being are protected at reasonable cost instead of imposing
blame and rehashing past differences; they must accordingly recognize the
necessity of engaging participation by the United States, China, and other
major developing countries, with sensible targets and cost-effective imple-
mentation mechanisms.
Meanwhile, participation in an international greenhouse gas regulatory
regime by China, India, and other major developing countries will occur
only if participation appears to them to be in their interest. The climate
regime must be structured to engage such participation. The most efficient
way to do so, we have argued, is through assignment of headroom tradable
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greenhouse gas emissions allowances in the context of a global cap-and-
trade system.
We recognize that our proposed strategy might, at least for a number of
years, yield two or more parallel international climate regimes: the Kyoto
Protocol regime and one or more regimes involving the United States and
the major developing countries (as well, possibly, as some Annex B
industrialized countries). If such a multiple track system operated for a
while, it would provide valuable experience for the design of a single
global regime that might eventually emerge,1 perhaps after those regimes
became functionally connected through interregime trading of allow-
ances. Such an approach would likely be far superior, on both economic
and environmental grounds, to the present prospect of a limited Kyoto
Protocol regime that omits half or more of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions. If a multiple track system persisted indefinitely, however, it would
inhibit allowance trading across the regimes. Precisely the economic inter-
ests in promoting such trading are likely to lead the separate regimes to
interconnect and ultimately to merge into a global trading system—via
private trading and arbitrage if not via formal negotiations. And the inter-
est of the Kyoto Protocol parties in allowance price stability is likely to
lead those parties to prefer joint accession by the United States, China,
and other major emitters into the Kyoto Protocol regime—that is, a full
merger of the Kyoto Protocol regime and the parallel regime we have pro-
posed here—over piecemeal accession by the United States, China, or
others individually.
The present situation poses a moment of truth for those advocating
global climate protection. The easy route is to lambaste the United States
for its current stance but do nothing to bring the United States on board.
In our view, jawboning the United States (or developing countries) will
have very limited impact. The more serious route is to design a strategy
that will engage the United States and major developing countries in an
effective and efficient global regime. We believe that engaging the United
States also depends on engaging China and other major developing coun-
tries in a cap-and-trade regime, for without them, the United States will
not join. And, eventually, it means fashioning a modified version of the
Kyoto Protocol, with developing country participation in a cap-and-trade
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system, full comprehensiveness (in gases, sources, and sinks), full scope
for flexibility mechanisms such as emissions trading, better compliance
assurances, and more sensible target pathways. It is in the national inter-
est of the United States to take the necessary initiatives to build such a
regime and to join it.
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Chapter 5: The Elements of Sound Regulatory 
Design for Climate Policy
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ton of greenhouse gas abatement ten years from now but more valuable than a
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International and Comparative Law 9 (1992): 83), this index would help guide
more optimal policy, including directing some financing to the projects that
reduce the local pollutants (sulfur and others), even if they increased projected
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Given the evidence of actual methane leakage rates in Russia (and elsewhere in
Europe), the environmental benefits of the comprehensive approach—which
were powerful when we first advanced them in the early 1990s—still remain
robust today. First, Russian and other European leakage rates may still be quite
high, such that a carbon dioxide–only policy would have perverse effects on total
global warming. Second, if Russian leakage has declined because of reduced total
gas production, then leakage could increase again if total gas production were to
rise to meet new European demand for coal-to-gas fuel switching under a carbon
dioxide–only policy. Third, even if Russian methane leakage has declined from 6
to 9 percent to, say, 3 to 6 percent (as suggested by Reshetnikov, Paramonova,
and Shashkov), then the comprehensive approach would still be much more
environmentally effective than a carbon dioxide–only approach; the 3 to 6 per-
cent leakage would still offset half or all of the effectiveness of the carbon dioxide–
only policy. Fourth, a decline in methane leakage during the 1990s may reflect
in part the success of the comprehensive approach: the fact that the Framework
Convention on Climate Change in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 both
adopted the comprehensive approach (including methane) may have been one of
the new incentives cited by observers that stimulated investments in reducing
leakage. The comprehensive approach to climate policy is part of the move to
incorporate greenhouse externalities into market price signals. Fifth, the reduced
leakage, if true, shows that methane emissions control and measurement meth-
ods are endogenous—responding to incentives—rather than fixed. That rebuts a
key assertion by critics of the comprehensive approach, namely that non–carbon
dioxide emissions are too uncertain to regulate. Sixth, even if Russian methane
leakage rates have declined dramatically and permanently, the comprehensive
approach would still be environmentally superior to an energy–carbon dioxide–
only policy because it would prevent perverse cross-greenhouse gas shifts in
other countries involving other greenhouse gas and would encourage forest con-
servation.
24. At first glance, replacement of fossil with biomass fuels seems attractive,
because it would reduce energy-sector carbon dioxide emissions, while the emis-
sions of carbon dioxide from burning the biomass fuels would, one might presume,
be at least partly offset by the sequestration of that same carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere by the corn as it grew. That analysis, however, neglects three important
categories of emissions. First, the carbon dioxide emissions from the ancillary agri-
cultural operations needed to farm the corn, manufacture fertilizer, irrigate the
land, and convert the corn into fuel would likely be very large. Second, growing
corn requires large quantities of nitrogen fertilizer, which release nitrous oxide
emissions—a greenhouse gas almost 300 times more potent per mass than carbon
dioxide. Third, if the corn is grown on cleared forest lands, the carbon liberated
from the forest ecosystem (trees, plants, and soils) and the reduced ability of the
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used to measure the emissions reductions from energy conservation measures in
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Affected by the Acid Rain Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1993), available at www.epa.gov/airmarkets/arp/crer/cvpsumm.html.
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to account for, among other things, saturation effects as atmospheric concentra-
tions increase, intergas interactions as atmospheric composition changes, the
choice of discount rates, the changing social value over time of damages associ-
ated with warming, the damages associated with the rate of warming as contrasted
with the level of warming, and the full environmental impacts of greenhouse
gases including global warming, direct effects on plant growth, ozone depletion,
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past: see U.S. Department of Justice, A Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate
Change; Stewart and Wiener, “A Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change
Policy,” 86–91, 99–101. Recent studies on greenhouse gas indexes have helped
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non–carbon dioxide greenhouse gases or weight them arbitrarily. The Framework
Convention on Climate Change is open to such improvement in the greenhouse
gas indexes: Article 4(2)(c) adopts not the global warming potential index per se
but the “best available scientific knowledge” on the “respective contributions of
such gases to climate change.” The body charged with revising greenhouse gas
index values should be insulated from political pressures, because its changes will
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may engender some path dependence that locks the climate policy regime into an
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propose below—the United States engaging China and other major developing
countries in a regime parallel to the Kyoto Protocol—would be the opportunity
to adopt an improved greenhouse gas index.
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42. See Stewart, “Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection.” For
example, before 1990, the primary approach to controlling acid rain was a
technology-based scheme to require the installation of scrubbers that remove sul-
fur dioxide from electric power plant smokestacks. That uniform conduct instru-
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